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31 October 1984

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

CONTENTS

ARAB AFRICA

EGYPT

Siraj-al-Din Gives Views on Tabah, Opposition Press
(Majdi Sarhan; AL-WAFD, 6 Sep 84)..... 1

Establishment of Industrial Projects in Large Cities Halted
(Shawqi al-Nahhas Interview; AL-AHRAM, 8 Sep 84)..... 4

TUNISIA

Opposition Groups Said To Have No Chance; Regime, No Program
(Werner Herzog; FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, 20 Aug 84)..... 7

ARAB EAST/ISRAEL

IRAQ

Saddam's Son Interviewed on Personal Life
(THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER, 29 Jul 84)..... 10

Statistics Issued on Agricultural Production
(Clela Koshaba; THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER, 1 Aug 84)..... 12

Social Services Agency Reports on Expenditures
(Farkad Nouri; THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER, 26 Jul 84)..... 16

Public Projects Executed in al-Anbar Province
(Sabah Y. Younan; THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER, 27 Jul 84)..... 18

Dahuk Carries Out 7 Million Dinars Worth of Projects
(THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER, 8 Aug 84)..... 19

Expansion of Transportation Network Updated (Hassan A. Hafidh; THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER, 8 Aug 84).....	21
Housing Ministry Reports Completion of Project (Sabah Y. Younan; THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER, 29 Aug 84).....	24
Three Large Bridges Opened (THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER, 8 Aug 84).....	26
Two in Baghdad, by Livon H. Garabet Saddam Bridge in Mosul, by A. Kadhim Hashim	
Ramadan Lays Foundation Stones of Third River Pumping Station (Basim Muftin; THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER, 9 Aug 84).....	28
Al-Rashid Bridge Opened Over Tigris River (A. Kadhem Hashem; THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER, 13 Aug 84).....	30
Second Phase of Third River Project To Be Completed in 1986 (THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER, 14 Sep 84).....	31
Housing Minister Opens al-Samarra' Bridge (Akram Dhanoon; THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER, 19 Sep 84).....	32
Almost 500,000 Children Enter Primary Schools for 1984-85 (Basim Muftin; THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER, 12 Aug 84).....	34
Navy Commander: One-Fourth of Iranian Navy Destroyed (Salman Dawood Shahd; THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER, 1 Sep 84).....	37
Briefs Sugar From Millet	40

ISRAEL

Histadrut Work Agreement Explained (THE ISRAEL ECONOMIST, Aug 84).....	41
Success in Recycling Agricultural Waste (THE ISRAEL ECONOMIST, Aug 84).....	43
Demographic, Economic Profile of Gaza Strip Presented (Elisha' Efrat; HA'ARETZ, 2 Sep 84).....	45
Defense Budget Cutbacks Salutary for Economy, Army (Matityahu Peled; HA'ARETZ, 2 Sep 84).....	48
Gaza Refugee Eviction Deferred (David Mandel; THE JERUSALEM POST, 7 Sep 84).....	52

Foreign Workers Linked to Unemployment Problem (Avraham Dishon; YEDI'OT AHARONOT, 4 Sep 84).....	53
Unemployment Causing Concern in Negev (THE JERUSALEM POST, 9 Sep 84).....	56
Plant To Produce Shale Petroleum (Aaron Sittner; THE JERUSALEM POST, 19 Sep 84).....	58
JORDAN	
Islamic Bank Expands Operations (ARABIA: THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW, No 38, Oct 84).....	59
KUWAIT	
Briefs Banks Faced With Bankruptcy	60
LEBANON	
Agriculture Sector Decline Detailed (AL-TADAMUN, No 69, 4 Aug 84).....	61
Pressure Mounting Against Chamber of Deputies Speaker (AL-TADAMUN, No 69, 4 Aug 84).....	64
Phalangists Elect New Leader (Zaki Shihab; AL-MAJALLAH, No 239, 8-14 Sep 84).....	68
Bank Assets Fall in First Quarter (Elias Baroudi; AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO, No 23, 17 Sep 84).....	71
Briefs Central Bank Profits	73
Interest Rate Battle	73
PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS	
Unemployment Rises, Social Services Decline in Lebanon (Samir Ayyub Interview; FALASTIN AL-THAWRAH, No 520, 11 Aug 84).....	74
Difference Between National, Democratic Alliances Examined (AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI, No 115, 18 Aug 84).....	79
Return of Armed Palestinians to Lebanon Debunked (AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI, No 115, 18 Aug 84).....	81

SYRIA

Briefs

Defense Spending Decrease	83
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SOUTH ASIA

AFGHANISTAN

Sweden First European Country Giving Rebels Humanitarian Aid (Christer Morling; SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 31 Aug 84).....	84
Cultural Upbringing Hinders Effective Fighting (Olivier Roy; LIBERATION, 26 Sep 84).....	86
Government Troup Buildup on Borders Reported (KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL, 4 Oct 84).....	88
50 Soldiers Reportedly Killed in Mujahidin Forays (TEHRAN TIMES, 3 Oct 84).....	90
Briefs	
Clash in Provinces	92

IRAN

Paper Says U.S. 'Export Embargo' Will Not Affect Iran (TEHRAN TIMES, 1 Oct 84).....	93
Foreign Reporters Visit Iraqi POW Camp in Tehran (ETTELA'AT, 25 Sep 84).....	95

PAKISTAN

Murtaza Bhutto Interviewed (David Lay; BBC Domestic Service, 22 Sep 84).....	98
Leader Urges Regime To Take People Into Confidence (DAWN, 1 Oct 84).....	101
Maulana Noorani Says Islam, Martial Law Not Compatible (Badruul Islam Butt; THE MUSLIM, 28 Sep 84).....	102
Elections Under 1973 Constitution Urged (THE MUSLIM, 29 Sep 84).....	103
Released Leader Comments on Elections (NAWA-E WAQT, 3 Oct 84).....	104

Pashtun Leader Returns From Afghanistan (JANG, 30 Sep 84).....	106
Minister of Agriculture Interviewed, Discusses Emerging Issues (Sartaj Aziz Interview; THE MUSLIM, 28 Sep 84).....	108
Security Options for South Asia Analyzed (Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema; THE MUSLIM, 28 Sep 84).....	112
Signing Defense Pacts for Security Opposed (Editorial; MASHRIQ, 2 Oct 84).....	115
Briefs	
Woman Appointed Shariat Court Consultant	117
Lawyers Decline Court Order	117
Student Unions: Ban Protested	117
Asghar Khan To Visit Sind	117
Refugees Moved to Camp	118
Scientific Research Body: Enquiry Urged	118
Romania To Provide Loan	118
Urea Export to China	118
Conspiracy Suspects Withdraw Defense	118

EGYPT

SIRAJ-AL-DIN GIVES VIEWS ON TABAH, OPPOSITION PRESS

Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 6 Sep 84 p 5

[Article by Majdi Sarhan: "Siraj-al-Din Announces at Weekly Forum That Printing Firm Would Be Established To Publish AL-WAFD Daily; Permanent Office for Party To Be Set Up Soon in al-Munirah"]

[Text] Fu'ad Siraj al-Din, the president of the Wafd Party, called the government's position on the question of the territory that was recently seized in Tabah unfortunate. He said the government's conduct gave Israel an excuse to deny the attack. Siraj-al-Din denied the possibility that the Wafd Party would ask the government to wage a new war against Israel for that reason. He also said in answering a question that the Wafd Party had no objections to an agreement with remaining parties over drafting a national charter which would stipulate Egypt's leadership role on the Arab and Islamic scenes. These statements were made at the [party's] weekly forum last Thursday.

Siraj-al-Din announced that the Supreme Board of the Wafd Party had decided to establish a large printing, publishing and distribution firm and that it had in fact drafted a bill that would set up a limited corporation which would implement this project. Siraj-al-Din also announced that the Wafd Party had agreed to purchase [a building] in al-Munirah to house a new office for the party. He said the building will be large enough to house the party's activities and its newspaper. He said the party will take possession of this building in a few days. Siraj-al-Din added that the party was now making major efforts to publish AL-WAFD on a daily instead of on a weekly basis.

Regarding the government's position on the territorial question in Tabah, Siraj-al-Din said, "The question that was raised recently by AL-WAFD indicates that Israel's colonialist wishes to occupy any meter of Egyptian territory are deep-seated. But the government's handling of that situation was extremely awkward. It could have used the Wafd's opposition to apply pressure on Israel to make it leave this area to Egyptian sovereignty as it was before. Instead, the government issued a lukewarm denial of what AL-WAFD had published, and that denial did not settle the matter. It gave Israel an argument it could use, if Egypt were to consider filing a complaint about this matter with an international authority, to deny this attack and to base its denial on statements made by the Egyptian government and by Egyptian officials that no attack had occurred. Unfortunately, the government looks at matters rather personally. Because it was AL-WAFD that raised this grave subject, all that the government

was concerned about was to deny the incident even though it is 100 percent accurate and known to be so to all officials."

One person attending the forum asked Siraj-al-Din about how the Wafd visualized the return of Tabah. "If you were president, would you declare war against Israel for seizing new land in Tabah?"

The president of the Wafd Party replied, "No reasonable Egyptian would ask the government to become involved in a new war with Israel because of 100 square meters it seized or isolated from Egyptian territory. If the government were to ask the People's Assembly to approve Egypt's involvement in a war with Israel because of this land, Wafd members of the assembly would object unanimously to a war that would be waged for that reason. At the same time, however, we have to confront Israel, and we have to devote attention to this matter. The government could have used this campaign that was launched by AL-WAFD to assume a position toward Israel."

An Arab citizen asked Siraj-al-Din this question: "What do you think about drafting a charter that all opposition parties as well as the ruling party would agree to? What do you think about such a charter, one of whose priorities would be a provision about Egypt's leadership role on the Arab and Islamic scenes?"

The president of the Wafd replied, "As far as the principle is concerned, we have no objections to a national charter for all parties, including the National Party, or for opposition parties only. But this charter would have to be based on sound national and popular principles that are founded on freedom and democracy, at least on a general level. After that there may be particulars and details over which the parties may differ. But it would be proper for a national charter to cover these basic elementary matters. Unfortunately, however, it's been noticed that some opposition parties have been attacking the Wafd Party. These campaigns which began since the elections are still going on. I cannot understand the purpose of the Labor Party's attacking us for no reason. In general, we've never turned down or refused an understanding as long as such an understanding was based on sound, national, popular and patriotic principles. We have no objections at all to an agreement over a national charter.

"On 23 August last year, in the speech I delivered on the anniversary of Sa'd and al-Nahas, I said that our country was facing major problems and that no single party could [singlehandedly] confront them with decisive solutions. I said that we had to have a national unity government or a national front to confront these problems with decisive, radical solutions that would be immune to political and partisan stratagems.

"There are solutions to all these problems, but any partisan government is apprehensive about a definitive, decisive and radical solution to a problem. Any partisan government fears the opposition; therefore, the solutions it proposes are flawed and fail to do the job. They are like sedatives. Sound, radical solutions can only be set forth by national fronts or by national unity governments confronting these problems for a certain period of time. After the problems are solved, the majority party would govern, or, once its mission has been accomplished, the front that was formed for a certain period of time and for specific purposes would be disbanded. Thus, we have no objections to that.

Unfortunately, however, it is others who object and not we because we are confident in ourselves and in our goals."

The Opposition Press

Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din's remarks were made after the lecture that was delivered by Jamal Badawi, editor-in-chief of AL-WAFD. Mr Badawi spoke about the rise of the opposition press and its role in developing political awareness.

Mr Badawi started his lecture by reviewing the stages that the opposition press had gone through since the days of Khedive Isma'il. He spoke about the first class of writers and journalists who had graduated from al-Afghani's school and had borne the burden of fighting the Khedive's corruption before parliamentary assemblies were formed. Mr Badawi said that newspapers of that time were tantamount to schools where public opinion leaders like al-Shaykh Muhammad 'Abduh, Sa'd Zaghlul, Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid and Mustafa Kamil were educated. He said that the political history of Egypt has a unique phenomenon that cannot be found in other countries: political parties came into being under the auspices of newspapers. As an example of that he cited the newspaper, AL-MU'AYYID which appeared 18 years before al-Shaykh 'Ali Yusuf's Islah [Reform] Party was founded. Also, Mustafa Kamil did not announce the creation of the National Party until 8 years after the publication of the newspaper, AL-LIWA'. The same is true of the newspaper that Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid used to publish for al-Ummah Party.

Jamal Badawi said that some opposition newspapers were more forceful and more influential than the parties for which they spoke. This is an indication of the power of the press as a public opinion forum. It is a phenomenon for which evidence can still be found in some existing opposition newspapers where we find that the impact of a newspaper is greater than that of the party.

He said that the newspaper, AL-SIYASAH, had a more forceful presence than that of the party of Constitutional Liberals. That party was made up of those who proclaimed themselves to be those with genuine interests. Nevertheless, they did not gain the people's confidence in any of the free elections that were held when Egypt's elite intellectuals were involved in politics.

After the lecture there was a discussion about the importance of the political press in shaping public opinion. Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din, Dr Ibrahim Disuqi Abazah and some of the people who were present took part in that discussion.

8592

CSO: 4504/456

ESTABLISHMENT OF INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS IN LARGE CITIES HALTED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 8 Sep 84 p 13

[Interview with Shawqi al-Nahhas, vice president of the Industrialization Authority by Ahmad al-'Attar: "Vice President of Industrialization Authority Declares That no Approvals Will Be Granted to Industrial Projects in Principal Cities"]

[Text] Project applications are to be steered to new cities; seven complexes for small industries are to be established.

The private sector is to be permitted to operate in all industrial sectors except textiles.

Engineer Shawqi al-Nahhas, vice president of the Public Industrialization Authority, has announced that a decision has been made to halt approvals of new applications to establish industrial projects in principal cities like Cairo and Alexandria. He said that new projects will be steered to new communities and cities so that the speed at which they are being populated can be speeded up and congestion in their facilities can be checked. Otherwise these facilities would have to bear new burdens. He added that emphasis will be placed on transferring technology to Egyptian industry so that those industries that are most suitable to Egypt's needs can be selected. He said that there was also considerable interest in encouraging the private industrial sector to work and to produce.

[Question] There is a tendency to encourage the establishment of new industrial projects in new communities and cities. How will this be done? Will applications for new industrial projects in principal cities be approved?

[Answer] It is expected that the value of the projects which this sector will seek to implement this year will be 2.5 billion dollars. And it is expected that the private sector will be granted permission to operate in all industrial areas except the area of textiles. A decision has been made to establish seven complexes for small industries. Construction work on three of them has actually begun.

It has been decided that approving applications from the public and private sectors for the establishment of new industrial projects in principal cities like Cairo and Alexandria is to be halted and all new projects are to be steered to new communities and cities. New projects are to be set up in those new communities and cities to avoid increasing the pressure on principal cities; to

avoid increasing congestion in them; and to avoid placing new burdens on their facilities. In addition, the establishment of new industrial projects in those new cities and communities will expedite the process of populating them. The Public Authority for Industrialization will make recommendations about the new projects that will be established in the new communities and cities so as to take advantage of the customs and tax benefits that are determined by law for these projects in these new cities and communities. Only existing plants in principal cities will be allowed to carry out expansions near their present locations, provided the components for such expansions, such as suitable areas of land and utilities, are available.

[Question] The private industrial sector plays a major role in implementing the development plan. In what areas will the private industrial sector be allowed to operate, and what is your estimate of the value of project applications that will be filed for implementation this year?

[Answer] It is expected that the total cost of the projects whose implementation this year will be sought by the private industrial sector is 2.5 billion pounds. It has been decided that the private industrial sector is to be allowed to operate in all industrial areas except that of textiles. It is expected, however, that emphasis will be placed on the food industry, on the mineral industry, on the furniture industry, on the construction materials industry and on the ready-to-wear clothing industry. A study is underway at the present time to look into the possibility of coordinating efforts to raise enough private sector capital that can participate in the implementation of a number of major projects that an individual capitalist may not be able to carry out, such as steel projects. Corporations are to be established for implementing these projects. Preliminary studies have been made for a number of proposed projects about which negotiations are now being conducted with the banks.

[Question] There is considerable interest in encouraging small industries, and complexes for these industries will be built. How many of these complexes will be built and where will they be built?

[Answer] A decision has been made to build seven complexes for small industries: three of them will be in Alexandria; and there will be one in each of the following cities: al-Buhayrah, al-'Amiriyah, 10 Ramadan City and al-Sadat City. Measures for building three of these complexes have actually been begun. Regarding the complex in 10 Ramadan City a piece of land has been designated in this city's industrial zone, and a preliminary plan for that area has been drafted. This will include areas that will be designated for production shops for small industries. These are standardized areas that may be increased or expanded in the future in accordance with the growth and prosperity of the industry. This complex will include a group of production shops in those industries that support existing industries in that city and elsewhere. These shops will also support other industries in other locations. In addition, administrative and supplementary service buildings for the industrial zone have been planned. That includes buildings and principal utilities. The necessary measures have also been taken for building a complex for small industries in Alexandria and in al-Buhayrah, and areas of land have been designated for them.

The first goal will be to move production shops and maintenance workshops which

are crammed together in Alexandria and Kafr al-Dawwar to those areas. This would enable these workshops to operate in a better fashion, and it would relieve the pressure on the heavily populated areas in those two cities. At the present time studies are being conducted to determine the new industries that will be given preference in these two complexes. The studies will also determine those industries for the other two complexes that will be built in the governorate of Alexandria.

Studies are also now being prepared about the best methods for managing these complexes: small manufacturers and craftsmen may own the units, or these units may be leased to them on a long term basis. The project would then be managed by a board of directors that would make plans for future expansions and periodic maintenance.

[Question] How can the right course for spending be set in industrial public sector establishments?

[Answer] At the present time the authority is reviewing construction designs for the public sector's new plants and units to make sure there is no waste or luxury and also to make sure they are suitable to the actual needs for which they are being built. Designs for public sector plants that were made by foreign consulting firms are also being reviewed to make sure they are suitable and that they conform to the laws and systems that are applied in Egypt.

[Question] There is no doubt that technology plays a major role in developing Egyptian industry. By what means and under what terms will technology be acquired, and how will it be used in industry?

[Answer] Technology does play a principal role in developing industry. There is considerable interest in putting all the resources of our local technology to good use. As far as imported technology is concerned, emphasis will be placed on acquiring the best technology that suits the needs of local industry and on acquiring it under the best possible terms. A department for technology has been established, and that department will study all the technical, procedural and legal matters that have to do with the acquisition of technology. There are also five centers that are now conducting the necessary research for developing the technology that is currently being used in plants. They are conducting the necessary modifications on the imported technology in accordance with local industrial conditions. Some projects are being implemented along with the UN Development Program, such as the industrial consulting project. The aim of that project is to solicit the assistance of international experts to help public sector industrial companies develop local expertise in uncovering production problems and proposing solutions to them. International experts will offer industrial advice that has to do with improving the productivity of industrial firms. Future use of such experts in the private sector will be considered.

8592

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OPPOSITION GROUPS SAID TO HAVE NO CHANCE; REGIME, NO PROGRAM

Frankfurt am Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 20 Aug 84 p 3

[Article by Werner Herzog (currently on assignment in Tunis)]

[Text] In Tunisia, everything is as it used to be: The daily press prominently displays a picture of the chief of state on page one every morning. Habib Bourguiba turned 81 on August 3. Two delegations from all parts of the country were received each day for 13 days in his summer palace in Monastir to pay homage to him with "song, dance and poetry." The father of Tunisia celebrated his birthday in quite good health. After a visit with him, Italy's Prime Minister Bettino Craxi praised his "great vision", and France's Minister of Economy Bereznev lauded the "sagacity" of his host.

At the direction of its leader, the Bourguiba Unity Party "Desfour" came out with a slogan in 1983 which was to lead the country into a new era: a multi-party system should be established. Bourguiba then legalized two opposition parties in November 1983--the liberal Movement of Socialist Democrats (MDS) and the socialist Popular Unity Movement (MUP). This would have been an extremely important step for the Arab world; Tunisia seemed ready to discard the traditional one-party system and distribute its political power among several parties made up primarily of members of the urban middle class.

The social and economic structures (a population of seven million, only 35 percent of which is rural, and a "borderline state" with an annual per capita income of 1,500 dollars) are in fact suitable for such an undertaking. Just less than a year after establishment of the new system was announced, however, there is still no indication of a new political horizon. The citizens of Tunisia can feel no fresh political breeze, and are not motivated to seek a new political direction.

Bourguiba and his 59 year-old Prime Minister Mohamed M'zali seem to have forgotten what they were going to do. Democracy is not part of daily life. On the contrary: Ahmed Mestiri, head of the very moderate opposition socialist democrats is displeased. His party continues to be attacked by the governors, the police and the censors. "Our primary goal is just to continue our existence," Mestiri explained, still with a degree of optimism.

The opposition is given no mention on television or radio, they are boycotted when they attempt to open local headquarters, their newspapers continue to be confiscated and their officials are the objects of harassment on the job. The opposition would like to constructively take part in discussions concerning the country's problems, however they are pushed aside; Bourguiba has to date offered no explanation. Mestiri has come to the conclusion that "Those responsible within the Unity Party are not yet ready for opposition." This situation is all the more serious because the "bread riot" in January showed that the Unity Party no longer has the support of the majority of the population.

The first regional democratic elections are scheduled to be held in the spring of 1985, however those involved have no idea how these elections are supposed to take place. The opposition sees neither a method nor a strategy on the part of the government. It is easy to understand why the younger generation attaches little importance to this date, and is turning away more and more from the views espoused by government officials.

Prime Minister M'zali has openly given a reason for postponement of the political rebirth: The bloody "bread riot" of last January shocked those in power, and now it is a question of "security before freedom". In order to break the opposition, the government has provoked a split in the existing industrial union UGTT and the founding of a new association, the UNTT. Police force was used to "solve" the university crisis, and judges sentenced ten of the "rebels" to death. They were granted amnesty by Bourguiba, however, due to the general protest movement.

The M'zali government is now struggling to finance bread subsidies (around DM 460 million) and to create enough jobs for the country's youth (official figures put youth unemployment at 25 percent). In 1984, however, only about half of the necessary 90,000 jobs will become available. To date the government has completely removed any wage increase from consideration this year; the UGTT has demanded an increase of 12 percent. In the meantime, bread prices have only been increased by a cautious 15 percent; in January the government wanted to double them.

The real reason for postponing the election is this: The incompetent politicians in the Destour [as published] Party do not want to do so. They realize that their services will no longer be required if the country chooses true democracy. They stick like glue to Prime Minister M'zali and oppose anything new. At the present time, M'zali still needs them as political allies in order to defend himself against his enemies.

Bourguiba's replacement as head of state is fraught with intrigue. The group of politicians in Tunis (Foreign Minister Caid Essebsi and Mrs. Wassila Bourguiba) is waging battle against the Sahel Group (Bourguiba and M'zali) in order to make sure that M'zali does not become Bourguiba's successor. This group is hoping for one of Bourguiba's feared "assistants" because, as a high government official admitted, those with whom Bourguiba has surrounded himself

are behaving "irrationally". The general feeling among Tunisians is that the tug of war is not a matter of differing viewpoints or in the best interests of the country, but is solely a power struggle between individuals.

The government, and even the oppressed opposition, are afraid of a new riot. Below the levels of organized citizens and workers, the army of "Nousouahs" --the outcast, unemployed rural dwellers--continues to flood into the cities and is becoming more and more aggressive. These people must be made part of the behavioral consensus in order to maintain stability. The government, however, is unable to solve the problems of these people or to at least give them a new set of values.

Values--of a religious nature--are being offered by the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI), however. The government is afraid of this movement, which is not and would like to tame it and move it toward acceptance of non-aggression and the republican constitution. These, in fact, were the conditions under which the government freed the last 17 of the 109 followers of Islam arrested in 1981. Among them is 44 year-old philosophy professor Rachid el Ghannouchi, one of the central figures of Tunisian Islam.

According to a government mediator, the followers of Islam should become like the Christian democrats of Europe. For now, this is nothing more than a pipe dream. Nevertheless, the government has two things in its favor: The Tunisian followers of Islam, who have drastically increased their number in university circles and in the lower middle class in the past four years, are thought by many to be the "most moderate in the Arab world" and will likely quarrel among themselves if a program, non-existent to date, is worked out.

All this is of little consolation to the democratic new generation. This generation sees the M'zali government losing prestige and taking a defensive stance just to stay in power, rather than practicing a truly new democracy. At present the government is not living up to its own expectations. "We are losing valuable time," said the independent Hamouda Ben Slama, "but we have not yet lost." The question is how much time the Tunisians can afford to spend on their experiment.

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CSO: 4620/3

SADDAM'S SON INTERVIEWED ON PERSONAL LIFE

Baghdad THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 29 Jul 84 p 6

[Text]

President Saddam Hussein's oldest son, Oday, gave "Ath-Thawra" daily an exclusive interview. It was published on July 12, and was a scoop since it was the first time ever the President's son had been interviewed. As a College of Engineering student, Oday reveals for the first time how three major issues have marked his life-style: his father's tremendous influence on him, why and when he joined the Arab B'ath Socialist Party (ABSP) and finally, his invaluable experience with sports as he is currently Editor-in-chief of "al-Ba'th al-Riyadhi", a sports daily. This article is an edited and abridged translation of the interview.

President Saddam Hussein's influence on Oday is immense. The son has learnt from his father fundamental lessons. What is important in this regard is how to maintain a relation with other people on various levels, rather than seek the highest ranks. That is one lesson. A second one is how to be modest, respect other people and be friendly to them.

"Bravery", says Oday, "should be an integral part of every human being. So it is essential that everybody knows how to maintain the meaning of bravery and the values of manhood."

Equally important, believes Oday, is the need to keep up communication with the people since it is a duty to work for them. However, Oday admits the fact that

there is still a very long way for him to learn all the lessons from his father. "As a personal experience, I look at the President as a father, leader and companion. I do my best to learn from him these three qualities," says Oday.

One of President Saddam Hussein's mammoth achievements was that he triumphantly re-organised the structure of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party after 1963. At that time, the President, then not in power, took a decisive and daring decision to sustain the basic structure of the Ba'th Party on realistic and scientific grounds. To Oday, that achievement still constitutes a pleasant memory of his father's distinguished political activities in 1963.

The son has been basically encouraged by his family to join the Ba'th Party. President Saddam Hussein has, as a dedicated father, played a prominent role in setting the scene for Oday especially in regard to delicate and critical issues.

"Sometimes the President does not have enough time to get through minor issues"; explains Oday, "yet he always points out the main outlines within a general context."

The President's role has had a great influence on Oday's decision to join the Party. Nevertheless, it was Oday himself who finally took the initiative to join. He first asked his father if he could do so when he was a first-year student in the intermediate school. The President agreed and explained to his son the significant role of the ABSP. "In 1975", recalls Oday, "I joined the ABSP and now I'm a full member."

Besides politics, Oday is very much keen on sports. He plays tennis, and football. He also enjoys swimming and gliding. His experience in "al-Ba'th al-Riyadhi"

newspaper is interesting.

"It was understood that there should be an impartial sports daily that could express the people's points of view rather than the interests of certain administrative quarters. Therefore, the sports daily came to notice on the grounds that it should pronounce the proper and precise views held by sports circles", explains Oday.

"We've heard from the youth that there should be such a sports daily. Many people speak their minds and tell of negative attitudes but couldn't do anything more since there is no outlet to get the message through adequately and practically.

"Al-Ba'th al-Riyadhi" is meant to be a serious and proper outlet for everybody. Besides, we've left the door open to our readers to write down realistically any view, positive or negative", says Oday.

The future of the paper seems to lie in the reader's responsiveness. The vital aspect of this paper, believes Oday, is illustrated by the fact that it should maintain its policy and standard.

STATISTICS ISSUED ON AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

Baghdad THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 1 Aug 84 p 4

[Article by Clela Khoshaba: "Agricultural Development is Making Progress!"]

[Text]

The political leadership has always given great attention to the agricultural sector from the very beginning of 1968. This sector has therefore grown in a way compatible with the ideas of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party. To bring this about, many laws have been enacted, including Agrarian Reform Law 117 of 1970 and law 90 of 1975 to improve agricultural development in the autonomy region.

In 1983, law 35 was issued on lease of agricultural land to Iraqis and Arabs and companies according to certain regulations. Priority is given to farmers producing cash crops, such as wheat, corn and barley. Until June 12, 1984, 537,202 donums were given on lease to 761 pensioners who paid ID 1,603,076 in return. The total area leased until July 11, 1984 reached up to 549, 580 donums exploited by 786 pensioners.

Earlier law 732 of 1980 was issued by the Revolution Command Council (RCC) according to which agricultural land were allocated to agricultural engineers who opt to exploit their plots on full-time basis. There are 796 full-time agricultural engineers working to exploit an area of 21,000 donums.

The area of agricultural land distributed among farmers according to agrarian reform law of 1970 reached up to 12 million donums up until 1983, while the number of farmers has reached 319,000.

Also, the area of orchards distributed among 13,000 farmers has reached up to 35,000 donums by the year 1983.

State Farms System has been adopted so as to increase farm products and develop farm administration. The number of state farms increased from 5 in 1968 of an area of 167,000 donums to 13 farms which cover an area of 554,000 donums.

Cooperatives also saw big development over the past

years. Their number increased from 473 in 1968 to 811 in 1983. Number of workers working in the cooperatives increased from 63,000 in 1968 to 374,000. Cooperatives' reclaimed and unreclaimed land increased to 27 million donums in 1983 in comparison with 3 million donums in 1968.

This is apart from setting up agro-industrial complexes, poultry projects, in addition to other development projects to which enormous amounts of money were allocated.

Furthermore, it has been allowed to set up agricultural companies in the private and mixed sectors. In the mixed sector companies, the socialist sector's share should account for 51 per cent of the total capital. These companies are required to adopt advanced techniques in exploiting agricultural land to increase production.

Plant Production:

Plant production is substantially important as it is the source of food crops and inputs necessary for certain industries.

Emphasis has recently been put on increasing yields per donum by adopting advanced technology. This experience has proved successful in growing wheat and rice ever since 1976 which has made possible growing more crops due to high yields.

The experience of growing plants in greenhouses has led to setting up more greenhouses to grow vegetables. There are 528 greenhouses in addition to many other ones which are under con-

struction.

To draw a comparison between the conventional and the newly-developed way of cultivating wheat and barley, table 1 shows the difference:

The Ministry of Agriculture has also given special attention to land reclamation over the past years. The total area of reclaimed land did not exceed 28,000 donums in 1974. Whereas the total area reclaimed until 1983 reached up to 1,068,000 donum. A committee was set up, chaired by the Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform to follow-up the use of reclaimed land.

Animal production:

Increasing demand for animal production has led to setting up many big projects. Table (2) shows actual animal production in 1968 and 1983:

As for fisheries, the State Organization for fisheries is exerting efforts to boost production.

Also, bodies concerned in the ministry produce concentrated fodders necessary for animal production projects as well as poultry farms. Fodder produced in the Socialist sector projects totaled 435,000 tons in 1983 in comparison with only 6,000 tons in 1968.

Agricultural mechanization is among other indicators of development in agricultural sector. The number of tractors increased from 8,200 in 1968 to 329,66 in 1983. Number of harvesters also increased to 2781 in 1983 compared to 1,220 in 1968.

The Private sector is also entitled to own agricultural machines. The Private sector was supplied by 2,010 tractors in 1983 and about 200 harvestors in addition to 384,3 tractors and 411 harvesters supplied to them in 1982.

Horticulture and afforestation

This sort of activity is complementary to plant production. Fruit seedlings, and shrubs are grown to be distributed among orchards' owners. There are 26 number of horticultural stations. They produced 3,994 fruit seedlings in 1983 and 3,131 shrubs where used in afforestation.

Plant protection. Up-to-date techniques appropriate to the area and kind of crops are currently used. Spraying is used to apply pesticides, either from planes or helicopters or machines drawn by tractors.

Areas where pesticides were applied reached up to 7.4 million donums in 1983 all over the country compared with 2.8 million donums in 1968.

Various studies on pesticides are also conducted by Plant Production Department within the Ministry. Production of honey has increased to 18.5 tons in 1983 in comparison to only 1.5 tons in 1968.

Table 1				
Corp	Conventional Method		New Developed Method	
	Area per	Yield	Area	Yield
	100 donum	(per kgs)	per 100 donum	(per kgs)
Wheat	51,129	164	132	304
Barley	55,036	149	619	272

Table 2		
Animal production		
	1968	1983
- Egg	95 million	687 million
- Chicken	-	8,4 million
- Sheep	-	12,6 thousand band
- Preventive vaccines	3,3 million	242 million
- Artificial insemination	41,000 doses	62,000 doses

The Ministry makes machines, tools, and seeds available and 246,000 tons of fertilizers were sold to farmers at reasonable prices in 1983 compared with 36,000 tons in 1968.

Agricultural marketing

Financial support has been given by the government through the Agricultural Bank to help farmers develop their farms. The capital of the Agricultural Bank at the present time is estimated at ID 300 millions compared with only 10 ID million in 1968. ID 23,353 million were given in loans to farmers by the agricultural Bank in 1983.

Eighty per cent of fruit and vegetables sales offices have been rented to the Private sector, leaving management of wholesale markets to the State Organization for Marketing (SOM). It also provides the private sector with facilities and encourage people working in it to increase their investments.

Quantities of various fruit and vegetables exported in 1984, until April 30, were 262 tons in addition to 18 tons of water melon and 487,080 eggs.

Translated from Arabic

CSO: 4400/9

SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY REPORTS ON EXPENDITURES

Baghdad THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 26 Jul 84 p 2

[Article by Farkad Nouri]

[Text]

The State Establishment for Pension and Workers' Social Security cares for providing best public services for the working class families through the implementation of various social, medical and recreational projects.

The Establishment with a capital totalling ID 666 million also undertakes building social centres, hospitals, nurseries, kindergartens, schools and cultural clubs throughout the country's provinces.

Designs for investment projects costing ID 115,000,800 have been referred to national consultative committees with the view of supplying public needs of recreational and facilities for the workers masses.

Among these projects, there would be a residential complex to be built at Bab Al-Sharqi (South Gate) district in the city of Baghdad, blocks of flats in Basra province and numerous markets, a grand club and a library for workers of Anbar province.

Last year's projects, at the cost of ID 10 million, included the building of 917 houses in Baghdad and Arbil provinces, three schools, 53 cooperative markets, a social centre, hospital, nursery, two giant residential complexes and a medical centre in Baghdad province.

They also contained nine social centres, eight nurseries, five kindergartens, four office-blocks for the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, two clubs, two libraries and two houses for workers in the country's other provinces.

The Establishment's projects under construction are a club, library, kindergarten and residential building in Baghdad province, a club and library in Kerbala province and four office-blocks for (the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs) in the provinces of Dohouk, Arbil, Nineveh and Wasit.

The project also includes building a hotel for workers of Arbil province, a club and library in Suleimaniya province, two nurseries in Diyalah and Najaf pro-

vinces, a club and library in Meisan province and a club, library and six high-rise flats in Basra province.

As far as training and cultural services are concerned the Establishment has organized eleven specialised courses for its personnel and for workers of both socialist and private sectors and unionists workers in the field of implementing social security regulations.

Many university students of both sexes have already been trained inside the Establishment's various departments each within its field of specialization.

It is worth noting here that the 4-year old war with Iran has had no effects on the country's overall development movement except for rationalization in the administrative domains. The 5-year development plan is being carried out quite smoothly. In 1976 the country's implemented projects totalled 16. The figure increased steadily to 20, 82 and 116 in 1982, 1983 and 1984 respectively.

CSO: 4400/9

PUBLIC PROJECTS EXECUTED IN AL-ANBAR PROVINCE

Baghdad THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 27 Jul 84 p 2

[Article by Sabah Y. Younan]

[Text] A large number of construction, service, health, educational and agricultural projects have been implemented in Anbar province at a cost of ID one million for the period from July 1983 to July this year. Many of these projects were inaugurated during the sixteenth anniversary of the 17-30 July Revolution. Others are still in the course of construction.

The new water supply project in Ramadi has a capacity of 30 million gallons per-day. Faluja water project has a capacity of 11 million gallons per day at a cost of ID 4 million gallons, in addition to a drinking water network which is 660 kilometer long.

The completed projects include the expanding of the second stage of Anbar poultry project at a cost of ID 10 million and has a capacity of 100 million eggs annually. New electronic telephone exchanges in Haditha, Heat, Al-Qa'im districts were also

completed. In addition Ramadi exchange was expanded.

In Kubaisa sub-district, a youth centre will be opened as well as a pontoon bridge which connects Al-Huriya and Haditha on the banks of the Euphrates. A road leading to Kubaisa cement factory at a length of twelve kilometers will be opened.

A complex comprising offices of the Ministry of Labour And Social Affairs and the head office of the National Union of Iraqi Students and Youth. Ambar branch will also be opened as well as a teaching-aids centre and a secondary school. A building housing primary school teachers in the city of Ramadi will be opened. A wide road-network in Ramadi and other cities in the province are being paved.

Other projects in Anbar province include reclamation of agricultural land of an area of 40 thousand donums and a complex for the offices

belonging to the State Organization for Consumer Goods.

The construction of Saddam Hospital has been completed as well as a pediatric hospital in Al-Ramadi and three medical centres in the village of Zinkora, Khtela and Mahboubiya as well as two emergency medical centres on the motor way from Ramadi to Rutba.

New wards have been established in various hospitals in Al-Amiriya, Al-Karma, Al-Saqlawiya, Al-Baghdadi, Al-Rummana and a Al-Ubaidi and a drug store in Al-Faluja.

Title deeds of two thousand plots of land are to be distributed to people throughout the provinces.

On the other hand, a large number of popular work drive was carried out including the opening of a 30 kilometres road and pavement of roads inside a number of cities namely Al-Ramadi, Al-Khalidiya, Al-Faluja and Kubaisa, the total length of which surpassed 30 kilometers.

DAHUK CARRIES OUT 7 MILLION DINARS WORTH OF PROJECTS

Baghdad THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 8 Aug 84 p 2

[Text]

Local government departments in Duhok province have carried out during the current year services, educational and housing projects, the total cost of which amounted to ID 7 million and 149 thousand, an INA report said yesterday.

The departments are executing similar projects throughout the province which are due to cost a total of ID 15 million and 45 thousands.

The projects carried out by local administration at the cost of ID 2 million and 969 thousands include the construction of 250 houses, a model village, the head office of the province's borders department, a secondary school consisting of twelve classrooms, and nursery school, a dormitory with a capacity of 240 beds, headquarters of Summail district's popular army and three official buildings.

Projects under construction by local administration will cost ID 5 million and 26 thousands and include three schools consisting of eighteen classrooms four nursery schools, three dormitories

with a capacity of 240-350 beds and 600 houses.

The above projects are in the modern villages of Maqbil, Batile and Jankoura. They also include 15 houses for state employees.

Local government departments in Duhok province have also carried out the new Zakho drinking water project at a cost of I.D 3 million and 500 thousands. The water project covers Zakho and Rizgari areas.

Currently, work is in full swing in the new Duhok water project at a cost of ID 9.5 millions. The rate of the work that has been accomplished is 65 per cent and work is expected to be completed at the end of the current year. The project will have an annual capacity of 16 million cu.m. of drinking water.

The water and sewage department in the province is currently implementing a water network project that covers residential areas in Duhok city. The Duhok municipality has completed constructing a rest house in Duhok at a cost of ID 480 thousand, in addition to paving and levelling work to a

number of roads of residential areas of 62 thousand square meters.

The province municipality has also accomplished supplementary work of a rest house, a main park, a garage as well as paving 12 thousand square meters by popular work drive.

Currently work is under-way in four heavy-machinery garages in Zakho and Summail districts, Naji and Batil and Zaweta villages at a cost of ID 200 thousands.

CSO: 4400/10

EXPANSION OF TRANSPORTATION NETWORK UPDATED

Baghdad THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 8 Aug 84 p 4

[Article by Hassan A. Hafidh]

[Text]

Iraq stands at the crossroads of some of the world's historic trading routes, but it is somewhat ironic that it should have to wait until the 1970s for a major start to be made on developing the country's national and international communication and transport systems.

Under an ambitious programme, beginning within the National Development Plan (1970-1974), Iraq started work on a new transport network. While total investment allocations for development projects stood at ID787 million in the plan, sums allocated for transport projects accounted for ID149 million, 31 per cent of which went to construction of roads and bridges, 25 per cent to tele-communications and 16 per cent to railways. The share of this vital sector constituted not less than 14 per cent of total investment allocations.

The relative scheme of investment in transport infrastructure in the current five year development plan, has risen to well over 24 per cent. Sums allocated for transport in the 1981-1985 development plan reached 1,889 million Iraqi dinars.

Railways

These sums of money have been spent on various transport projects. To mention a few of the new railway lines under construction, there is the Baghdad-Kut-Um Qasr (in Basra province) line, the Baghdad-Samawa railway line and the Kirkuk-Baiji-Haditha line. These are designed to connect Baghdad to the Mediterranean in the West, to Europe in the North, and to its neighbouring countries in the South.

The railways are being designed to the highest standard and will be capable of carrying traffic at up to 250 kilometers per hour, said an official from the new Railway Implementation Authority (NRIA) which undertakes the execution of these lines.

Work is currently underway to construct Baghdad-

Qaim-Akashat modern railway. The project consists of 72 compartments, 83 coaches and 4460 cargo wagons.

The development of railway services covers the amount of goods transported by the Iraqi Railways in addition to the increase in the number of locomotives in operation on the railway lines throughout Iraq. Maintenance and operation services are offered by several workshops which have been constructed close to these lines.

Motorways

The construction of motorways provide the most dramatic evidence of Iraq's modernization drive. Among projects recently completed were the 105-kms Haditha-Qaim highway, in Anbar province, to connect the industrial project in Qaim (Akashat) with the capital, Baghdad, and other Iraqi cities; the 45 kms Kut-Jassam-Badra highway, the 55 kms Jalawla-Kifri road in Diyala Province, the 50 kms Samarra-Fallujah highway, and other roads.

The State Establishment of Highways is currently constructing 14 motorways. They include the international 255 kms motorway to link Iraq with the holy shrines in Saudi Arabia; 100 kms Kut-Ali Gharbi road, 80 kms Kerbala-Najaf motorway, the 222 kms industrial highway between Qaim (Akashat industrial project) and Rutba, and others.

Inter-city transport has witnessed expansion. New

buses were purchased for the state establishment of public transport. So far the establishment operate a fleet of 400 air-conditioned coaches all over the country. These improvements resulted in an increased number of passengers, who totalled three and a half million in 1983.

Cargo transport has also seen development. In 1970, the first company for transporting goods was set up. It expanded in 1979 and was renewed as the State organization for Land Transportation, running five general establishment. The 1976-1980 development plan gave priority to land transportation. About 2,400 vehicles were purchased. In 1980 the organization had 1923 vehicles and a fleet of 261 trucks. This number has increased during the last few years.

Cargo transport capacity of the organization is to increase from five million tons in 1980 to 16 million tons in 1985, according to the five year national development plan (1981-1985).

Furthermore, in 1976, the State Establishment for Navigation in Basra was set up, in a bid to ensure better services for Iraqi imports and exports. The Establishment is currently operating a fleet of 16 ships, with a payload capacity ranging between 3600-13600 tons each. These ships are operated on four international navigation lines in northern Europe, the Mediterranean Sea, the Far East and the Indian subcontinent.

The Establishment played an active role in the Arab

and international conferences on sea navigation. It is a member of the West Indian Coast Federation, East Indian Coast Federation, the Mediterranean Sea Federation and the Arab Federation for Sea Shippers.

Civil aviation has already achieved major development strides. The State Organization for Civil Aviation plan includes the expansion of Iraqi Airways facilities and the construction of new airports. Iraqi Airways now has a fleet of 15 modern airliners. These are jumbo jets and Boeing 707 and 737.

Last year, the first and second phase of Saddam International Airport (cost ID 245 million) was officially inaugurated. The third phase is expected to finish at the end of this year. The airport, in a suburb of Baghdad City, is designed to handle four million passengers building up to 9.5 million passengers in the year 2000, the Minister of Transport and Communication said.

The project includes a VIP hall, three passenger terminals, two buildings for aircraft ground services, an air cargo terminal, a communication building, including a centre tower and a car park.

Other means of communication and transport such as telephones, river transport, private transport companies have also expanded.

HOUSING MINISTRY REPORTS COMPLETION OF PROJECT

Baghdad THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 29 Aug 84 p 2

[Article by Sabah Y. Younan: "Important Projects, Roads, Bridges Completed"]

[Text] A large number of important and strategic projects have been implemented by the Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction including roads, bridges and houses.

11 thousand kilometres of cross country roads have been completed as well as one hundred and forty-five various bridges, the first and foremost among them were the Great Bridge of Saddam, 30 July Bridge, Kwair Bridge, Dhaloviya Bridge, Second Nasiriya Bridge, Rasheed (Al-Sinak) Bridge, 15 Ramadhan (Al-A'dhamiya) Bridge.

During the 17-30 July Revolution celebrations, the member of the Revolution Command Council (RCC) and First Deputy Premier Mr Taha Yassin Ramadhan opened Saddam Bridge in the city of Mosul. The bridge was another significant accomplishment in the development of the road and bridge network in Iraq.

A large proportion of the work in Army Canal interchanges project has been completed amounting to eighty eight per cent of the schedule. One of the interchanges that link Al-Ghadeer to Baladiyat via Army Canal was opened early in August. All the rest interchange will be opened by the end of this year.

Housing programmes have been carried out to provide decent accommodation for all Iraqis.

New residential districts have emerged in all provinces thanks to State Organisation for Housing. Many other projects are being currently carried out.

In fact, the housing units that have been completed during war time were around 25 thousand. There are other 30 thousand housing units under construction. A major part of them is expected to be accomplished towards the end of the year.

Among the major housing projects that have been completed are the Saddam Town housing project, Um Al-Idhaim, Saidiya, Zaiyouna and Al-Salihiya projects in addition to other prefabricated housing units projects in Baghdad, such as Al-Dora project as well as in other province namely Nineveh and Kerbala.

Other two thousand housing units have been set up in Al-Mahmoudiya and 5,600 units in Fallouja and Samara.

The State Organization for Buildings has also accomplished large number of educational and medical projects which amounted to 250 projects. They include ly hospitals and a large number of medical centres in all provinces up and down the country. The educational projects include 100 insitutes, schools, dormitories and teachers training institutes.

The General Company for Water and Sewage Contracts has also carried out a number of important projects. The most important of those projects are Al-Musaib water project, Fallouja water project, Samawa water project and Diyana water project. They also include the first stage of Al-Karkh sewage project and the first stage of Western Desert Irrigation project and the second expansion of heavy water filtering project in Risafa the eastern part of Baghdad.

The public service projects that have been accomplished include Al-Qayara sewage project and similar sewage project in Nasiriya and Saddam Town in Baghdad.

CSO: 4400/11

THREE LARGE BRIDGES OPENED

Two in Baghdad

Baghdad THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 8 Aug 84 p 4

[Article by Dr Livon H. Garabet]

[Text]

During the 16th anniversary of the 30th July Revolution, two new bridges were opened in Baghdad by the First Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Taha Yassin Ramadhan. These two new bridges are part of a comprehensive transportation planning effort to connect the Karkh area with the Rassafa area which would facilitate the movement of people and goods.

The 14th of Ramadhan bridge consists of six lanes, three lanes for each direction. Each side consists of 10m. with a pedestrian pavement of 3.3m and a middle island of 2.5m. which adds to a total of 30.1m of width while the length of the bridge is 405m. The bridge stands on concrete columns strengthened by steel cables attached to a central steel column.

Obviously the bridge is going to solve a lot of the existing transportation problems facing Baghdad, but for future planning some im-

provements could be made. If the bridge continues as it crosses the river from Rassafa to Karkh as a passover over the Imam Mousa Alkadhim Street (in the direction of 14th Ramadhan Street) with side lanes going to and coming from Imam Mousa Alkadhim Street. In such a solution the traffic would move faster and quicker and this would eliminate the long halt as you come from Karkh to Rassafa by 14th of Ramadhan Street

The other improvement could be effected in the area where the traffic comes from the Karkh areas to Aadhamiya river frontage. The street along the river front is a very narrow one that takes one lane in each direction, which will cause the traffic to slow down, since the three-lane traffic coming from the bridge has to go through one lane which will slow and hinder the traffic. The solution is to widen the river street into at least two lanes in each direction to ease traffic congestion.

Saddam Bridge in Mosul

Baghdad THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 8 Aug 84 p 4

[Article by A. Kadhim Hashim]

[Text]

Mr. Taha Yassin Ramadhan, First Deputy Premier and Member of the Revolution Command Council opened, on 1 August, Saddam Bridge in Mosul city.

A celebration was held at the site of the bridge attended by Mr. Mohammad Fadhl Hussein, Minister of Housing and Reconstruction, Mr. Subhi Yassin, Minister of Industry and Minerals; the deputy governor of the Nineveh Province, and a number of Party officials.

Saddam Bridge in Mosul, the fourth in the city, will help the flow of traffic and speed transport in the city centre and link it with other provinces.

The consultation services for the bridge were by the Studies and Designs Office in the State Organisation of Roads and Bridges.

The Chinese Company for Roads and Bridges En-

gineering built the bridge. It was built under the supervision of the State Establishment for Constructing Bridges. Services of quality control were provided by the National Centre of Construction laboratories. Work on this giant project, which cost millions of Iraqi dinars, started on 28, May 1980.

The bridge is 648 metres long; 30.80 metres wide, including 11.50x2 metres for the cars with a middle island of 1.80 metres wide. Both sides of the bridge have pedestrian passages 3 metres wide.

The approaches to the bridge are 149 metres long.

The materials used to construct the bridge included 30,000 tons of cement, 6,000 tons of reinforcement steel, 63,000 cubic metres of gravel stones; 42,000 cubic metres of sand; 58,000 cubic metres of concrete and 180,000 cubic metres of earth works.

CSO: 4400/10

RAMADAN LAYS FOUNDATION STONES OF THIRD RIVER PUMPING STATION

Baghdad THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 9 Aug 84 p 4

[Article by Basim Muftic: "Speeding Up Work on 'Third River'"]

[Text] On July 27, Mr Taha Yassin Ramadhan, member of the Revolution Command Council and First Deputy Premier, laid the foundation stone of a big pumping station, south Nassiriya city, Dhi Qar province, at the area where the Third River, a big drainage canal, crosses with Euphrates.

The construction of such a big pumping station in this area will aid the flow of the Third River drained waters to the Arab Gulf, as the land in south Iraq is very low. The station comprises eight fixed pumps and four mobile ones.

In a special ceremony held on this occasion, Mr Ramadhan said Iraq's economy has overcome all difficulties and it will be sound enough after the completion of the development projects currently under construction

Further, he said, the economy has met all the requirements of the war.

Referring to the economic value of the Third River, the First Deputy Premier said, that it had direct bearing on living conditions of citizens.

The idea of constructing this major drainage system which is so big that it is called the Third River, had sprung from the pressing need for combatting and flushing away the increasing salt deposits as a result of the unplanned expansions in land cultivation in the central and southern areas of the country.

Another reason behind

the construction of the project was the growing salination of the agricultural lands between Tigris and Euphrates rivers, marshes and other irrigation sources by discharging into them the heavy water of the small existing drainage projects — a state which would affect not only the maritime life in the water resources but also the productivity of the farm lands irrigated by them.

According to the Minister of Irrigation, Abdul Wahab Mahmoud, who attended the foundation-stone laying ceremony, the areas to be drained are six million donums, which cover most

of the irrigated areas in the central and southern parts of Iraq. In other words the Third River comprises the drainages of the western area of Baghdad which include those of Ishaqi, Saqlawiya, Abu Gharib, Radhwaniya, Yousifiya, Rajab Marshes, Latifiya, Iskendar-
iya, Mussayyab, Qsaiba, Shahamiya, Mahaweil, Shar-
ta and Dalmaj.

It also comprises the drainage from Hilla, Diwaniya, Semawa, and the drainage network of east and west Gharraf river.

The project is divided into three major parts, the northern part is at Dalmaj marshes where it is composed of the projects of Ishaqi, Saqlawiya, Abu Ghraib, Yousifiya, Rajab marshes, Latifiya, Iskendariya and Mussayyab.

The central part is a 201 kilometer long canal which extends from Dalmaj marshes to the main pumping station near Euphrates. The canal passes through the sand dunes and the deserts between the Tigris and Euphrates.

The southern part, which covers the areas in south Iraq, is a 172 kilometer long canal with eleven bridges; 8 out of them are on the Third River itself; one on the Euphrates and two for rail lines which criss-cross with the Third River.

To secure the discharge of the Third River water to Al-Hammar Marshes, Dhiqar Province, in case of technical failure to the aforementioned main pumping station, a large regulator was constructed. This regulator has one viaduct with a discharge capacity of 210 cubic meters of water per second.

Navigation facilities were also made available at Shatt Al-Basra and at the point where the Third River criss-crosses with Euphrates to provide services for vessels passing from Euphrates to the Third River and vice-versa.

Eight bridges are also constructed over the Third River for traffic and a 330 kilometer long road along the two sides of the project in addition to a 75 kilometer drainage network to absorb filtrated water from the agricultural areas along the two sides of the Third River.

The Third River will be divided into two lines for vessels. The southern part allows the passing of 2,000 ton vessels. This line starts from the Arab Gulf till the confluence of the Third River and Euphrates near Nasir-
iya city.

The second line allows the passing of 1,000 ton vessels. It is linked with both Tigris and Euphrates, through Tharthar Tigris Canal near Sweira district, Wasit province.

AL-RASHID BRIDGE OPENED OVER TIGRIS RIVER

Baghdad THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 13 Aug 84 p 4

[Article by A. Kadhem Hashem: "Baghdad Now Has]2 Bridges"]

[Excerpts] On July 30, last month two new modern bridges were opened for traffic in Baghdad, bringing the number of the bridges over Tigris River to 12

Al-Rashid Bridge

The second bridge opened on 30 July 1984 was Al-Rashid bridge. This bridge will not only help solve the traffic problems in the Baghdad City centre but will also facilitate the traffic flow on both Al-Ahrar and Al-Jumhuriya bridges. The bridge is between Al-Jumhuriya and Al-Ahrar bridges. It links the street leading to Al-Khullani square in Russafa with Haifa street in Karkh.

The consultation services were provided by the Designs and Studies Office in the State Organisation of Roads and Bridges in cooperation with a Dutch company. The building contractor was a South Korean company, while the General Establishment of Bridges Construction overseered the construction. Quality control services were provided by the National Centre of Constructional Laboratories.

Al-Rashid bridge is 600 meters long. It is 21.2 meters wide, 14 meters for vehicles and two pedestrian passages, 3.60 meters wide. The bridge's approaches are one kilometers long each. It also includes two car parks.

Among the materials used building the bridge were 16,090 tons of cement, 3,042 tons of reinforcement steel, 34,066 cubic meters of sand and 36,800 cubic meters of concrete.

Mr Ismail Ibrahim Al-Bayaa', Director General of the General Establishment of Bridges Construction said that citizens realised the importance and necessity of the 14 Ramadhan and Al-Rashid bridges since their inauguration on 30 July 1984.

Mr Al-Bayaa' added that the establishment would start the second stage of the 14 Ramadhan bridge in Al-Utaifiya area to link the bridge with the 14 Ramadhan street in Karkh. He said that all the designs of the third stage, which is to link the 14 Ramadhan bridge in Aadhamiya area with Muhammad Al-Qassim expressway have been completed. The project in its three phases, Mr Al-Bayaa' said, would further facilitate the flow of traffic in Baghdad city centre.

SECOND PHASE OF THIRD RIVER PROJECT TO BE COMPLETED IN 1986

Baghdad THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 14 Sep 84 p 2

[Text] The main outfall project or, the 'Third River' is one of the gigantic drainage projects in the Middle East that runs between the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers and ends at the Arab Gulf. This project is being implemented by the Ministry of Irrigation at a cost of ID 104 millions.

The Minister of Irrigation, Mr Abdul Wahab Mahmoud, in a statement to Iraqi News Agency (INA) said that the second phase of the project, which stretches for 172 kilometres, links Nassirya district with the Arab Gulf by huge concrete installations built under the Euphrates river bed and passes through Al-Hammar marsh.

The second phase, he added, consists of two contracts, the first covers sand excavations, constructing dams and covering some areas with stones. As for the second contract, it provides for the implementation of concrete work and installations situated near the project, such as a gigantic squirt plant to speed up the water running in the outfall project, building 14 bridges for cars and railways as well as

building navigation installations.

The Minister went on to say that the second phase also includes a large reservoir used as a dam to hold water during tide movement in the Arab Gulf. The water is drained back to the sea, at ebb. The second phase, he said, will be implemented in 1986.

The main outfall project, he added, is designed to fit for the operation of river barges with a loading capacity of 2,000 tons between the sea and the outskirts of Nassirya district. Other river barges that load 7,000 tons, will be operated between the north of Nassirya and the central part of Iraq.

The project will serve other large agricultural projects such as the projects of Abu Ghraib, Mussayib, Saqlawiya, Ishaqi, Dalmaj, Hilla, Diwaniya and other projects in the Euphrate basin.

As for the prospects of the project, the Minister said that it will be used for water transportation, irrigating wide-scale areas of woods and farms that cannot be harmed by the salty water of

the project. It will also be useful in stopping desertification in the nearby areas.

He added that the third river project will be of great use to six million donums in the central and southern parts of Iraq, as it drains heavy water from this vast area to end up in the Arab Gulf, thus preventing pollution of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers.

Concluding his statement, the Minister said that President Saddam Hussein's prime care to the project and his useful instructions in this regard, had encouraged the Ministry to accomplish the project despite the war imposed on Iraq by the Iranian regime, which proves that Iraq is capable of achieving victories in war and continue with the process of construction.

It is worth mentioning that the first phase of the main outfall project was implemented in 1977. It is located between the Mussayib project and stretches south to Nassirya district.

HOUSING MINISTER OPENS AL-SAMARRA' BRIDGE

Baghdad THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 19 Sep 84 p 2

[Article by Akram Dhanoon]

[Text]

Minister of Housing and Reconstruction, Mr Mohammed Fadhl Hussein yesterday opened the Samarra' bridge in Saladdin Province at a total cost of ID 24 million.

The bridge and the interchanges were carried out by the State Organisation for Roads and Bridges in cooperation with an international company.

The inauguration ceremony was attended by Mr Mohammed Zimam the governor of Saladdin and the Assistant Secretary and members of Saladdin branch-command of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party (ABSP), heads of establishments in the city and a number of officials in the ministry.

In an exclusive statement to the Baghdad Observer, the Minister of Housing and Reconstruction said that the Samarra project is considered one of the development projects in Iraq and has economic yield as it eases traffic on the international motorway. He added that

the project has been accomplished as scheduled and in a fine condition.

Commenting on the project, the Director General of Bridges Establishment said that despite the war imposed on Iraq, over the last four years, the Revolutionary development brought about by the 17-30 July Revolution and masterminded by the ABSP, has made great progress. The Iraqis, he added, made extra efforts in order to meet war effort and carry out development projects.

The Director of the Establishment said that the project includes the southern interchange on the Baghdad-Mosul expressway, some six kilometres south of Samarra' and comprises three small bridges. The bridge also includes a main bridge at a length of 1,270 metres across Al-Tharthar Valley.

The bridge is divided into a main auto-lane at a width of 18.5 metres and pavements on the two sides each at a width of three metres.

The project also includes a northern interchange where

the bridge approaches' meet with Baghdad-Mosul expressway.

The northern interchange includes one bridge at a length of 29 metres and approaches at a length of 24 metres. The approach comprises two parallel roads each at a width of 10.75 metres. Each road includes three lanes and a traffic island at a width of six metres and two road shoulders at a width of 1.25 metres.

The project also includes tube tunnels to drain water as well as seven syphons for agricultural purposes. The project is totally supplied with electric power and lighting.

Later on, work has been going on to protect Al-Tharther canal according to irrigation requirements and spans were added to both bridges to meet railways requirements. Despite these additional work, a sum of money of ID 500,000 was

saved.

He added that the main bridge and the approaches are the best substitute for the former narrow road via Al-Tharthar regulator. It will also ease traffic jams to and from Samarra' and will diverge traffic via two axes and according to traffic need. The project will also ease weight which has been totally undertaken by the regulator the work of which will be confined to water drain and storage.

The project will also facilitate nearby farmers marketing their crops, will connect northern central and southern provinces with an international expressway that uses in outer ring-road off Samarra city and will expand Samarra city.

The project will attract more construction, housing and tourism to the city and promote culture in the city.

CSO: 4400/12

ALMOST 500,000 CHILDREN ENTER PRIMARY SCHOOLS FOR 1984-85

Baghdad THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 12 Aug 84 p 3

[Article by Basim Muftin: "Building Skilled Workforce Starts in Primary Schools"]

[Text]

Some 459, 483 children, covered by the Compulsory Education Law, will join primary schools at the start of the 1984-1985 school year. Education Ministry sources said.

Preparations were almost completed in the provinces to prepare lists of the names of children who were born in 1978, and their schools. The work was organized and supervised by central committees in the provinces, headed by the Mayors, and subcommittees in the districts and subdistricts.

The figures given by the Ministry of Education include 123,313 children in Baghdad; 24,449 in Nineveh; 13,839 in Saladdin; 17,103 in Ta'meem; 20,950 in Diyala; 18,128 in Anbar, 22,660 in Babylon; 9,762 in Kerbala; 14,820 in Najaf; 17,345 in Qadissiya province.

The Ministry sources said the number of children covered by the Compulsory Education law in Muthanna province is 8,597; in Dhiqar 24,283; in Wasit 15,283. 13,100 children are to join primary schools in Meisan Province; 36,152 in Basra; 10,399 in Dohouk; 22,280 in Arbil and 29,020 in Suleimaniya Province.

Children's parents were informed of the lists of the names and they were asked to contact nearby schools to register their children.

At the beginning of September, the central and subcommittees will check that all children have joined their schools. Reports including the names of children that do not attend school and the reasons shall be submitted to the Ministry of Education. the sources

affirmed.

Eight years ago the government enacted the Compulsory Education Law whereby all six-year old children must be admitted into primary schools. The law stipulates that children's parents would be legally responsible if their children are not enrolled in schools.

According to the Central Report of the Ninth Congress of the Arab Ba'th

Socialist Party one of the main effective means of bringing about profound changes in the society is the expansion of general education which would create a solid basis for the development process.

In this respect high attention has been given to primary education as it forms the basis for technical and higher education. Primary education therefore, was made compulsory.

The children who graduated from the primary schools by the end of the school year (1983-1984) were the first batch of children covered by the Compulsory Education law. They were born in 1972 and admitted into primary schools in 1978-1979 school year.

Minister of Education, Abdul Qader Izzeldin, told "Al-Thawra" Daily last month that the number of pupils of the six primary grades, who were all covered by the compulsory education law, topped 2,698,542 by the end of this school year. This number, of course, included this year's graduates who are to join intermediate schools at the beginning of September.

According to the Minister, the total number of pupils at the primary and secondary schools during 1983-1984 school year was 3,815,000, in addition to 76,663 children at the kindergartens.

The Ministry had already prepared special programmes to develop secondary education aimed at two objectives to train pupils who will receive higher education and prepare and

train skilled workforce needed to embody development plans.

This expansion of education has, further, narrowed cultural differences between urban and rural areas, and has provided citizens with ample opportunities to enjoy their right to free education.

According to the Minister, attention has been given to technical education to meet the increasing needs for efficient and well-trained technicians for technical centres, created by the rapid industrial development in the country.

In the 1983-1984 school year, 77,433 students attended industrial schools; 8,407 students attended agricultural schools and 25,226 students attended schools of commerce.

Girl students form a considerable percentage of the total number of technical education students. Their number reached 22,749 in 1983-1984 school year, the Minister explained.

This increase in the number of pupils was also matched by an increase in the number of teachers, who were the graduates of either teachers' training colleges or teachers' institutes, which 36,475 teacher students attended in 1983-1984 academic year.

The achievements in the educational sector were the result of long struggle by the Ba'th Party to establish educational concepts and principles which comply with the Party's philosophy in education.

Several specialized com-

mittees were formed to revise old syllabuses in conformity with the new trends in the society in addition to modernizing methods of teaching. Intensive use is being made of school libraries and laboratories which are established in almost all the schools in the country.

At intermediate schools, pupils' technical and vocational capabilities are released by developing the industrial crafts departments and creating interest among pupils in technical subjects. Group activities in this field are being encouraged.

Necessary regulations were laid down to govern the distribution of intermediate schools graduates in compliance with the needs of the State establishments and offices.

CSO: 4400/11

NAVY COMMANDER: ONE-FOURTH OF IRANIAN NAVY DESTROYED

Baghdad THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 1 Sep 84 p 4

[Article by Salman Dawood Shahd]

[Text] Two members of the staff of The Baghdad Observer recently visited Basra and were given an interview by the Commander of the Iraqi Navy, Brig. Abd Mohammed Abdullah. The conversation with the commander turned to the Iranian Navy and what was left of it, and the sieg of Kharg Island.

The commander said: "you want figures, you may have them. I can say that according to our military estimates our naval forces have so far succeeded in destroying more than a quarter of the Iranian Navy. This has been confirmed by both the insurance companies and the world media. We can say that more than 170 vessels have been destroyed, of which insurance companies have so far named one hundred, during the last two years of the war. Likewise, two frigates and a large guard ship were also destroyed, in addition to a number of mine sweepers, six boats as well as a considerable number of rescue boats."

The commander said that the aim in giving these figures was not for propaganda purposes. He pointed that these facts have been supported by parties out of the conflict such as the British Centre for Strategic Studies "which has come out with the conclusion that the Iranians have been defeated at sea and hence their leaders have chosen to withdraw further to the south of the Arab Gulf to avoid any direct confrontation with Iraq's Navy."

Iran's Navy, which was established by the Shah to play the role of gendarme in the Gulf and to fight in high seas, has failed in straits and waterways in combat with even such a small navy as Iraq's, which was not known earlier as a combat force with considerable arms and potential, according to the centre's analysis, Commander Abdulla pointed out.

Iraq's Navy commander went on to say that similar confirmation has come from Iranian officers. "Captain Ariavar, an Iranian Navy officer, who lives in Paris in exile, said that Iran has lost more than 20 per cent of its naval units and 80 per cent of its planes and helicopter gunships" he added.

The commander then mentioned other indications which prove Iran's naval defeat and recall the fact that Iran's ex-navy commander, Hussein Asvandiyar, has

been detained and the earlier commander executed; while Iran's ex-minister of defence had fled the country and is now in exile.

All Iranian officers in exile, the commander said, have issued statements to the effect that there was no point in continuing the war against Iraq and that Iran's navy is paralysed and unable to fight against Iraq's Navy.

The commander then said that reports from insurance companies indicate that there was a marked drop in the figures of shipping in the war zone area, while insurance fees have registered a sharp upward trend, soaring to about 150 per cent.

He added that during the last six months, Iraq's Navy carried out ten effective raids against Iran's Kharg Island, striking loading terminals, vessels entering or leaving the ports of the island, and the approaches to the island. "This is in addition to strikes against all vessels at Bushahr Port or the vessels heading for this port," he added.

Hence, one can have an idea of the strong siege we have laid on these targets which are as distant as some 300 km. from our shores," the commander said.

He added that the approaches to both Bandar Khomeini and Khor Mousa ports have become graveyards for the vessels sailing in the area, and said that the world media currently refers to the area as "suicide straits."

The commander confirmed that no vessel can enter Bandar Khomeini port safely, and that a number of Iranian attempts to force convoys of vessels into this port have failed.

"Our naval forces have been destroying 70 to 80 per cent of any convoy of ships in the area. Last August, we destroyed 100 per cent of a convoy of ships and the names of the vessels were disclosed at the time by Lloyds insurance company," he said.

Answering a question on Iraq's ability to reach Iranian naval targets, the commander said that after four years of war, the Iraqi armed forces have gained an accumulation of combat experience enabling it to run the war with efficiency, crushing enemy forces. He pointed out that there are many factors behind Iraq's superiority over the Iranian enemy, "including, in the forefront, the high morale of the Iraqi soldiers, and the maturity of the Iraqi political leadership, led by President Saddam Hussein."

The commander pointed to yet another factor in this innate superiority of the Iraqi side and said that this was President Hussein's unlimited backing of the Iraqi Navy. Another big feat was the efficient coordination between the Navy and the Air Force in confronting the enemy and hitting the targets set for us."

The commander then clarified the term "a major naval target" mentioned in Iraqi war communiques. This means ships with high payloads, such as commercial ships and oil tankers. Military vessels of 200 to 300 metres anchorage are considered to be medium-sized targets.

Commenting on the news that Iran is to receive a number of barges, vessels and frigates for its navy from some European countries, the commander said that all endeavours of the enemy to strengthen its navy would fail to change the balance of power in its favour. "We hold the initiative in our hands, and will keep it this way. On our part, we are carrying on with developing and improving our combat and armament potentials. Moreover, the morale of our seamen is on the increase, for the simple reason that while the enemy troops are forced to fight, our soldiers are defending our dignity and existence," the commander said.

Replying to a question on the most outstanding sea battle the commander said that all the battles of the Iraqi Navy are unforgettable. However, the last battle in the beginning of August, 1984 can justly be called an epic. In this battle, we destroyed five naval targets and downed three enemy planes. This battle can be considered among the fastest and most impressive ones, but not the most important," the commander said.

CSO: 4400/11

BRIEFS

SUGAR FROM MILLET--Iraqi efforts to extract sugar from new sources, in addition to traditional sources such as sugar beets and sugar cane, have borne fruit as experts at the Baghdad Agricultural College Crop Research Station have been able to develop a process for extracting sugar from millet, which has high productivity, reaching more than 30 tons per hectare. Sources at the Baghdad Agricultural College report that it is possible to extract about 120 liters of syrup per ton from millet. In addition, millet has a high capacity to withstand heat, thirst and dehydration. Its growth cycle is considered relatively short, shorter than the growth cycle of sugar beets and sugar cane, and it is possible to have two growing seasons, one in spring, the other in summer. The Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture will endeavor to spread the cultivation of this type of millet over as wide an area as possible. The concern of the Iraqi authorities for procuring new domestic supplies of sugar is due to the high sugar consumption of the individual Iraqi in comparison to the other Arab nations, which is 30 kilograms per year. [Text] [London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1453, 7 Sep 84 p 51] 9310

CSO: 4404/643

HISTADRUT WORK AGREEMENT EXPLAINED

Jerusalem THE ISRAEL ECONOMIST in English Aug 84 p 12

[Text] Last month the industrialists and the Histadrut signed a work agreement for the next two years. Lisa Rotter reports on the agreement, its background, and future directions.

The private sector wage agreement for the 1984-86 period was signed in mid-July. It provided for an immediate 9% wage increase to all covered workers, with an additional 1% to be paid at a later date. The situation will be re-examined in October and again next April to determine if further increases are warranted. Plant-level agreements are not precluded by this overall framework.

As is to be expected in a period of hyperinflation, the public and private sector agreements are concerned solely with wages. Other concerns of past framework agreements, such as work conditions, pensions and retraining, are being dealt with on the sub-committee level and will be finalized only in the coming weeks.

The added cost of the agreement to private employers will be a minimum of 7.5% this year. Taking plant-level agreements into account, the total cost to employers is unlikely to rise above 12%. Thus workers in the industrial sector are likely to receive an increase averaging some 4% less than the 15.8% received by workers in government and the public services.

While the future course of negotiations and agreements is difficult to predict, it is evident that the centralized negotiating system, in which the Histadrut represents the entire spectrum of unions, is not flexible enough to survive. Public sector workers, whose employer can print money, will never have the demands as engineers some whose bargaining leverage stems from the limited supply of trained engineers and from their high level of productivity. The Engineers' Union recently demanded and won the right to negotiate a separate unlinked wage scale. They are probably the first to have done so.

Results: compared to what?

During the negotiations, Chezy Guttman, statistical adviser to the Manufacturers' Association, questioned the validity of the wages of the third quarter of 1983 as a basis for comparison.

He noted that, based on data from the Central Bureau of Statistics, the average wage in the economy in 1983/84 was only 1.3% less than in the corresponding period the year before. The real wage in April 1984 was the same as the average wage of 1983/84. In dollar terms, Guttman claimed that the June 1984 wage was 18% above that of 1980, 6.5% above that of 1982 and even 5% above that of the peak of mid-1982.

On a longer-term basis, the Association claimed that the wage in the last eight years was a real 36% greater than the increase in worker productivity. Of the last eight years, only 1980 registered an increase (4.9%) in worker productivity. Yet each of those years — again excepting 1980 — saw an increase in both wages to workers and wage-costs to employers. To put the last eight years in perspective, it should be noted that the cumulative inflation in this period was 1,500% and that while wages have risen faster than productivity, prices have risen fastest of all. Rapid inflation has cost workers an annual average of 10-20% of their real wages.

In general, better-paid workers benefitted more in the last years of this Likud government. The top 10% of all income earners in 1983 registered a real 9.3% growth in income and the top 10% of all salaried employees showed a real 7.5% growth in 1983. Urban salaried workers have shown a fairly level income in the past four years.

Among urban salaried workers, the top 20% garnered about 40% of gross salaries,

while the bottom 20% collected only about 7%. The Gini coefficient, which measures the distribution of income between rich and poor, has remained level in the past few years, at around 0.32.

Some 30% of the wage-earning families in the bottom 20% have six or more members, compared to only 14% of total wage-earning families. About half the people in these families are under 18 years of age. Of the top 20%, only 3% of these families have six or more members and only one quarter of the people in these families are under 18 years of age.

Throughout the past five years, families whose principal wage earner was born in Europe or America had an average household income 20% higher than that of families in which the principal wage earner was from Africa or Asia. On a per capita basis, the gap is 45%, because of the typically larger families in households with members of Asian or African origin.

In a different labor comparison, the Federation of Israeli Chambers of Commerce in a recent study charged that a worker earning IS262,600 a month has a take-home pay of IS140,831, while the self-employed with the same income takes home only IS80,055. The self-employed can enjoy the same take-home pay if he foregoes the provident fund, which is only one-third financed by the employee.

Yet self-employed individuals earned an average income equal to 170% of the wage paid to salaried workers last year. Average wages of general managers are now five times the average wage.

Election influence

Whoever forms the next government will immediately face a deteriorating labor picture. Requests for unemployment compensation by individuals who had not found "appropriate work" were received from 11,784 individuals in June, some 2% more than in June, 1983. However, the 11,000 unemployed represented a 24% drop from May. Of these, 1,284 were academics, 8,170 were males and 2,268 were first time requests. "Job seekers" numbered 31,428 in June, down 12.7% from May. Much of the recent drop in unemployment can be attributed to political parties hiring 5,000 campaign workers.

In the second quarter of 1984, Manpower Israel Ltd. reported that "help wanted" advertising was up 20.4% over the first quarter, totalling 41,058 advertisements. Only in the job classification "technical workers" was a decline (2.2%) registered. In comparison with the second quarter of 1983, the demand for all classification of workers showed a decline, with the total down 30.1% and each sector registering declines of from 14.7% to 49.8%. ■

SUCCESS IN RECYCLING AGRICULTURAL WASTE

Jerusalem THE ISRAEL ECONOMIST in English Aug 84 pp 16

[Text]

Agricultural waste utilization has served as a source of energy for centuries. Today Israel is broadening its applications and enhancing its commercial prospects, and kibbutz tests are encouraging. Judy Maltz reports.

Perhaps Israel's lack of natural resources has made it more open to recycling waste. In the case of agricultural waste, this country has established an international reputation. Zalman Perah, director of the Kibbutz Industries Association's agricultural waste utilization project, Project Nefah, says that "Our methods are becoming recognized as the most intensive and effective in the world for the breakdown and utilization of waste matter."

By means of anaerobic digestion, which uses micro-organisms cultured in controlled environments, scientists are breaking agricultural waste into biogas and a slurry. The biogas, consisting of 60% methane, serves as fuel for heating, cooking and power production. The slurry can be further broken down into a solid component called *cabutz*, which resembles peat moss and serves as a plant substrate, and a liquid component, which can be used as a fertilizer.

The decision to launch Project Nefah in 1976 came as a response to the energy crisis. Funds were provided by the Kibbutz Industries Association and the Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure.

Until that time, agricultural waste utilization was valued solely for its energy-producing potential. Israel was the first and remains the only country to process cabutz. The success of this endeavor has led to a shift in the focus

of research toward alternative uses of the slurry, and the biogas component has been de-emphasized.

Cabutz performs two critical functions: it serves as an import substitute for peat moss and it contributes to higher crop yields. In both respects, it helps Israel's balance of payments.

It's also cheap. While peat moss costs approximately \$800 per ton, cabutz sells for \$400 a ton. The digesting process renders it hygienic, and the results show that plants grown on it blossom faster and are of a considerably higher quality.

Further research on alternative uses of the product is under way. Experiments on its use as animal and fish fodder have shown favorable results. Outside the farm, it has been successfully utilized to make particle boards. Also under investigation is the use of carbon dioxide, left over after the methane has been extracted from the biogas, in greenhouses, to increase yields.

Cow manure is presently the principle type of waste employed in anaerobic digestion, though other sources, particularly vegetable waste, are now being tried. All this in pursuit of the ultimate objective which Perah defines as: "the conversion of every bit of waste matter on the farm into a vital resource".

To date, three plants have been established — one on Kibbutz Kfar Giladi

in 1979, another on Kibbutz Zikkim in 1982, and the most recent on Kibbutz Yagur early this year. Six more are scheduled for construction in the near future.

The unique characteristics of the kibbutz render it an ideal customer for waste utilization. It is both a producer of large quantities of waste and a consumer of its by-products. Large-scale farming (at least 500 cows), a necessary condition for the supply of adequate waste material, exists on the kibbutz. And, in contrast to private farms, the division of labor in the kibbutz is such that one worker can devote all his time to the project without being hampered by other tasks.

Notwithstanding these advantages, money remains a limiting factor: the installation of a plant runs about a quarter of a million dollars. The decision to embark on the project therefore requires a close look at costs.

Studies show that when agricultural wastes are utilized only for their energy by-product, the economic benefits are minimal. On the other hand, when all the waste by-products are utilized in an integrated approach, the venture is more attractive.

Kibbutz Yagur is a good example. Its dairy consists of 800 cows, presently the sole source of waste matter for the plant. Each cow provides half a liter of liquified gas fuel per day; with 800 cows, this comes to 400 liters worth \$100 per day, or about \$30,000 annually. If energy were the only product, the investment would be questionable.

It is the cabutz that makes it all worthwhile. With 800 cows producing a ton of cabutz per day worth \$400, total proceeds are \$500 per day, or approximately \$150,000 per year. Fur-

thermore, the kibbutz saves \$25,000 annually - the cost of getting rid of waste deposits by conventional means. In the next few months, Kibbutz Yagur plans to use the liquid component of the slurry in fertilization, a step which will undoubtedly augment the profitability of the project.

As a commercial operation, Project Nefah also shows signs of success. On the home front, each kibbutz involved in the project sells cabutz to neighboring kibbutzim and nurseries. Shelley Terr, one of the coordinators of the Kibbutz Yagur project, says he barely manages to keep up with the flood of new orders.

Last year, Israel established a plant in Italy, and negotiations are underway for similar operations in several other European countries.

But the picture isn't always rosy. Waste matters vary from place to place and are not all suited to the Israeli system. In Italy, for example, this engendered problems initially. But current research is attempting to remedy this problem by improving the adaptability of the system. In addition, it is not always easy to sell the project abroad when most western countries, unlike Israel, have adequate reserves of energy and substrates.

Still, growing concern with environmental issues has led many countries to search for new safer ways of discarding wastes; Project Nefah offers a solution. Several major international concerns, presently undisclosed, are now negotiating joint research projects with Israel on the subject.■

DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC PROFILE OF GAZA STRIP PRESENTED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 2 Sep 84 p 10

[Article by Elisha' Efrat: "The Belt is Tightening"]

[Text] The Gaza Strip, which differs from Judaea and Samaria from the viewpoints of location, natural conditions and historical past, nevertheless does not present uncommon economic or development features. It would seem that the fact that a large population is contained within a politically and geographically limited strip of land and is governed by a civilian-military administration entails foreseeable economic effects, whether the area in question is located in the mountains or along the sea coast.

The Gaza Strip stretches over an area of merely 340 square kilometers. The majority of the population is Arab and is comprised of local inhabitants, refugees and bedouins coming from the Sinai peninsula. The population, which currently numbers some 476,000 people, is mainly concentrated in the major cities: Gaza, Khan Yunis, Dayr al-Balah, and Rafah, in the refugee camps of al-Shati and Jabalyah, and in the large villages of Lahya, Bayt Hanun, and Nusayrah. The population density in the strip is currently approximately 1,400 people per square kilometer, i.e. one of the highest in the world.

The original inhabitants of Gaza hardly make up 1/3 of the population today. In 1948 they were only 60,000-70,000 people. Some 54 percent of Gaza's population are defined as refugees, and some 13 percent are bedouins. The Gaza strip refugees are those who arrived there in the War of Independence, having abandoned their homes in the southern plain. The refugees live in physical and social isolation from the rest of the inhabitants and are in the care of the UN Refugee Administration. The camps that were built for them lack an appropriate infrastructure of services and have become slums with a population density of over 30,000 people per square kilometer. The situation of the refugees has been improving since 1967; Israeli authorities focused their efforts on ensuring that the treatment accorded the refugees is equal to that of all the other inhabitants. Rehabilitation endeavors began in 1971 for the refugees; a new infrastructure was established, on which people began building their houses. However, of the approximately 260,000 refugees currently living in the Gaza Strip, some 170,000 still live in camps, while the rest have moved to cities and villages.

The economic structure of the strip had always been based on agriculture, small-scale industry, and trade in traditional commodities. Some 70 percent of the land is under cultivation, and the main crop is citrus fruit. Few changes occurred in the urban structure of the Gaza Strip since the Six-Day War. The cities developed somewhat, but they are affected by a large population density, increasingly crowded conditions, unemployment, and a flimsy economic basis. These phenomena have led to increased social pressure brought to bear on the authorities in the 1960's and 1970's, as well as to a revival of extreme nationalistic feelings. The housing conditions that the Israeli authorities provided did ease the pressure to a certain extent, but the land thus made available did not meet all requirements. It should be recalled that 87 percent of the population live in towns and camps, where the need for housing solutions is at its most acute.

The Six-Day War brought economic changes to the Gaza Strip. The fact that the area was opened up and that people could now work in Israel contributed to alleviating the situation of the population. Since then, the living standard has become relatively higher, agriculture has improved, several plants have been built in the north of the strip, and the infrastructure has improved.

Labor Force Potential

The demographic development of Gaza shows that its population has been growing at an annual rate of 2.9 percent--twice as fast as in Judaea and Samaria. Drops in emigration were less significant than in Judaea and Samaria, since for many years previously emigration figures had been low, and in 1982 they only totaled 2,000. This drop in emigration balances a 0.5 percent growth in population. The birth rate in the Gaza Strip is very high--46 per 1,000--and in fact one of the highest in the world. The net natural population growth has reached 37 per 1,000 yearly, as compared to 32 per 1,000 in Judaea and Samaria, and less than 20 per 1,000 in Israel. As in Judaea and Samaria, there are fewer men than women: 823 men to 1,000 women.

The population of working age in Gaza totals about 250,000; the rate of employed people is 33.4 percent, and that of men alone 66 percent. Over 36 percent of the active manpower is employed in Israel, as compared to the 46 percent of the labor force employed in the Gaza Strip. The number of Gaza people employed in Israel increased by a 2.3 percent annual rate, totaling some 36,000. The percentage of people incorporated in the labor force has not changed significantly in recent years, and neither has the percentage of 18-24 year olds within it, unlike the situation in Judaea and Samaria. Here there was no significant drop in negative emigration, which could have increased the percentage of young people within the labor force.

A considerable drop occurred in agriculture--the major economic branch--in recent years in comparison to Judaea and Samaria. Gaza has a large area of irrigated fields, mostly in citrus. The citrus trees have been affected in the past few years from increased salinity in subterranean waters caused by excessive pumping, and as a result, many citrus groves had to be uprooted. Nevertheless, in the 1981-82 period agricultural production increased by about

2 percent, mostly citrus production, as did wholesale marketing of vegetables from Gaza to Judaea and Samaria, which was partly due to a drop in vegetable growing in those areas.

The construction branch in the Gaza Strip increased at an annual rate of about 1 percent, while the percentage of people employed in it increased at a somewhat higher rate. Construction work on housing starts and other projects was very slow in 1982, while work on projects in the finishing stages was much faster in the same period. The low number of new building projects may point to a continued slow-down in 1983, too. In the same period, the transportation and trade sectors increased in Gaza to a higher degree than in Judaea and Samaria.

In the second half of the 1970's, 80 percent of Gaza's citrus was exported to Jordan, but this figure dropped by 2/3 in the 1981-82 period while exports of vegetables and other fruit increased to make up the difference. General exports from the Gaza Strip to Jordan also dropped considerably. While in the second half of the 1970's exports from Gaza made up some 37 percent of general exports, in the 1981-82 period they dropped to only 27 percent, particularly as a result of increased industrial exports from Judaea and Samaria, which have become considerable. Gazan exports to Jordan increased by only 5 percent yearly, i.e. at a lower rate than in Judaea and Samaria. Gaza exports to Israel, which are mostly comprised of textiles, increased rapidly and reached a 10 percent annual rate, while exports from Judaea and Samaria to Israel dropped dramatically, to only 2 percent a year.

It must be noted that in 1981-1982 economic development in the Gaza Strip was very slow. The gross national product totaled no more than 2 percent, as compared to an average of 4 percent in the previous 4 years. The combination of slow increase in the gross national product and rapid population growth caused the per capita product to drop at an average annual rate of 1 percent. The increase recorded in the gross national product in the Gaza Strip was due to an approximately 5 percent annual increase in the income of foreign production factors, which make up about 1/3 of the production, while local production failed to increase at all. Gaza production incomes are derived mainly from employment in Israel. Gaza's economy is less influenced by changes in the Arab countries, and hence yearly fluctuations in economic components are less perceptible.

It can be said in conclusion that the economies of both Gaza and Judaea and Samaria suffer from a lack of free markets, from a lack of varied means of production, from rapid population growth, from increasing population density, and from a development infrastructure that does not keep pace with people's requirements. The pool of young labor is increasing in both areas and, as opportunities for emigration and for work abroad open up, this labor force will increasingly seek jobs in Israel and will become increasingly dissatisfied with the local agricultural and industrial conditions. This demographic and economic phenomenon exacerbates even more the issue of the future of the territories, whose situation will not significantly improve whether they are completely incorporated in or completely severed from Israel.

12782

CSO: 4423/2

DEFENSE BUDGET CUTBACKS SALUTARY FOR ECONOMY, ARMY

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 2 Sep 84 p 7

[Article by Matityahu Peled: "Reduction for the Sake of Efficiency"]

[Text] A reduction of the defense budget to about 10 percent of the gross national product within 3 years will restore the IDF to the principle of quality over quantity.

In his article of 16 August, Nehemiya Strassler points out that cutbacks in the defense budget is the primary condition for resolving our economic problems. This is undoubtedly correct. Strassler adds that the relationship between increases in our defense spending and actual security is a very strange relationship, and that contrary to expectations and to practice anywhere else, our defense budget increased after each war.

This phenomenon was revealed after the Six-Day War, after the Yom Kipur War, and after the latest war in Lebanon and appears to be a recurring phenomenon with us after each war. Every graph charting Israel's defense spending since the 1950's shows a constant increase that does not seem at all connected to Israel's security situation and does not come as a result of the war, despite the fact that after each war there was a considerable jump in defense spending. A pamphlet put out by Ma'rakhot entitled "THE PRICE OF POWER," shows how defense expenditures rose from approximately 7 percent of the gross national product in 1954 to about 30 percent in the past year without any discernible link between Israel's security needs and the size of the defense budget.

N. Strassler undoubtedly points out a strange and very serious phenomenon that should be examined carefully. However, the solution he suggests--and which he describes as an economic management of the army--seeks the explanation for the above phenomenon in the wrong place, like the person who looks for a lost coin under a lit lamppost.

There is no doubt that the army can, to a great extent, be run on the basis of economic principles. At the time when the logistical system of the IDF was reformed in the years 1966-67 it was established that the principle of economic management will govern all army production and service bodies, such as rehabilitation and maintenance centers, support centers and so forth. That

reform considerably improved the efficiency of those bodies both from the viewpoint of budget and quality. However, the assumption that this principle can be implemented in the management of the regional commands and of the corps is unrealistic, and the last remnants of such a concept had long since disappeared from other armies of the world. The phenomenon highlighted by N. Strassler is not the result of bad management but of an incorrect policy, and this fact merits clarification.

Let us dwell on the two examples brought by Strassler in his article: the Six-Day War and the Yom Kipur War and their impact on the defense budget. The first war considerably increased the buffer between the armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria and Israel's borders. The newly created situation could have become a tremendous security asset. The IDF's strength was proven, and the threat posed by the presence of Jordanian and Syrian troops on our borders was lifted (the Egyptian troops had been normally stationed on the western bank of the Suez Canal and their presence in the border area was not of military significance). This new situation should have led to the conclusion that Israel's defense budget was appropriate and that the improvement which occurred in Israel's military position as a result of the war warranted no changes in the budget, unless it was to reduce it.

It should be recalled that the war ended in a ceasefire agreement monitored by UN forces, and that for a long time there was no fear that the defeated armies would take any offensive against Israel. In that situation it would have been easy to encourage diplomatic initiatives designed to explore the possibility of more stable arrangements which, in the final analysis, could have led to peace. One should note that the Arab countries did come forth with proposals which contained elements propitious to such initiatives immediately after the end of the war, such as Egypt's suggestion to meet for talks within the framework of the Ceasefire Committee and its proposal to discuss the resumption of work on the Suez Canal, not to mention the initiatives of Gunnar Jarring, the mediator appointed by the Security Council.

However, the Israeli government decided upon a different path. Instead of viewing the territories that were occupied as a safety buffer zone free of enemy troops and as a positive element of security, the government decided to eliminate the area separating the armies, to advance the IDF's troops in menacing strength to the ceasefire lines, and to provide considerable logistic apparatus in support of the new expansion. Any army in the world would have viewed this development as threatening, since it created the potential for a surprise attack, and the reaction of the three Arab armies was the outcome of this fear. That is how the war of attrition broke out or intensified along all three fronts, the Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian fronts. And as if the new military expansion were not enough, we were subjected to the plague of the settlements, which proved that the Arab governments had reason to worry not only about Israeli attack, but also about permanent Israeli expansion beyond its borders.

Thus, instead of the relaxation that should have followed the victories of the Six-Day War, a new tension was created. This tension added a measure of urgency to the new expansion--which was intrinsically unjustified--while the

defense budget climbed to about 11 percent of the gross national product in 1966 and to over 26 percent in 1971. This jump was not the result of an objective defense situation, but the result of the superfluous tension that the Israeli government had created through its policy of expansion, a policy that neutralized the actual gains of the war.

It is interesting to note that after the signing of the peace agreement with Egypt, in the wake of which the IDF withdrew from the Sinai peninsula, the government decided not to dismantle the troops that had been established to hold that area but to consolidate them within our borders. That decision obliterated any financial advantage that may have been derived from the peace with Egypt. We thus found out that neither victory in war nor peace were sufficient to alleviate our defense burden.

In the wake of the Yom Kipur War the defense budget jumped to close to 50 percent of the gross national product and only gradually did it drop to the current rate of over 27 percent. This increase had no security justification. At the end of that war--which came as the direct consequence of the policy described above--there was no reason to fear that war will break out again. Political initiatives, first through the Geneva Peace Committee and then through direct American mediation, brought about partial arrangements and finally to the peace with Egypt. However, the trauma caused by the Egyptian-Syrian attack and by the important gains achieved by the Arab armies in the first stages of the war constituted sufficient reason to pour unreasonable amounts of money into the defense apparatus, and it was this pouring out that completely disrupted the organizational and theoretical principles that had governed the IDF before the Six-Day War.

The abundance of money at the disposal of the army shifted the military stress from the reserves to the regular army, because the means were now available to establish and maintain a large regular army. And since this quantitative increase (unaccompanied by actual strengthening) paved the way for in-corps growth, the corps developed like independent kingdoms, as if they could have fought each by itself without support from the others. This evil was clearly discerned by part of the higher command and various proposals were advanced to halt this process by establishing new divisions that would promote the concept of joint corps warfare. However, nothing was done to implement these ideas.

Indeed, there is no difficulty greater than to attempt to curb armies that seek to build empires for themselves and that have the means to do so. An infantry command was recently established, but it is still at the inception stage and there are as yet no signs that it will indeed be capable of turning the wheel back and of restoring the IDF to the position of an army built on quality, not quantity.

One of the objective consequences of this process of unchecked quantitative growth is that the IDF's capability is dropping just as its size is increasing. In other words, not only does the defense budget increase, but the returns from this great investment are diminishing. Today's IDF costs the state close to 30 percent of the gross national product but provides it with less security

than in the past. In fact, the state currently pays much more for its defense than the increase in the budget would indicate, because the IDF's quality is now lower.

The last proof that this indeed is the case comes from the lesson of the Lebanese invasion of 1982. By itself the political-moral question involved in the invasion of Lebanon points out that an army twice the strength of that in the Six-Day War failed to secure, after 90 days of fighting, any of the objectives it had set to achieve. And while in the Six-Day War the IDF fought against three large and well-equipped armies, in Lebanon it actually faced several thousand Palestinian guerilla fighters and about 1 and 1/2 Syrian brigades. Faced with these forces the IDF not only failed to achieve its objectives, but suffered most embarrassing failures.

The explanation to this phenomenon is dual. Firstly, following the quantitative growth, the IDF's field troops became an average army in which the principles of resourcefulness, initiative among the lower ranks, and original planning and execution were relegated to a very low priority. Secondly, while the IDF was increasing in size so were the Arab armies, and at the moment the IDF ceases to be a quality army and becomes like the other armies in which the stress is placed on size, at that moment it loses its major advantage and its superiority begins to fade.

The main conclusion of this analysis is that sizable cutbacks in the defense budget are necessary not only for the sake of Israel's economy, but also for the IDF's future. Only when the IDF has to handle its objectives within the framework of a reduced budget--cutbacks that should bring the defense budget to, for example, 10 percent of the gross national product within 3 years--will it be in a position to improve its quality and to provide the country with the security it needs.

12782

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GAZA REFUGEE EVICTION DEFERRED

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 7 Sep 84 p 3

[Article by David Mandel: "Court Delays Eviction of Gaza Refugees"]

[Text]

The High Court of Justice yesterday rejected a petition by 35 Palestinian refugee families in the Gaza District. The government wants to evict them from their illegally built homes in Beit Lahiya to make way for a comprehensive rehabilitation plan for refugees in the nearby Jabalya camp. But a 1½-year-old temporary injunction against the evictions was kept in force for another six months, during which the two sides were instructed to seek a compromise.

The military government has offered compensation to some of the refugees, who squatted on the state-owned land at various times after they fled their homes in what became Israel in 1948. The Egyptian government did not evict them. In trying to do so now, however, the Israeli authorities are relying on Egyptian law, which, unlike Israeli law, does not recognize ownership

on the basis of extended possession.

Petitioners who own land elsewhere were not offered compensation, according to their lawyer, Felicia Langer. But most of them, she said, cannot afford to build new homes on that land, even if it is suitable for such construction.

The petitioners relied in their suit on estoppel – the authorities' failure to act until now, recognized in the common law tradition as sometimes granting a right – and on international law. The 1907 Hague convention, Langer argued, obliges an occupying power to act in a manner consistent with the public welfare, except in cases having to do with military security, which the present case does not.

Justices Miriam Ben-Porath, Shlomo Levin and Tova Strasberg-Cohen disagreed, however, confirming that Egyptian law, which does not recognize estoppel, applies. The purpose of the government's action, they further ruled, is also clearly for

the general good of the area's residents.

The justices nevertheless seemed reluctant to totally reject the petition, and asked state representative Renato Jarach if the military government would be willing to defer the eviction until the refugee-rehabilitation plans are ready to be implemented. But he refused, and was visibly disappointed by the six-month delay granted, along with instructions to negotiate for fair compensation.

In another petition brought by Langer yesterday on behalf of the family of Abdul-Latif Omar, Jarach announced that the military government would reconsider the sealing of Omar's home in the village of Al-Maskufi near Tulkarm in Samaria. Omar was convicted of attempting to commit a terrorist act two years ago and is now serving a prison sentence. But other members of his family who were not involved remain unable to use the house.

CSO: 4400/13

FOREIGN WORKERS LINKED TO UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEM

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 4 Sep 84 Finance Supplement pp 3, 12

[Article by Avraham Dishon: "Foreign Work Force"]

[Text] It is no secret that thousands of foreign workers are currently employed in Israel without work permits, particularly in uncomplicated but difficult jobs in industrial enterprises, as cooks and waiters in luxury restaurants and hotels, as household help in private homes, in construction, and even in agriculture. Normally, both the Histadrut and the Employment Agency prefer to ignore this reality, since the foreign workers usually do hard or "dirty" work, man uncomfortable shifts, or perform menial jobs that none of the "spoiled" Israeli workers is prepared to do.

However, whenever the employment situation in Israel deteriorates, administrative managers cry out against and "discover" the phenomenon of foreign workers employed in the country with or without work permits. Such discoveries are normally accompanied by statements to the effect that all illegal foreign workers must be expelled, since they deprive unemployed Israelis of a livelihood.

Anyone familiar with the employment situation in Israel will receive these statements with great indifference in view of the fact that Israelis--even the unemployed among them--will not agree to take the place of the expelled foreign workers. However, the authors of the statements continue their loud outcry and in the process see themselves awarded big fat headlines in the media, while the foreign workers continue to work without permits as if nothing happened. Dogs bark and the caravan passes.

A Cheap Labor Force

Who are the thousands of foreign workers currently employed in Israel without work permits?

Such workers can be divided in several groups, the largest among them being that of teenagers who wander from country to country and take on any job to finance their stay and their travels.

Most of those young people work in restaurants, guest houses, and hotels, where they are prepared to do any job, even the basest cleaning job, for a low salary. Some people say that half of the hotel and tourist business in Elat is based on that type of worker. As soon as they have put aside enough money to travel they buy a plane ticket and are off to the next country.

Another group, which counts about 1,000 workers, lives in Israel and is employed in industry. People in this group arrived in Israel in recent years particularly from Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey, and are employed exclusively on the night shift in various plants. Their presence is particularly felt in the industrial area around Holon.

This type of workers finds employment easily because Israelis are not prepared to do shift work on a permanent basis. Workers committees in the respective plants close their eyes and allow the foreigners to continue working--as long as they remain their "night workers."

Fines Do Not Help

A third group of foreign workers is comprised of about 400 nurses and house maids employed in rich homes; some arrived in Israel from south-east Asian countries, particularly from the Philippines. All efforts to expel them have so far been to no avail, possibly because of the pressure brought to bear by their Israeli employees.

In addition to those groups, currently there are some 25,000-30,000 illegal workers from Judaea, Samaria and Gaza employed in Israel, on top of the approximately 55,000 who come to Israel on a permit.

The most difficult problem is identifying the foreign workers; especially difficult is to identify such workers in menial hotel and restaurant jobs--they come for short periods of time and soon disappear again. Employers actually profit from this cheap manpower and are not prepared to give it up.

In some cases the Israeli employers procure housing for their foreign workers--in conditions that are not of the best, to say the least. Employers justly claim that they cannot get Israeli workers for those jobs, and they are prepared to pay the fines levied on them from time to time in order to keep their foreign workers.

Sources at the Employment Agency state that were employers prepared to raise salaries, they would have no trouble finding Israelis, even for menial jobs.

The Employment Agency admits that it does not have the capability to inspect all restaurants and hotels in the country; its managers have requested reinforcements in order to bolster their control system, but have yet to receive the approval of the Finance Ministry to proceed along this line.

A Conspiracy of Silence

Managers of the Employment Agency claim that there exists a conspiracy of silence among all plant workers concerning the foreign workers, in view of the fact that they, too, profit from the employment of foreigners for night shifts, which thus frees them from this unpleasant chore.

The Employment Agency stresses that there is cooperation between employers, who pay lower wages to foreign workers, and workers thus exempted from night work. And so, one finds Yugoslav, Turkish, and Greek workers employed for heavy work without social rights and unprotected against firing.

As for the foreign maids, who, for some reason, are all known as "Philippines," they can mostly be found in luxury residential areas and represent a status symbol for successful businessmen. One of the biggest diamond dealers, who employs a Philippine maid, says that was the only way for him to organize his household without problems.

The maids are paid about \$1,000 a month including board and one yearly trip home, but those who can afford it say it is worth the expense. All efforts to expel the 400 or so maids have so far failed. In some cases, the pressure brought to bear on the Ministry of the Interior was based on the claim that the girls provided therapeutical assistance to employers who had procured medical certificates specifically for the purpose.

We must, however, add that even if swift and thorough steps were taken to expel the 400 foreign workers from Israel ((as published)) it is doubtful whether Israeli workers could be found to take their place, since the latter are not prepared to accept every type of job currently available. The employers, on the other hand, forcefully claim that the foreign workers merely fill gaps existing in the employment market and are thus not a factor in solving the unemployment problem.

It is to be noted that 1,418 foreign workers have been given work permits and are legally employed in the following branches:

- 71 are industrial staff, most of them employed in the air force industry;
- 353 in tourist and hotel branches, including artists and entertainers, chefs, hotel managers and so forth;
- 168 in medical facilities, including operating room and intensive care nurses;
- 194 researchers in institutes of higher education, and special researchers;
- 55 university lecturers;
- 68 special humanitarian cases, such as nurses to invalids who arrived in Israel in their company.

In some cases the jobs could have been filled with Israelis, if such had been found, particularly in tourist facilities, hotels, and restaurants.

UNEMPLOYMENT CAUSING CONCERN IN NEGEV

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 9 Sep 84 p 3

[Text] BEERSHEBA (Itim).--A steady upward trend in unemployment figures for Beersheba and the Negev is a source of worry to local officials. Local labour exchange head Leon Miyuni noted on Friday that the number of job-seekers in Beersheba increased by 10 percent in August and that more dismissals are on the way. Miyuni also pointed out that a considerable number of soldiers are due to be demobilized in the near future, which would aggravate the situation.

One encouraging tendency is a willingness of job-seekers to take less popular jobs, said the labour exchange head. As the job market became tighter, people are proving less choosy about their employment, he noted.

Local labour council secretary Arik Nissan is concerned about another trend: the decline in new jobs. There were only 700 jobs going in Beersheba in August, a decrease of 10 per cent over July and of 15 per cent compared to June. He forecast several hundred more unemployed in the near future. The Negev has 2,600 unemployed, but some 4,700 are looking for jobs, while not yet being officially classified as unemployed.

Some 2,000 workers from Judea and Samaria are registered at the Beersheba labour exchange, but the exchange estimates that the actual number working in Beersheba and nearby is at least twice that figure. Attempts are being made to prevent the unofficial employment of these workers.

One of Beersheba's unemployed is Avraham Dadon, 27, a graduate of the Beersheba Technical College, who was employed by a local factory which went bankrupt. Dadon has been reporting at the local labour exchange three times a week for the past four months.

Another is Yohai Hanan, 50, who worked for 25 years laying floor tiles for the Solel Boneh construction company. He retired from the company last year and started a private business, but he has not been able to find enough work and has joined the ranks of job-seekers. He has managed to find some employment, but says that he is always fired after a few months so that he does not achieve permanent status. His efforts to get back into Solel Boneh have proved fruitless.

Moshe Cohen, 27, did a retraining course and earned a certificate as a production technician, but he has been unable to find work in the Negev. He has now been told that he should take another retraining course for work in the Dead Sea Works or at Negev Phosphates. He is reluctant to start another course, but says that there does not seem to be an alternative. He is finding it difficult to exist on IS70,000 per month unemployment pay.

Mark Gavriel, 21, a technical secretary, has not been able to find employment since leaving the army, except for a few days here and there with private contractors. He notes that he fought in Lebanon and is shortly to return there on reserve duty. He has served his country, he says, but the state is not helping him.

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PLANT TO PRODUCE SHALE PETROLEUM

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 19 Sep 84 p 3

[Article by Aaron Sittner]

[Text]

With an estimated 10 billion tons of oil shale buried beneath the soil in various parts of the country, the Energy and Infrastructure Ministry has finally decided to build a pilot plant that could produce 1,000 barrels of oil a day.

Shale is a layered sedimentary rock formed from clay under heat and pressure. The bituminous variety of shale is rich in petroleum and related substances.

Exploiting shale as a basic energy source here has been under investigation for many years. The decision to begin work on the pilot plant was based on recommendations of the ministry's steering committee, headed by chief scientist Dan Zaslavsky.

The committee found that "it is

very reasonable to assume that extracting oil from shale in Israel will be economically feasible... Israel's known shale deposits could provide 600 million tons of petroleum, a quantity that could fill our needs for decades."

The ministry reported that a company in Colorado had used Israeli shale several times in its extraction process and had found it suitable for petroleum production. As a result, a ministry-affiliated company, Pituah Mashabei Energia (Development of Energy Resources), had signed an agreement with the American firm on the technology to be used in processing the shale here.

CSO: 4400/13

ISLAMIC BANK EXPANDS OPERATIONS

East Burnham ARABIA: THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English No 38, Oct 84 p 53

[Text]

bank's financial report for the fiscal year ending 30 June, 1984, which has just been published, suggests that a substantial increase has been achieved in investments and deposits.

In the real-estate sector during the fiscal year 1984 the bank has financed projects totalling JD1.5m (approx \$4m). In the housing sector the bank is working on its first housing project for middle-income earners. The project comprises 30 villas, 213 apartments, a shopping centre covering 7,000 sq. metres, a school, a mosque, a library, a club and a car-park. It costs JD13m (\$34m).

The bank has already acquired land for its second housing project for low-income earners. In education, the bank has financed Jarash College at Jarash, Hitteen College at Amman and the campus of Jerusalem College at Amman, at a total cost of JD1.16m (\$3m). In transport, the bank has participated in a syndication with the Kuwait Finance House for Royal Jordanian Airlines (ALIA) for the sum of KD10m. The Jordan Islamic Bank's share of the syndication is KD2m (\$6.5m).

The bank has also financed a fleet of trucks to help the road transit trade between Jordan and neighbouring Arab countries, especially with war-hit Iraq. In the health sector, the bank has financed five hospitals in Jordan to the tune of JD1.6m. In the petroleum sector it has extended finance facilities totalling \$10m to the Jordan Petroleum Refinery Company.

THE Jordan Islamic Bank, as part of its expansion plans, will open four more branches this year, bringing its total to twelve. The new branches will be opened in the major cities of Jordan. A spokesman told *Arabia* that the bank's new head office and main branch in Amman is almost ready for opening. The bank already employs between 350-400 people.

Preliminary information about the

KUWAIT

BRIEFS

BANKS FACED WITH BANKRUPTCY--A group of Kuwaiti banks whose capital does not exceed 750 million dinars had lent more than 4 billion dinars to creditors involved in the al-Manakh crisis. These banks are now faced with bankruptcy. The government is trying to solve the crisis quietly fearing that depositors might withdraw their capital and thereby trigger a collapse of the banking system in Kuwait. [Text] [London AL-MAJALLAH No 245, 20-26 Oct 84 p 3]

CSO: 4404/43

AGRICULTURE SECTOR DECLINE DETAILED

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 69, 4 Aug 84 p 64

[Text] Since the beginning of the Lebanese war in the middle of 1975, the Lebanese agriculture sector has witnessed dramatic developments and significant changes that have continued throughout the war years. These developments worsened noticeably during and after the Israeli invasion in the summer of 1982 and they continue. These developments and changes have had a clearly negative impact on the underpinnings of Lebanese agriculture in terms of the area of land under cultivation, the amount of production, the amount of imports, and the percentage of the workforce in this sector. Statistics recently issued by the General Labor Federation indicate a significant reduction in the percentage of participation of the agriculture sector in domestic production. The decline is from 15 percent in 1975 to 6.5 percent by the end of 1980. Concerning the total agriculture sector workforce, which had represented 34 percent of the total Lebanese workforce in 1975, the statistics show that this percentage has declined considerably due to developments in the Lebanese war which has produced new economic and political realities in the country. The figure declined to 14 percent in 1978, then to 8 percent at the end of 1982.

Statistics from the Lebanese Fruit Bureau also indicate that there was a significant decline in the amount and value of agricultural exports during the war years. These statistics note a decline in the amount of fruit and citrus exports from 519,623 tons in 1975 to 319,623 tons at the end of 1981 and then to 257,309 tons at the end of 1982. The value of these exports declined from 1.7 billion Lebanese pounds in 1975 to 950 million pounds in 1981 and 715 million pounds in 1982. As for the value of such exports in 1983, unofficial statistics (the Fruit Bureau stopped issuing statistics in 1982) indicate a further decline in the value of these exports. The value is estimated at under 150 million Lebanese pounds.

The extent of the damage, or disaster, is clear from a quick reading of the above statistics. This has happened to the Lebanese agriculture sector as a result of well-known events in Lebanon that began in the middle of 1975 and were instrumental in the flight of much of the agricultural workforce for security reasons. These events also made it difficult to work the land during the repeated episodes of violence witnessed by most Lebanese regions. In addition, they created a number of problems in the area of marketing agricultural production domestically and abroad. It is also clear that the greatest

damage to the Lebanese agricultural apparatus has come at the hands of the invading Israeli forces since the summer of 1982, particularly in the south of Lebanon and the western Biqa' region where there has been an Israeli occupation from the date of the invasion until today.

Israel, which invaded Lebanon under the guise of Operation Peace for Galilee, has exceeded the military and security goals of its invasion and has pursued economic goals represented by Israeli ambitions in Lebanon to control the land, the water and the people. No sooner had Israel set foot in the south of Lebanon and the western Biqa' than it began to strike at the underpinnings of the Lebanese economy, most importantly, agriculture. This cleared the way for the invasion of Israeli agricultural exports into the Lebanese market and from there into the Arab market. For some time Israel has faced agricultural problems resulting from restricted markets.

In fulfilling Israeli schemes aimed at hitting the Lebanese economic structure, the occupation forces in the south and the western Biqa', under the guise of security and the protection of forces, burned hundreds of acres of agricultural land and turned it into wasteland. They especially went after tobacco plants and citrus and olive trees, which represent the agricultural and economic base in Lebanon and the south in particular.

The occupation forces also limited the removal of agricultural production from the south and the western Biqa' to Lebanese and Arab markets. This has led and still leads to produce remaining on the ground threatened by spoilage. By contrast, Israel unleashed its agricultural production to invade the south and from there the various Lebanese regions at exorbitant prices. This has contributed to economic failure for many Lebanese agricultural harvests, in light of the inability to compete. In addition, Israel has tried to market its agricultural products in a number of Arab countries via Lebanon. This has prompted more than one Arab country to bar the entry of Lebanese agricultural products into their markets out of fear that these products are of Israeli origin. This led to the unsaleability of a number of Lebanese agricultural harvests when the Arab markets were closed to them because these are the primary markets for Lebanese exports.

In the face of the dangerous Israeli practices, which have begun to threaten to a large extent the Lebanese agricultural structure and which threaten to generate dangerous political and social complications by stripping the south and the western Biqa' of its people and creating an army from the unemployed agricultural workers, the government has moved to institute a plan of action that could lead to the liberation of agriculture from the restrictions enforced by the Israeli occupation. This plan came about after a number of meetings held by Minister of Agriculture 'Adil 'Usayran which included influential people and experts in the agricultural field. Among the most important steps decided on by the state in this regard are the following:

1. Immediate high level contacts are to be made with the Arab countries to urge them to import Lebanese agricultural products. It appears that these contacts have begun to bear fruit, if only in terms of principles. The Arab League (the Arab Social and Economic Council) has made a recommendation

calling on the Arab states to facilitate the entry of Lebanese exports into their markets. However, this recommendation, which was made almost a month ago, has not been translated into action.

2. The Lebanese government is to purchase some agricultural crops from the south, such as tobacco and olive seedlings, and pay the farmers and then sell them at a later time for its own account. This step is aimed at supporting the Lebanese farmer, especially the farmer in the south, keeping him on his land, and thwarting the Israeli occupiers' schemes which are aimed at destroying the land and the people in Lebanon.

3. An effort will be made to establish agricultural cooperatives in the various regions of Lebanon, which are to purchase crops from farmers and market them later locally and abroad in conformity with a general marketing policy to be decided on by the state.

4. [The state] will work to secure new markets for Lebanese exports in general and agricultural exports in particular.

We are now waiting for the Lebanese government to implement the plan it has drawn up to limit as much as possible the damage to agriculture. Finally, it remains for us to point out the importance of government support for the Lebanese agriculture sector, especially in the south and the Biqa'. This support must come as quickly as possible in order to thwart Israeli schemes aimed at destroying Lebanese land and stripping it of its residents so that it can achieve its expansionist goals in Lebanon and strike at the Lebanese economy, which has always been a strong competitor with the Israeli economy.

12608

CSO: 4404/626

PRESSURE MOUNTING AGAINST CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES SPEAKER

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 69, 4 Aug 84 pp 12-13

[Text] It appears that the continuation of Kamil al-As'ad as speaker of the Chamber of Deputies has become a topic of discussion by local, regional and international parties for a wide range of reasons. The positions adhered to by the man are viewed by these parties as an obstacle to closing the Lebanese file. This is a summary of the information obtained by AL-TADAMUN, which is presented in this analysis in detail.

It has now become well known that every region of Lebanon has been subjected to bloody events that have paved the way for the entry of brigades of the legitimate army whose majority leadership and rank and file comprise the people of the region the army is entering or members of the region's confession.

This same principle will apply when implementation is begun of some of the things that were agreed upon in the two dialog conferences, the Damascus summit and the Bikfayya talks regarding changes in the system of government. This is raised in connection with the vote of confidence for the Karami government from the Chamber of Deputies. Everyone still recalls the calamitous days that preceded this most recent confidence vote session. At that time, the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies Kamil al-As'ad was accused by his enemies of being the direct cause of what happened, because of his opposition to granting the government the extraordinary mandatory powers to enforce what had been agreed upon--the modifications to the system of government in accordance with the contents of the ministerial statement that contained the primary outlines for government and governing policies.

In addition to opposing the abrogation of the 17 May agreement with Israel before finding an alternative for liberating the south, Speaker al-As'ad continued to insist that no new deputies be appointed and that the membership of the Chamber of Deputies not be increased before the constitution is amended. This will require ratification by two-thirds of the members of the Chamber and is unlikely as long as al-As'ad remains the speaker of parliament.

Due to numerous other considerations, including failed attempts to bring al-As'ad and Syrian officials together, the loss of cooperation between the executive and legislative branches due to disagreement between the president

of the republic and the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies that has reached a point that they have not met for 3 months--in violation of the law which requires them to meet at least once a week--despite their long friendship and family ties, and due to representation in government of the Islamic Shiite sect--now embodied by al-As'ad in the three-sided pyramid of government--being restricted to the Amal movement and its allies after the two dialog conferences, the Damascus summit and the Bikfayya resolutions, due to all of this and more, Kamil al-As'ad's continuation at the head of the legislative branch has become a stumbling block to regional, international and local desires to close the Lebanese file before the advent of the era after the American presidential elections when Middle East regional issues will be discussed. Damascus is seeking to close the Lebanese file so that it can engross itself in dealing with plans for [regional] solutions in the aforementioned period and employ the card of its success in Lebanon. Israel, for its part, does not oppose this as long as it retains the card of the south in its hand.

Speaker al-As'ad himself knows that some are demanding his head and that he must "deliver" it--and the word is not a recommendation--or leave or do his job.

Those close to the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies believe it is unlikely that there will be a change in his stance in opposition to the directives of the government and its ally, Damascus. He is convinced that they are wrong, that they will not rescue the south, and that they are all serving, perhaps unintentionally, a conspiracy to partition the country and take away the south. It is well known that he is stubborn in his convictions and firm with those who act rashly. He is a talented politician who has perfected the art of the parliamentary game and is skilled at maneuvering in the Lebanese political labyrinth. His enemies say that he was brought up spoiled and that he lives in a high ivory tower, far from his people and kin. From the time he was a child accustomed to people kissing his hand, when he inherited the family leadership from his father Ahmad al-As'ad, and before him his grandfather Kamal Bey, who was his mother's father, he has not been able to rid himself of his arrogance and his disdain for people, even his most loyal supporters.

His supporters respond that he is a skilled lawyer and parliamentarian who has developed a wide range of experience through his tenure in office. He was elected deputy in 1956 despite his father's loss in the elections made fraudulent by Camille Sham'un. He differed with the Shihabists and lost in 1960. He was then reelected to his father's seat and to the post of speaker of the Chamber of Deputies for the first time in 1964, when he was able to coerce General Fu'ad Shihab into not renewing his term. He continued as a successful deputy from the south and headed a bloc that included at least nine deputies, and he continues to hold the speakership. He was behind the elections of Charles Hilu, Sulayman Franjiyah, Ilyas Sarkis, and then Bashir and Amin al-Jumayyil to the presidency of the Republic. This experience has taught him that serving his country, his people, his family, and especially his region--the south--and its people can only be accomplished through a wise and mature policy devoid of emotionalism. It is true that he was spoiled and inherited tremendous leadership, but this has not made him arrogant and

haughty. Rather, it has made him proud, full of self-respect, confident in his views and firm in his position.

His stern statement at the door the temporary parliament headquarters recently is an indication that he continues to adhere to this inflexible position.

Sources close to al-As'ad believe that many deputies who are his proteges will be forced to oppose his reelection as speaker of the Chamber of Deputies for a 2-year term instead of a 1-year term in accordance with the amendments agreed to at the conferences in Lausanne. The deputies of the Phalange Party and the National Liberal Party may decide not to support him--and this is likely--not because they oppose him but because they are bound to what was agreed upon, especially during the discussions with Syrian Vice President 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam in Bikfayya, regarding limiting the representation of the confessions to those who participated in the dialog conferences, and al-As'ad was not among these. If this is the case, then al-As'ad will not retain any hope of returning to the seat of the "second president." However, if the Phalange and National Liberal Party deputies, along with the bloc of independent Maronite deputies, some Sunni deputies, and the deputies of al-As'ad's block insist on their current support for him, then the country, and especially Beirut, will see more bloodshed during the first half of October when the elections for the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies are scheduled.

Those close to al-As'ad see the names mentioned as candidates for the speakership as posing a threat to many of the powers [in parliament], something which will help to garner their support for al-As'ad. Husayn al-Husayni from Ba'labakk, for example, may be acceptable to moderates and radicals alike, but he is rejected by some of the powerful Shi'a because he represents a threat to their leadership. Besides, he is not from the South, which, in light of the current concerns about losing the south, is undesirable since there must be an effort to keep the second president in the country a Shiite from the south.

Dr 'Ali al-Khalil is from Tyre and, despite the fact that he is a close friend of the president of the Republic, which would mean a desirable relationship between the heads of the executive and legislative branches, his previous "leftist" views and his non-adherence to the Amal policy line clearly make him an unlikely successor.

Kazim al-Khalil, an old-timer from Tyre, is also an unlikely candidate because he is vice president of the National Liberal Party headed by Camille Sham'un. Nonetheless, he has good relations with both al-As'ad and Nabih Birri.

There are others, such as Rafiq Shahin, 'Abd-al-Latif al-Zayn, etc.

Those close to al-As'ad say that there is only one that could be a serious candidate likely to secure something of a consensus among the deputies to elect him to the speakership as a successor to al-As'ad, and his name has

not yet been circulated in the crowded market of candidates, which confirms his desire not to get burned and not to pursue the seat of the second president seriously. The name is that of 'Adil 'Usayran, the current minister of defense and a participant in the dialog conferences who represented the Shi'a alongside Nabih Birri, the head of the Amal Movement and former speaker of the Chamber of Deputies. He is one of the premier independents and famous for his moderate positions. This, in addition to his capabilities, secured agreement to support his mission of political supervision of the army. Despite the fact that he is a member of the establishment, he enjoys the support of the prominent Shi'a with revolutionary tendencies as well as Shi'a prominent in economic circles who have tremendous material influence. All of this would make him a good candidate for a "compromise solution." In this case, sources close to al-As'ad conclude that because the current speaker wants the Lebanese legislative branch to continue and be renewed, and because he also wants the democratic and legitimate regime in Lebanon to continue, he would prefer to withdraw from the battle after delivering a statement in which he would express his opposition to everything that is occurring in the Lebanese arena, as he threatened in his latest speech. They say that his statement would reveal important secrets for the first time about the period that followed the Israeli invasion, his role in the election of Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil to the presidency, the promises that Bashir made to him and broke concerning the south, and the limits Bashir placed on relations with Israel which led to his death. In addition, he will relate the story of the election of Shaykh Amin al-Jumayyil, the 17 May agreement, and the conspiracies that are under way to detach the south and gnaw away at it.

Information made available to AL-TADAMUN indicates that as soon as 'Usayran is elected to the speakership, there will be movement to expand the government so that it will comprise 22 ministers including representatives from all important groups, in particular the Franjiyah bloc, the Salam bloc, the Armenian bloc, and the independent Maronites bloc. Then the number of members in the Chamber of Deputies will be increased to 120 and the new appointees will be selected from among groups that support the government so that there will not be a repeat of the opposition to the extraordinary mandatory powers in the Chamber of Deputies. At the same time, members of the constitution committee that will draw up the fundamentals of the new system will be named. But from now until next October, the government's efforts will be restricted to implementing the security plan in all regions of the country and to reviving the state's economic structure.

12608

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PHALANGISTS ELECT NEW LEADER

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 239, 8-14 Sep 84 p 16

[Article by Zaki Shihab: "Phalangists Elect Elie Karamah President: No One Can Take the Place of Shaykh Pierre Except President Amin al-Jumayyil"]

[Text] Many questions hover over the Lebanon situation as a result of the death of Phalangist chief Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil; they oscillate between the question of who will succeed him in the Lebanese Front and the question of who will take over his ministerial post. Is something basic changing in the Phalangist Party, in the Lebanese Forces, and in Muslim-Christian cooperation as a result of the death of the Lebanese leader?

Dr Elie Karamah, the new Phalangist leader, is seen as a likely candidate to succeed Pierre al-Jumayyil in the Lebanese Front. Phalangist Deputy George Sa'adah, who is close to the president of the republic, is expected to take Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil's place, and Louis Abu Sharaf or Edmond Rizq may be destined to take over the ministerial post, although these central positions and changes are not the important thing. What is important is the manner of making transfers in Lebanese politics, in which President Amin al-Jumayyil is heir to his father.

In recording the memories of his childhood Pierre al-Jumayyil said that he was born into a conservative household: the man was head of the house, and the young respected and absolutely obeyed the old. He added that in these days it might be called reactionary, and said: "If those customs are reactionary, then I am reactionary."

The Maronite household is a conservative one; if the father dies, authority is transferred to the son. The word of the leader is law in this conservative household, especially in historical periods in which there is fear for one's own life, or the deep-seated kind of political anxiety that has dominated Lebanon for a long time.

The same thing may apply to the non-Maronite Lebanese. When Druze leader Kamal Junblatt died, his son Walid succeeded him easily and with no preliminaries, even though Walid is neither a Majlis deputy nor the holder of an official position. From the moment Pierre al-Jumayyil died, Amin al-Jumayyil became two men in one: a president concealed in a leader, and leader of the

Phalangists, "The Lebanese Forces," "The Lebanese Front," and, naturally, the Maronites, the group viewed as the leading group in Lebanon.

The Most Difficult Task

To govern in Lebanon, however, with or without Pierre al-Jumayyil, is the most difficult task that can befall a human being in these times. Pierre al-Jumayyil work during the last period of his life, or since the middle of the Lebanese war, was to reconcile the old and original factions of the Phalangist Party, founded in 1936, and the "Lebanese Forces," the military wing discharged from the party under the pressure of the current war. It was incumbent upon him to reconcile the inclination to seek mutual understanding with Muslims, even if done under the old formula, for the sake of Christian-Muslim coexistence, and the military inclination to apply iron-fisted pressure to the ruling powers in Lebanon, even if in collaboration with foreign forces hostile to Arabs, such as Israel, for example.

Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil's, responsibilities increased sharply and critically after the ascent of his son Bashir and then his last son Amin to the presidency. At this point it was his task not to reconcile two Phalangist wings, but to concentrate his efforts on making a success of the policies of the government, and of the president in particular. Shortly before his death he told one of his friends: "We are carrying a tremendous burden." Pierre Jumayyil may actually have become a great sacrifice to the challenges that have faced and continue to face the Lebanese government. At the same time, it is unprecedented for Lebanon to be changed into a battlefield extending from Israel to Iran, a runway for Arab and Western governments who consider themselves historically obligated towards the makeup of Lebanon, and indeed a runway for the Soviet Union, which fights U.S.-dominated policies wherever they appear.

With regard to al-Jumayyil's succession, a scheduled event has occurred following the death of Pierre al-Jumayyil, and that is the occupation of his position by the president's associate Dr Elie Karamah, whom Pierre al-Jumayyil has named as his successor 2 weeks before his death in an address to the Phalangist political office. The political meaning of Elie Karamah's coming is that there is a balance between the generation of Phalangist old timers who helped Shaykh Pierre establish the Phalangist Party, most of whom now control basic party centers, sit in the Council of Deputies, or have positions in economic and general affairs, and the generation of new Phalangists who are children of the war and earlier years, including "The Lebanese Forces." The older circles did not monopolize power with his arrival, nor did "The Lebanese Forces" prescribe his path and methods. Elie Karamah is a Catholic, not a Maronite; he represents a strong and firm center of power for the president, who has more confidence in him than in others because of his contacts with party leaders, as well as his being a Phalangist newcomer.

It is well known that the Phalangist party respects the prime ministership. Pierre al-Jumayyil taught them for a long time that the presidency is the chief stronghold for the Maronites, and according to the Phalangist concept "for Lebanon generally it is the independent decision maker." There is thus no

basis for the belief that the Phalangist Party will abandon its full support for Amin al-Jumayyil, who has spent his life supporting presidents in the Phalangist Party, and this is all the more true today for the man who is at once Phalangist president, heir to the party organization and a deputy. As for the struggle over leadership of "The Lebanese Forces," this is a family fight: Fadi Afram married into the al-Jumayyil family and Fu'ad Abu Nasir is one of its grandsons. In contradiction to all political analyses, "The Lebanese Forces" were perfectly compliant in the hands of the Phalangist members of the Jumayyil family. Symbolic of this was the absolute authority enjoyed by Bashir Jumayyil within the party, then the ease with which Fadi Afram succeeded him, and recently the ease with which Dr Fu'ad Abu Nasir emerged as the sole competitor to Fadi Afram. Even if no one other than these two men had the right to attain the presidency, this does not mean that there will not be factions in "The Lebanese Forces," the most prominent of which is that of Samir Ja'Ja' and Eli Hubayqah, which has spontaneous relations with Israel that do not touch the Jumayyil family and those close to it.

Changes in "The Lebanese Forces"

In the forthcoming elections for the leadership of "The Lebanese Forces," this block will try to expand its control over the group's internal affairs. After losing Bashir and the political support given to them at the 17 May accord, they were no longer able to win fights with the president in particular. The president is not far from the traditional centers of power outside the party who wish harm on the Lebanese Forces; starting with Sulayman Franjiyah and ending with Camille Sham'un, whose positions the Forces threaten as leaders of the North and the mountains. In the event of a clash between the forces and the president, and this is not anticipated, it will be easy for the president to isolate them both inside and outside the party at their first attempt at unilateral action. The vacancy left by the death of Pierre al-Jumayyil will be filled by none other than the current president Amin al-Jumayyil, notwithstanding the fact that it is unusual for the president of a party to be able to lead it for long unless he has the ability to accommodate more than one tendency within the party. The multiplicity of tendencies is a safety valve for the party's continuation, and Pierre al-Jumayyil proved that he understood this truth from the beginning of the foundation of the Phalangist Party, for time after time he was able to coexist as a rightist with leftist movements in the party, including Marxist 'Ubayd 'Isa al-Mufakkir, leftist attorney Edmond 'Awn, and Nakhlah Mitran, founder of the Communist Union in Lebanon. Jumayyil was the father who debated with them within the party after their tendencies surfaced, but he had doubts about their expulsion from the party. Among those who were within the party, played a role, and stood out for their pro-Arab and social inclinations was attorney Joseph Mughayzil, who was well known even before his expulsion from the Phalangist Party for having pro-Arab and leftist inclinations. Despite Mughayzil's expulsion from the party, his wife Laure remained a prominent Phalangist for a long time before a decision was made to expel her. The situation in the Phalangist Party has changed with time, however, and the factions which are on its fringes are rightist rather than leftist as it was in the past. This is a new thing in the Phalangist Party now, whose opponents accuse it of changing more and more with time into a rightist party, rather than developing in a balanced direction.

BANK ASSETS FALL IN FIRST QUARTER

Beirut AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 23, 17 Sep 84 p 3

[Article by Dr Elias Baroudi]

[Text] The latest figures from the Bank of Lebanon (central bank) show that the consolidated balance sheet of commercial banks in Lebanon dropped by five per cent in the first quarter of 1984, from LL78.496bn at the end of 1983, to LL74.546bn at the end of March 1984. On the assets side, the drop was mainly in claims on non-resident banks, which made up around 19 per cent of the consolidated assets of commercial banks at the end of 1983 and which decreased by 17.9 per cent (or, LL2.696bn) during the first quarter of 1984. Claims on non-residents also dropped, by 29.4 per cent, from LL3.045bn at the end of 1983 to LL2.15bn at the end of March 1984.

As against this, the banks' reserves increased by nearly 18 per cent during the period, to LL5.187bn; claims on the private sector also rose, by seven per cent, to LL35.938bn; while claims on the public sector increased by slightly less than one per cent.

Private sector deposits, which made up nearly 70 per cent of consolidated liabilities at the end of 1983, dropped by 0.7 per cent, or LL390mn, during the first quarter of 1984 after increasing by 6.2 per cent in the last quarter of 1983.

Non-resident deposits and engagements to non-resident banks dropped by 6.5 per cent and 6.1 per cent respectively. Coming in parallel with the sharp drop in claims on non-residents and non-resident banks, this reflects a foreign disengagement from the Lebanese banking system, largely as a result of the increasing uncertainty and instability which Lebanon saw in the last part of 1983 and the first quarter of 1984.

Public sector deposits, on the other hand, increased by 3.5 per cent during the first quarter of 1984 and, more important, banks' shareholders' equity rose by nearly five per cent, largely as a result of profits carried forward from 1983.

A closer look at the development of banks' deposits during the first quarter of 1984 reveals a number of interesting points. Resident deposits in

foreign currencies dropped from the equivalent of LL14.4bn at the end of 1983 to LL12.434bn at the end of March 1984, or by LL1.966bn. These figures, however, underestimate the extent of the drop in these deposits since they are expressed in Lebanese pounds at the prevailing exchange rate and since the Lebanese pound depreciated by about 12 per cent against the dollar during the period.

Keeping this in mind, the fall in resident deposits in foreign currencies was due in large part to the transfer of funds from Lebanon as the political situation in the country worsened and as a new wave of fighting broke out in Beirut during February.

As against this, however, resident deposits in Lebanese pounds increased by LL1.575bn during the same period. One explanation of this is that part of the resident deposits in foreign currencies was converted to Lebanese pounds to meet current income requirements at a time when earned incomes dropped as a result of the political situation which developed in the country.

Once account is taken of deposits by non-residents, the total drop in deposits in foreign currencies turns out to be L12.118bn, or nearly 13 per cent. Once again, however, it should be noted that this drop is underestimated because of the depreciation of the Lebanese pound.

CSO: 4400/12

BRIEFS

CENTRAL BANK PROFITS--Central Bank of Lebanon profits for 1983 were 750 million Lebanese pounds compared to 725 million pounds in 1982. Bank of Lebanon profits were derived from the increased value of foreign currency deposits in the bank. These deposits reached 6 billion pounds. The profit also represents some of the normal transactions conducted by the bank in the local market. [Text] [London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 69, 4 Aug 84 p 57] 12608

INTEREST RATE BATTLE--The Society of Lebanese Banks has decided to keep the prime interest rate at 14 percent until the end of the third quarter of the current year. Many in banking and financial circles were surprised by this decision since the common belief was that the society would raise the prime rate by two points to 16 percent following the Ministry of Finance's move to increase interest on treasury bond issues by 2 percent. It is well known that the banking society was subjected to high level political pressures to maintain and not raise the current prime interest rate. This represented the government's desire to bolster the hard hit economic sectors such as industry and trade by making it possible for them to obtain commercial bank loans at reasonable rates. [Text] [London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 69, 4 Aug 84 p 57] 12608

CSO: 4404/626

UNEMPLOYMENT RISES, SOCIAL SERVICES DECLINE IN LEBANON

Nicosia FALASTIN AL-THAWRAH in Arabic No 520, 11 Aug 84 pp 30-31

[Interview with Dr Samir Ayyub, director of the Beirut Branch of Samid Organization: "We Are Trying To Increase Production; date and place not specified]

[Text] The number of Palestinians in Lebanon ranges from 300,000-400,000. According to the estimate of the Higher Political Committee, the major part of this number lives in the camps of Sabra, Shatila, Burj al-Barajinah, Mar Ilyas, Nahr al-Barid, al-Baddawi, al-Jalil, al-Miyah Wa Miyah, 'Ayn al-Hulwah, al-Nabatiyah, al-Buss, al-Burj al-Shamali and al-Rashidiyah.

The camps of Tall al-Za'tar, Jisr al-Basha and Dubayyah as well as al-Nabatiyah Camp were completely destroyed and their inhabitants evicted at the beginning of the civil war in 1976 by the Israeli forces and the Phalangist militias. These camps had been built around the major Lebanese cities, with the exception of al-Nabatiyah camp, and especially around Beirut because of the Lebanese economy's needs, considering that the camp inhabitants formed a reserve of cheap manpower for Lebanese businessmen.

Lebanon has benefited from the three classes of Palestinians on its soil: the rich class with its capital, the middle class with its numerous skills and the working class, which has played the role of the reserve of very cheap and highly qualified labor. This is in addition to a large number of emigrant Palestinians working in the Arab Gulf and North Africa who were sending aid to their kinsmen in Lebanon and, consequently, contributing to enhancing the Lebanese balance of payments. Added to this are UNRWA's expenditures, which also contributed to boosting the Lebanese economy.

It was difficult for the Palestinians to work in the major sectors but they have maintained their identity as a people with a cause. The Palestinian Refugee Affairs Administration was the only authority concerned with the Palestinians' conditions prior to the emergence of the PLO and their employment was confined to the UNRWA's travel, residence and work permit affairs until the conclusion of the Cairo agreement, the entry of the Palestinian armed forces and the construction of bases for these forces in the camps. All this helped create a relative relaxation in Palestinian employment and work activity. Whereas the Palestinians had relied on what the UNRWA offered, they came to depend, in addition to the fighters' salaries, on a number of

production establishments which also performed the role of training skilled cadres, providing work opportunities and setting up agencies which met some of the Palestinians' needs.

Samid Establishment, for example, performed a major role in this respect and built a number of production, service and folklore craft agencies and others and was able to absorb more workers in a production sector meeting modern standards.

The Palestinian Red Crescent, which opened its first hospital in 1969, has been the Palestinian agency concerned with providing health services for the Palestinians in Lebanon. It set up hospitals, clinics and schools for training male and female nurses, assistant pharmacists and laboratory and X-ray technicians in addition to numerous other services that had a positive role in improving the social conditions of the Palestinian masses in the camps.

But what about the current situation of the Palestinian masses in Lebanon, especially in the wake of the 1982 invasion and the PLO's departure from Beirut?

It is well known that this invasion has destroyed all the establishments and all the sectors that had been built by the organization.

In accordance with its objective of destroying "the PLO's infrastructure," Israel has resorted in the camps under its occupation to methods that seek to empty the camps of their effective elements. Israel has engaged and continues to engage in large-scale arrests, especially among the ranks of the youth, and is still creating obstacles in the face of rebuilding the destroyed camps, especially in the south. Israel is also exerting efforts to block all sources of livelihood in the face of the Palestinians, in addition to having prohibited the UNRWA schools from resuming their activity under the pretext of being centers for the training of fedayeen. Israel has also shut down all the health, social and cultural establishments founded by the PLO.

Director of Samid Establishment Speaks

Regarding the current social and economic situation in the camps, we interviewed Dr Samir Ayyub, the director of Samid Establishment in Beirut and sociology professor at the Arab University of Beirut:

[Question] In the wake of the Palestinian resistance's departure from Beirut, the camp inhabitants, especially the workers, are experiencing numerous problems, particularly widespread unemployment. As a professor of sociology, what are the reasons that have led to this decline in employment and production?

[Answer] After the Zionist invasion and the Palestinian forces' departure from Beirut, the Palestinians have lost the entire infrastructure which had been built for them by the PLO and many Palestinians have lost their sources of livelihood.

To realize the dimensions and meaning of this development, we must put it within a broader and more comprehensive framework, namely the Lebanese framework

which has also been smashed by the Israeli invasion. To understand further the meaning of the Palestinian hardship, we must note:

1. A large part of Palestinian labor was employed in clerical and office jobs in the organization's institutional structure. This is why after the resistance's departure this labor has suffered from unemployment because it lacks vocational training in the industrial sense.
2. The spread of the phenomenon of office work results in a "white collar" worker psychology.
3. The tightness of the labor market for administrative and office jobs.
4. The fact that the Palestinian is compelled to get a work permit as a foreigner.
5. The sensitivity of some Lebanese establishments to employing Palestinians for psychological or political reasons or because of pressures from here or there.
6. The tight employment market for the Lebanese citizen himself as a result of the devastation brought about by the 10-year war and then as a result of the Zionist invasion.

All this has thrown thousands of Palestinians into the ranks of the unemployed and has created living hardships. Some negative social manifestations have emerged in a number of camps. Unemployment among Palestinian labor in Lebanon is estimated at 70-80 percent.

Fifty-six Million Pounds in Losses

[Question] How big are the losses sustained by Samid Establishment and the other Palestinian production agencies?

[Answer] Several of our factories have been destroyed and the loss we have sustained has been estimated initially at 56 million Lebanese pounds, including installations, equipment and raw materials. The destruction of these factories has compelled us to absorb their workers, thus creating for us the problem of masked unemployment with all its drawbacks.

[Question] Haven't you tried to rise anew and what is the PLO's position toward this deterioration of the living standards among the inhabitants of the camps?

[Answer] Since the invasion, Samid Establishment has tried, with whatever limited resources it has at its disposal, to solve this problem through raising the productivity of those factories that have survived or through opening new factories that rely fundamentally on labor, not on mechanization, to absorb the largest number possible of Palestinian workers. What is as important is that Samid has not closed its doors in the face of the Lebanese worker knocking on them in search of work.

I regret that the PLO does not own its own production establishments in Lebanon. Here, I would like to stress that Samid is only one of the establishments founded and tended by Fatah Movement and that this movement is still spending on the establishment.

Contrast Between Mobilization and Education

[Question] In your capacity as a socio-economic establishment, do you have any problems facing you with the State of Lebanon?

[Answer] Insofar as the State of Lebanon is concerned, we are not facing at present any problem with any of the institutions connected with our work. However, the Palestinians as individuals, like all foreigners, have to acquire an advance work permit before working in Lebanese establishments. On this occasion, Samid is not a company or an establishment but a Lebanese charitable association subject to the rules governing charitable associations in Lebanon.

[Question] What are the consequences of the resistance's departure to the conditions of the schools, teachers and students?

[Answer] To understand the problems from which the Palestinian students and teachers in Lebanon suffer, we must note the negative effects left by the presence of the Palestinian organizations in Lebanon on the Palestinian educational process in this country. The process of mobilization, organization and the development of cadres [al-ta'tir] to which the Palestinian students were subjected in a haphazard manner did not take into consideration the importance of the sciences as an instrument of struggle and of living.

Assigning the students struggle duties and tasks during school hours caused the students to miss numerous learning opportunities.

The teachers' membership in various and competing organizations prevented the school administration and the Educational Inspectorate from exercising its power to control and discipline the teachers. Add to this the fact of the predominance of political action over educational action, as if education were in a strange conflict with struggle. Moreover, some believed that the struggle identity can do without a scientific education. Some went to excess in saying that the solution emanates only from the barrel of the rifle. Therefore, some people did misunderstand this issue and others thought that there isn't any importance in any degree or any education at present.

As for the harm suffered by the students and the teachers during the invasion and after the departure of the resistance, it is well known. Many students and teachers were martyred and a number of educational institutions, especially in the camps, were completely damaged or destroyed.

Numerous teachers and students, especially newly graduated students who could not find work opportunities, have emigrated. As for the schools, the smallest problem they suffer is the problem of furnishings. Moreover, many of these schools cannot accommodate the students and their officials have been forced to introduce the two-shift system.

Children and Health Problems

[Question] Childhood has its special problems in a society living in a sea of tragedies, such as Palestinian society. What are the dangers of these problems to the Palestinian child in particular?

[Answer] The Palestinian child feels persecuted and this feeling creates a state of defeatism and retreat or a state of aggressiveness. Each of them has its dangers to this rising generation that is aware of a world hostile to it or in which it is not accepted. This is in addition to all the hardships experienced by those living in a wartime climate in which childhood has no opportunity to express itself and to move. There are very many orphaned Palestinian children who have lost both their parents and who are denied all tenderness and affection.

[Question] To what degree have the health conditions deteriorated since the organization's departure?

[Answer] You can inspect the conditions of the health establishments for yourself and meet with their officials. But I can say that the health problems in our camps emanate from the following main causes:

1. The small area of the camps, the small size of the houses, the overcrowding in these houses and their poor ventilation which make it easy for diseases to spread and lower the natural immunity, especially among children.
2. The small incomes and the spreading poverty that compel people to disregard the necessary dietary balance.
3. The low level of education among numerous mothers due to early marriage.
4. The meagerness of the fundamental facilities and of public utilities in the camps, such as paved roads, covered sewers, water control and purification agencies and agencies in charge of the disposal of wastes and garbage.
5. The psychological and social effects and the resulting cases of physical imbalance under the impact of the living conditions.

There is no doubt that there are major health problems from which the Palestinian people and their institutions suffer, especially the Red Crescent which lost the major part of its equipment during and after the invasion. A number of hospitals, such as the 'Akka and Hayfa hospitals, have been paralyzed and other hospitals in the south have been idled as a result of the Zionist occupation. But I don't think that these difficulties can prevent us from performing our humanitarian duties. This is why the Red Crescent agencies are fully performing the role entrusted to them despite all the obstacles placed in its way.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NATIONAL, DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCES EXAMINED

Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI in Arabic No 115, 18 Aug 84 p 15

[Article: "While Reports Indicate That Dialogue Between Them Is Faltering-- National Alliance: These Are Our Points of Disagreement with Democratic Alliance; Abu Salih Is Mere Bubble That Has Burst"]

[Text] Differences have flared up between the National and Democratic Alliances and each side is accusing the other. The differences have not been confined to mutual accusations exchanged by the two sides. What is more, conflicts have been raging between the leaders of the factions forming the National Alliance. These differences and conflicts are not surprising to any of our people as long as these self-proclaimed leaders are proceeding from the starting point of narrow and temporary personal interests.

We will review here some aspects of these differences through the statements of some of these self-proclaimed leaders to see what condition they have reached!

Fruitless Dialogue Between National and Democratic Alliances

Regarding the outcome of the disjointed dialogue between the Democratic Alliance (the Popular Front, the Democratic Front, the Palestinian Liberation Front and the Palestinian Communist Party) and the National Alliance (the dissidents, the Struggle Front, al-Sa'iqah and the General Command), Qadri said: "We have not reached any positive results in our dialogue on the Aden agreement. We believe that this agreement is worthless as long as we and Syria continue to oppose it. We disagree with the Democratic Alliance on three points:

"A. Dropping 'Arafat.

"B. Evaluating the Fatah Central Committee.

"C. Convoking the Palestinian National Council.

"First, we are for dropping 'Arafat and not for renewing his corroded legitimacy. We do not believe that the Fatah Central Committee is much different from 'Arafat or that it stands in a trench opposed to him. We are also convoking the National Council before 'Arafat is dropped." Qadri added: "But the Democratic Alliance has views that differ with ours in this regard. They

believe that the Fatah Central Committee can drop 'Arafat and they call for holding the Palestinian National Council in the presence of 'Arafat, claiming that this does not mean the reaffirmation of his legitimacy or the renewal of his leadership.

"We do not attach much hope to Tal'at Ya'qub's faction. They are a small band, nothing more. We also have no confidence in the positions of the Palestinian Communist Party, which disavows the armed Palestinian struggle and which is allied with Rakah. But we had been hoping that the Popular Front would be able to drag the Democratic Front to its positions. However, it seems that what has happened is the opposite. This is perhaps what motivated a large number of the Popular Front's cadres in Syria and Lebanon to oppose the Aden agreement and to issue a heated communique against it. In any case, we hold the parties to the Aden agreement responsible for splitting the PLO, as long as they cling to the contents of this agreement. We have presented to Khalid al-Fahum, the Palestinian National Council chairman, written answers to questions he had previously addressed to us and to the Democratic Alliance. It seems from the context of the answers that the viewpoints are still far apart."

Freezing Abu Salih in Midsummer

Regarding Abu Salih's position within the Fatah opposition movement, Qadri said: "Abu Salih is just a bubble that has quickly burst. He is isolated and frozen, now that we have settled his issue in several central decisions taken by our movement." He added: "We were faced with two difficult options. The first was to continue the old methods experienced by our arena for a number of years and to let Abu Salih form his own faction at the expense of the Fatah opposition movement or, and this was the second option, to resort to infighting to settle this problem. But we resorted to a third option that surpasses the two conventional options. This option was, as I have already mentioned, to isolate Abu Salih in accordance with key decisions by our movement, and this is what has happened."

However, Qadri strongly denied that Abu Salih "had sent a message to Abu 'Ammar," saying: "Abu Salih is bigger than such begging and it is not in his character to behave in this manner. These allegations are no more than 'Arafatist endeavors to belittle Abu Salih and to cast doubt on the credibility of the 'uprising' among our people's masses."

8494

CSO: 4404/659

RETURN OF ARMED PALESTINIANS TO LEBANON DEBUNKED

Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI in Arabic No 115, 18 Aug 84 p 16

[Article: "What Is Behind Publication of Reports on Return of Palestinian Fighters to Lebanon; Search for Justification To Deal Military Blow and To Reshuffle Cards"]

[Text] What is behind the reports published here and there about the return of Palestinian fighters to be stationed in South Lebanon and West Beirut? What are the circles behind these rumors, and what are their motives and objectives?

First, it is indisputable that the June 1982 war and the subsequent blockades of Beirut and Tripoli forced the Palestinian fighters to depart from Lebanese territories and to be distributed in various Arab countries. If Palestinian fighting elements have returned to Lebanon, then they belong to underground cells and groups that may have lost contact with the circles supervising them or they are elements released from Ansar Camp that may be occasionally carrying out military operations with weapons from caches not discovered by the Israeli forces and those collaborating with them. But the obvious fact is that the Palestinian fighters as an evident presence do not exist in South Lebanon or in West Beirut. The organizations may have returned secretly to the quarters where they had stayed in the past, but not in the manner reported by the press and news agencies. We all know that the conflicting Lebanese factions, even those that were within the framework of the National Movement, reject the armed Palestinian presence and the return of the men of these organizations to the Lebanese territories. Clashes that have taken place in the western sector of the Lebanese capital are a reaffirmation of this fact.

In the past 2 weeks, the news agencies have circulated two reports saying that Hayil 'Abd-al-Hamid--alias Abu al-Hawl--who is the director of the PLO's security, visited Beirut recently, met with Lebanese leaders and discussed with them the question of reviving Palestinian activity and returning armed Palestinian elements to Lebanon.

The second report said that 300-350 Palestinian fighters have withdrawn from the mountain to al-Biqa' and have taken positions there. THE WASHINGTON POST reported that Fatahland has again turned into a Palestinian base, as it was before the June 1982 war. Why have these reports been circulated at this time?

There is an active movement in the international arena to find a political settlement for the Palestinian problem. The efforts are currently focused on holding an international conference that includes all the parties to the area's conflict to begin the peace process. At the same time, voices are rising in the United States to warn of international terrorism and of its return to the area and to Lebanon in particular. It is to be noted that the U.S. administration recently held in Washington a conference in which it considered the PLO a terrorist organization. Consequently, the purpose of the published reports about an armed Palestinian presence in this period is to strike at the peace process that has started seriously and actively and then to provide a justification for "certain" forces to deal a blow to the organization's institutions, cadres and positions somewhere--all through spreading propaganda about the return of an armed Palestinian presence to the Lebanese territories and to the south in particular. Moreover, Israel, which continues to implement its schemes in the south, may use this propaganda to entrench these schemes. Furthermore, Israel can achieve more of its conditions in its ongoing efforts to establish security arrangements by claiming that the Palestinians have armed bases in Lebanon. This claim encourages its groups to continue clinging to plans that are hostile to whatever is Arab.

There is also the insurmountable ministerial crisis in Israel. Usually, Israel resorts to launching a war beyond its borders as a way out of any crisis it encounters. Considering that the crisis is present, then the published reports about the Palestinian fighters are perhaps intended to give the Israeli forces the justification to launch a military assault outside Israel's borders, perhaps in the direction of countries directly involved in the conflict.

We do not find it unlikely that these rumors may be a prelude to schemes to drive the organization and Jordan apart. It is not unlikely that Israel will claim sometime that there are armed groups in Jordan so as to prepare for a military assault that reshuffles the area's cards now that the world's countries are making a serious move to establish a just and lasting peace in the area.

8494

CSO: 4404/659

BRIEFS

DEFENSE SPENDING DECREASE--The newspaper HERALD TRIBUNE quoted Syrian Minister of State for Planning Kamal Sharaf as saying that his government wants to decrease its defense spending; were it not in an adversarial position with Israel, it would use its defense credits for social purposes. In a similar vein, the governor of the Central Bank in Damascus mentioned the pressure the Syrian economy is enduring because of Damascus' military commitments. Defense credits reached \$3.21 million in this year's budget; this is 32.5 percent of all public expenditures and 57.9 percent of all the Syrian government's current expenditures. Sources close to the Syrian government add that the military confrontation with the Israelis in 1982 cost the Syrian treasury more than a billion dollars, and that the average daily cost of operating the Syrian army in Lebanon is around a quarter of a million dollars. The burden of defense costs on the Syrian treasury was increased by the cessation of payments from the Gulf nations, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, of their share of the financial aid scheduled for Syria at the Baghdad Arab summit conference, due to reductions in their oil revenues. [Text] [London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1453, 7 Sep 84 p 50] 9310

CSO: 4404/643

SWEDEN FIRST EUROPEAN COUNTRY GIVING REBELS HUMANITARIAN AID

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 31 Aug 84 p 4

[Article by Christer Morling: "Afghanistan: Sweden Gives 5 Million"]

[Text] The Swedish government decided on Thursday to give the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan 5 million kronor, which will be used to provide humanitarian aid to victims of the war in Afghanistan.

This is the first time a European government has come to a decision concerning this type of aid. The Committee for Afghanistan trains, among others, doctors and hospital personnel who work in the area controlled by the opposition movement. The guerrillas are fighting against the country's communist regime, which is supported by Soviet troops.

The Swedish Committee has twenty clinics within Afghanistan. No Swedes work at these clinics, which instead are run by Afghans who function as village doctors and offer medical aid in the area controlled by the guerrillas. The committee educates hospital personnel and others in Peshawar, Pakistan, and contributes weapons and medicine.

The committee has previously received contributions through its support organ, SIDA. But now that the amount exceeds 3 million, a government decision is needed.

"The decision does not imply any change in the Swedish attitude regarding Afghanistan," says Ingrid Helt from the Information Division of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

The government also decided to give the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 25 million kronor, of which 4 million will go to Afghan refugees in Pakistan, 17 million in contributions to Africa, and 4 million in contributions to Central America.

"The shortage of supplies and medicine is very great," says journalist Anders Fange, who recently returned to Sweden after a three-month-long stay in Afghanistan, where he traveled with six different Afghan guerrilla groups. Until 1 April of this year Fange was the representative of the Committee for Afghanistan in Peshawar.

Mosques as Toilets

"The Russians systematically use mosques as toilets, and tear apart the Koran and use the pages as toilet paper," reported Fange at a press conference on Thursday.

Reports were received earlier that the Babrak Karmal regime, acting on Soviet initiative, tried to take a more respectful line of approach and issued invitations to the Muslim leaders.

During his 200-mile-long journey on foot through Afghanistan, Fange visited, among other places, Panjsher Valley, where the Soviet and Afghan government troops initiated a strong offensive in April. The goal was to crush the powerful guerrilla forces in the area led by Ahmed Shah Massoud who, according to Fange, stands out as the most important guerrilla leader.

"The majority of Soviet troops has now left Panjsher, but the valley is almost completely destroyed.

"A large number of houses, irrigation systems and crops has been bombed or burned to the ground."

Fange believes that the battle of Panjsher is not over yet. The Panjsher guerrillas have not been crushed, but Fange does not exclude the possibility that the Russians will succeed in separating the guerrillas from the general population.

"One hundred thousand civilians were already evacuated before the offensive, because Massoud had good sources in Kabul who reported it to him in advance. But what will the civilians do now? Return to the valley and a winter of imminent starvation, or become refugees in Pakistan or in the government-controlled areas near Kabul?"

Pastoral Idyll

In spite of the fact that Fange followed the guerrillas for three months, he came into direct contact with Soviet and Afghan government troops only three times.

"Travel within Afghanistan is not as dangerous as one imagines. Ninety percent of the time one travels in a peaceful, almost pastoral idyll where nevertheless people live under very meager circumstances. But the war is heard in the distance, and the Soviet supremacy in the air makes itself felt."

The bombing of villages causes great destruction. Sometimes when the Soviet planes don't reach their goal, they bomb civilian targets. Fange himself saw a bomber which didn't succeed in attacking a center for Mujahedin guerrillas turn away instead and bomb other villages in the vicinity.

12573

CSO: 3650/281

CULTURAL UPBRINGING HINDERS EFFECTIVE FIGHTING

Paris LIBERATION in French 26 Sep 84 p 34

[Article by Olivier Roy: "Border Hopping in Afghanistan"]

[Text] Oliver Roy who, 15 days ago, passed through the same area as Jacques Abouchar, relates how journalists and doctors try to enter Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion.

Whether one is a journalist or a doctor, the problems crossing the Afghan border are the same. First one has to find one's taxi: the group which will take you in. One traipses from one office to the next; preference is given to small groups without a lot of equipment.

There is always a warm welcome among the committees set up in Pakistan; most of them do not even bother to check the identity or the professional reasons of those wanting to make the trip. To be a decent looking fellow is more important than letters of recommendation. "Important" visitors (television team, doctors) are treated in the same way as the first freelance arrival. An example of democracy or of a free and easy approach, according to one's point of view.

The trip is usually free, except if one needs several horses or a jeep for transporting equipment; in the south, the danger and the increasing number of journalists making the trip have raised prices, the more so since the Mujahidin do not have any means of transport at their disposal and rent them from private individuals.

The Afghans prefer that the "volunteers" join a column which is taking in weapons. But it is also the best way to fall into an ambush and it is not uncommon to wait for weeks in Pakistan for the departure of the column which is always planned for tomorrow. This is where one runs into the first cultural problem, which will continually crop up throughout the whole trip: the attitude to time. For an Afghan, waiting is second nature. The second problem is the complete lack of discretion. Adopting a very philosophical outlook, the Afghans think that, since they cannot hope to counter the KGB's information networks, the best thing to do is to ignore them with scorn. Nevertheless, the task of the networks is not so easy; up to the last minute, the leader of the group himself has no idea when they will leave and the Kabul information offices must crumble under the reports which announce each day the same departure for tomorrow.

The first obstacle is the Pakistani police which forbids foreigners to cross through tribal areas; disguised as Afghans, we got through. The worst thing that can happen is to be expelled. Once at the border, the Mujahidin "depot," usually a small village with a teahouse and party office, is the first stage. This is where the latest news on the state of the road is exchanged. The Afghans wait for a good report before they will leave. It is at this point that the Soviets can track down the group precisely and find out whether there are foreigners, because even if a disguise can fool a Pakistani auxiliary, the Afghans can recognize a Westerner immediately by his bearing and gestures. The trip is decided on suddenly and is usually made in broad daylight.

Another aspect of the resistance is this: the Afghans are real homebodies and wedded to their ways, and do not like to go through areas where they have neither relatives nor friends. Right off, the same itineraries are used; one stays with the innkeeper that the group leader has been staying with for years. Stops are made in villages where one is sure of being fed. Theoretically, danger zones are crossed at night at top speed and in small groups. In fact, as soon as a group meets up with fellow countrymen, they join up and travel together.

During these trips, the personal relationship of the "guest" and the group is of prime importance; the level of the political orientation of the Afghan resistance is admittedly inferior to that of the "classic" guerillas, and the Afghan will always put the personal relationship before his political duty. One meets professional seasoned border runners such as Agha Gul for the Panjshir and Amine Wardak, as well as braggarts who flee at the first shot. For, of course, it is at the point where things start to go badly that the number of relations established with the group plays its part. It is a mistake to think that one is dealing with activists who are obeying party orders and are aware of their political duty. In fact, except for a few Islamic cadres, the majority of the "taxis" see a guest in the foreigner and, it must be admitted, sometimes a customer, especially if one shows too much money.

The amazing thing under these conditions is that so few foreigners have been killed or captured by the Soviets (5 prisoners in 5 years, all French, and two dead, a Norwegian and an Italian). The thing is that Afghan uncertainty unites with Soviet military bureaucracy to make the trip safer than it seems. The departures forever postponed bother the planners of the Red Army. For one must not imagine that the Russians have commandos on permanent alert, ready to exploit a piece of information in the following hours. The ambushes are routine and in fact result in few deaths, quite simply because they are carried out with tanks or helicopters and the infantry do not comb the ground.

More precautions by the resistance would make the Soviet countermeasures of little effect. Everything goes on as if the rebels thought that the risk run did not warrant discontinuing their relaxed approach to crossings in favor of establishing safer channels. But the segmentation of the resistance also makes it difficult to coordinate different groups in order to ensure the protection of an entry route.

9823

CSO: 4619/1

GOVERNMENT TROUP BUILDUP ON BORDERS REPORTED

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 4 Oct 84 p 1

[Text] Islamabad, Oct 3--(Reuter)--Afghanistan has concentrated troops on its border with Pakistan's southwestern province of Baluchistan, the Pakistan Press International (PPI) news agency reported today.

No official confirmation of the report was immediately available.

The report, carried by the government-controlled Pakistan Times and other dailies, also spoke of "intensive Afghan military activity" in border areas of Afghanistan's southern province of Kandahar.

"Soviet-supported Afghan Armed Forces are reported to have set up a chain of military posts along the border," the report said.

In August, Pakistani authorities reported the massing of more than 10,000 Soviet troops across border in the southeastern Afghan Province of Paktia. But western diplomats in Islamabad estimated the strength of 12,000 to 14,000.

Afghan President Babrak Karmal told a meeting of the ruling Communist Party in Kabul last month that Afghanistan would try to seal its borders with Pakistan and Iran to stop the infiltration of guerrillas.

Border, Airspace Violations

Pakistani newspapers have carried reports in recent weeks of Soviet troops stationed close to Pakistan's border.

Pakistan reported a series of border and airspace violations by Afghanistan in August and September.

Islamabad said 33 people were killed and 48 wounded when an Afghan jet bombed a remote border village last Thursday.

Afghanistan denied the charge and said the casualties were caused by explosions in insurgent arms stores at the village of Trimangal, five miles (eight kms) from the border.

A Pakistan government spokesman said today residents of Trimangal had seen the Afghan plane drop two bombs.

Experts also confirmed that craters formed in the incident were caused by aerial bombing, the spokesman said.

CSO: 4600/37

50 SOLDIERS REPORTEDLY KILLED IN MUJAHIDIN FORAYS

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 3 Oct 84 pp 1, 2

[Text] ISLAMABAD (Reuter)--Up to 50 Afghan soldiers were killed in Kabul in a battle with anti-Communist guerillas who have been operating in the Afghan capital for more than a month, Western diplomats in Pakistan reported yesterday.

They said a coordinated guerilla attack on a several targets in Kabul on the night of September 24 ended in an intense 20-hour battle near the Balhissar Fortress in which 40 to 50 Afghan soldiers were killed.

The diplomats, quoting information received by them, also reported nightly guerilla rocket attacks on selected targets in Kabul which had provoked punitive ground operations by Soviet and Afghan forces.

They said more than 200 civilians were reported killed and 170 wounded in a September 17 battle in the Central Province of Wardak, south of Kabul.

The guerillas shot down seven helicopters in the battle at Jalez in the northeast of the province, they quoted witnesses as saying.

Soviet and Afghan government air and ground forces mounted a punitive attack on September 25 in the Showaki area, destroying many buildings and crops by helicopter bombing, the diplomats said. There were also an unspecified number of civilian casualties, they said.

They said the guerillas fired up to 17 rockets at targets in the capital September 28, provoking another punitive action by Soviet troops in villages south of Kabul.

They said the security situation in Kabul had deteriorated substantially in the past six weeks, with a continuing wave of rocket attacks and a bomb blast at Kabul Airport which killed 28 people and injured up to 350.

Meanwhile, Afghanistan Monday strongly denied as "unfounded lies" Pakistan allegations that Afghan warplanes bombed the town of Teri Mangal inside Pakistan territory, official Radio Kabul said.

The state-run radio, monitored here, said the Pakistan Embassy's charge d'affairs was summoned to the Afghan Foreign Ministry in Kabul and handed an official protest note, rejecting the "lies claimed by Pakistan."

Radio Afghanistan, in its Pushtu-language service, categorically denied its "security forces" have committed any air or land violations of Pakistan territory.

CSO: 4600/33

BRIEFS

CLASH IN PROVINCES--Fierce clashes are reported to have taken place between Mujahideen and Soviet-Karmal troops in the four provinces of Afghanistan including the mineral-riched province of Jowzjan, where the conscription campaign was in full swing. According to the Agency Afghan Press sources the affected provinces are Samanga, Bamiyan and Baluch majority province of Nimruz bordering Iran and Pakistan. The report received indicated that over 200 youths were arrested so far in connection with conscription campaign in Jowzjan Province. The Muslim Mujahideen were resisting the campaign as a result of which fierce clashes between Mujahideen and Soviet-Karmal troops have been reported in the areas. According to the reports, the Mujahideen blasted the gas-pipe line leading towards Mazar Sharif, the capital of Balkh Province. The production of a major fertilizer factory in Mazar Sharif was badly affected due to the blast. The report adds that the Mujahideen also attempted to damage the petrol and diesel pipe-lines between the Soviet Union and Qila Ghaiin Samangan Province where clashes still continue between Mujahideen and Soviet-Karmal troops in Khulim and Pul-e-Khumri. It was learnt that Soviet-Karmal troops were engaged in military operations, 12 kilometers east of Bamiyan city to capture the supply ways of the Mujahideen in this area. The Soviet troops for the first time were able to operate outside Bamiyan city, the report adds. In the meanwhile, the Soviet-Karmal forces have constructed fortifications on River Helmand in Baluch majority province on Nimruz. The constructions were aimed to set up a military camp near Iranian border.--Agency Afghan Press [Text] [Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 7 Oct 84 p 5]

CSO: 4600/37

PAPER SAYS U.S. 'EXPORT EMBARGO' WILL NOT AFFECT IRAN

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 1 Oct 84 pp 2, 3

[Text]

AS PROPOSED by chief of Central Intelligence Agency, William Cassey, the U.S. State Department has placed an export embargo of certain items against "countries supporting terrorism."

Iran is also included in the CIA list of "terrorist" states. We can look at the issue from two different angles. (a) What is terrorism and who is a terrorist, and (b) What consequences will the U.S. sanction entail?

It seems that generally the White House, the Western block and the affiliated world bodies, like the Human Rights Organizations, have fallen so deep into the capitalist corruption and are removed so far away from human values to realize their solely materialistic goals that these "civilized" leaders seem to have really forgotten, or have deliberately chosen to either partially distort or fully reverse, the substance, meaning and interpretations of linguistic expressions, such as the terminology of terrorism.

Iran's Leader Imam Khomeini and other key officials have repeatedly declared in clear terms their absolute opposition to acts of terrorism. The divine religion, Islam, does not need to indulge in a terroristic campaign.

The Iranian nation and its Islamic administration have condemned hundreds of times in the past violation of any legitimate right of human beings, inflicted either from the East or the West, but the U.S. officials still term Islamic Iran as a terrorist country and themselves as champions of human rights.

Within a short duration since its revolutionary triumph in 1979, our oppressed state itself has suffered severely due to the ugly face of terrorism.

That's why we have always been leading the fight to oppose terrorism. How can we be called as "terrorists"?

Our revolutionary people have lost hundreds of high-level authorities (including president, prime minister, chief justice, ministers, parliamentary deputies, Friday prayers Imams, reputed scholars, etc. as well as the innocent men, women and children in streets and markets, as a result of bomb explosions and assassination spree carried out by Munafeqin (hypocrites or the MKO arms).

Most of them confessed voluntarily that the generated atmosphere of terror was masterminded by intelligence units of the American, French, Soviet, Iraqi and other governments who also supplied to the executioners the lethal weapons required for sabotage.

In the White House terminology, such brutality is named as "measures to support human rights"! Many of the murderers and terrorists have sought refuge and asylum in international hideouts of terrorism such as Paris, Washington and Baghdad, but Islamic Iran was branded as "supporter of terrorism."

It is sad to regard and interpret the acts of terrorism as measures in support of peace and human rights.

They regard as positive signs terroristic moves like the Baathist's air raids and chemical warfare against our civilian and residential areas, killing women and children, murdering Sunni and Shia Ulama in Kurdistan, torturing the Pasdars (Revolutionary Guards), assaults on diplomatic missions of the Islamic Republic in Washington, London, Paris, Amsterdam, Copenhagen, etc., beating the diplomats, hijacking and selling Iranian airplanes

by Munafeqin and monarchial supporters to invader regime of Iraq, the U.S. mining in Nicaraguan waters by the CIA, massacre of Palestinians, physical and armed attacks on Friday Prayer gathering and Iranian students abroad, American military invasion in Tabas and the Persian Gulf, and a number of aborted military coup d'etats in Iran.

However, these same American officials and their allies in the West regard as "terrorism and opposition to human rights" the Holy War of our Moslems in the Iraqi imposed war and our right to drive out the aggressor Baathists, Jordanians, Egyptians, and Sudanese in "the Iraqi battlefields", our right to reject an imposed peace proposed by initiators and planners of the 4-year-old war, our right to imprison killers and spies of the East and the West, and our right to hold peaceful demonstrations and prayer ceremonies.

What the CIA and U.S. State Department mean by terrorism and terrorists is now quite clear.

As to the renewed U.S. sanctions: They had enforced such a boycott earlier, after Iranians conquered the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, and it proved to be more damaging to the West than Islamic Iran.

It only led our revolutionary masses to reduce foreign dominance in economic field by relying more on their own capabilities. Our people worked harder and invented various devices thereby achie-

ving self-sufficiency in hundreds of spheres.

After our miraculous victory in the imposed war, and losses suffered by the paralyzed production wheels of the Western factories who lost the Iranian market after Shah's downfall, made the U.S. and its allies relax the restrictions! The same dark fate now awaits the Western bloc in future. Their own economy will suffer greater repercussions.

The first effects of the U.S. boycott will mean further fall in consumption of Western goods, increase in domestic production, more anger of people against Americans and the Westerners and, finally, a cold winter in the West as a result of reduced oil exports.

We conclude with the eloquent guideline of Imam Khomeini, the leader of all Moslems, that: "If the world impose economic sanctions against us, we are Sons of Ramadhan and our leader is Ali (AS) and if they decide on a military embargo, we are Sons of Moharram and our leader is Hussein (AS)."

They must remember that Ramadhan is the month of fasting and martyrdom of the first Imam, Hazrat Ali, and Moharram is the month of martyrdom of the Third Imam, Hazrat Hussein, and his close family members and handful of ill-equipped companions who fought the huge, armed-to-the-teeth army of the time.

FOREIGN REPORTERS VISIT IRAQI POW CAMP IN TEHRAN

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 25 Sep 84 p 14

[Text] Tehran, IRNA: A group of reporters of the foreign mass media, who have traveled to our country to participate in the special ceremonies honoring war week, visited Heshmatiyyeh camp, where a group of Iraqi war prisoners are kept, yesterday afternoon, and interviewed three of them.

The three Iraqi prisoners, upon the request of the reporters, introduced themselves as follows: (1) Major Hoseyn 'Ammar-Azawi, 35 years old, of regiment 25 of the 6th army of Iraq, a resident of Babol Province; (2) Captain Fowaz Allahiali, 28 years old, of regiment 35 of the 9th army of Iraq, from Mosul; (3) 2nd Lt, physician, Jabbar 'Abd ol-Zohreh, 30 years of age, a graduate of Baghdad university medical school, and a member of the 9th army of Iraq, from and a resident of Basra.

After the introduction of the prisoners who participated in this interview, Captain Fowaz Allahiali responded to one of the foreign reporters who asked him: Has any delegation or have any delegations of the International Red Cross come to visit this camp? He said: The representatives of the International Red Cross have thus far come to our camp several times and have spoken to us quite frequently. And we, too, have spoken very freely.

Captain Allahiali, responding to a Zaire reporter who had asked him about the opinion of the members of the Iraqi army concerning the start of the war and the aggression on our Islamic soil, also said: The members of the Iraqi army who are Muslims and have no affiliation with the Ba'th Party know that this war is an aggressive war against an Islamic country. Hence, based on the Islamic instruction which calls for Muslims not to attack other Muslims, they have had and have no inclination to start or continue this war. Therefore, they either escape from the front or leave service in various ways. Thus far, a large number, including a group of seven persons, which I myself witnessed in the Ahvaz front, belonging to Iraq army artillery regiment 35,

have been shot by firing squads in the fronts or behind the fronts by the direct order of Saddam. Another reporter asked the three Iraqi prisoners to give their opinion regarding the proposals of the Islamic Republic of Iran, inviting the families of the Iraqi prisoners to visit their relatives. In this connection, Major Hoseyn 'Ammar-Azavi said: This is not the first time that the Islamic Republic of Iran has announced such a proposal to the international assemblies and has faced Saddam's opposition. Saddam knows that if the families of the Iraqi prisoners come to Iran, all his empty propaganda will be exposed and he would no longer be able to govern the oppressed nation of Iraq. Hence, he refuses this humane proposal of the Iranian officials.

Major Hoseyn 'Ammar said that the daily schedule of the Iraqi prisons in the Heshmatiyyeh barracks consist of performing religious obligations; studying and learning, for the illiterate Iraqis; group recreation; and visits to the sights and religious places in Tehran and other cities of the Islamic Republic of Iran. A reporter of one of the Mexican newspapers asked: Based on existing documents in Mexico, Iraq has made use of chemical bombs and gases against Iran. Have you yourself witnessed the use of such material? He responded: When the United Nations, the International Red Cross, and the major mass media organizations of the world confess that Iraq has used chemical bombs and gases in the battle fronts against the Islamic army, what can I say? I can only tell you that in the Iraqi army, there are special units for teaching the use of chemical bombs and the major work of these units, which are managed by foreign advisors, is to teach the Ba'thist personnel of the Iraqi army about such matters.

Second Lieutenant Jabbar 'Abd ol-Zohreh, who treated the military patients in the ninth army of Iraq, also confirmed Iraq's use of chemical bombs and gases in the battle fronts and said: I am a physician, and because of my profession, I have seen many cases of the effects of the chemical bombs, even on the Iraqi soldiers.

In response to a question asked by an African reporter, Dr 'Abd ol-Zohreh explained the participation of the military forces of the dependent regimes of the region in the war front against the Islamic Republic and said:

In addition to Jordanian and Egyptian soldiers, a number of whom even supervise the internal affairs of the cities of Iraq, forces from Sudan and Somalia also fight in the Iraqi army against the Islamic army. Thus far, many of them have been killed or wounded or have even been captured by the Islamic combatants.

Major Hoseyn 'Ammar-Azawi, then responded to a question by another correspondent, who asked him: Do you believe that Saddam is the aggressor and that he started the war? He said:

I am among those who entered Iranian soil with the first wave of the soldiers of the Iraq army. In the course of the three days of the attack, we were able to advance at some points several km into Iranian soil without any major resistance.

Then he asked the reporter who had asked him that question: Is this not a convincing answer to your question of who started the war?

In the conclusion of this interview, Captain Allahiali asked the foreign reporters to report to the world his message and that of other Iraqi prisoners, who are now like guests in the Islamic Republic, according to the humane mission of a reporter.

In his message, Captain Allahiali described the purpose of the conspiracies of global imperialism as creating disunity and discord among the Muslims in the world and said: They have announced throughout the world that the Islamic revolution belongs only to the Shi'ites; but, I am a Sunnite, and today, like other Muslims, I have been warmly embraced by the Islamic revolution. This in itself shows the mere falsehood of this conspiracy.

Today, I have realized that the Islamic revolution belongs not only to the Shi'ites or Sunnites. The Islamic revolution of Iran belongs to all the oppressed people who have lived or are living in the chains of slavery.

10,000

CSO: 4640/31

MURTAZA BHUTTO INTERVIEWED

LD111121 London BBC Domestic Service in English 1309 GMT 22 Sep 84

[From the "24 Hours" program presented by David Lay]

[Text] The 1977 coup in Pakistan and the subsequent execution of Zulfiqar 'Ali Bhutto, the former prime minister, not only redirected the course of Pakistani politics but also the destinies of individuals caught up in those events. For the late Mr Bhutto's sons the change of course has been most dramatic. Their elder sister, Benazir, has taken over the leadership of the Pakistan People's Party, the PPP. But Murtaza and (Sharnwaz) have sought to avenge their father's death by violent means. Al-Zulfiqar, the terrorist group they command, has carried out operations in Pakistan itself including attempts to assassinate President Zia. In July, a plot to kidnap diplomats in Vienna ended in failure with nine members of Al-Zulfiqar being arrested by Austrian police. They will be coming to trial shortly.

This week I met Murtaza Bhutto in one of Europe's most elegant cities, a far cry from his native Sind Province in Pakistan or the guerrilla bases he uses in the Arab world. Murtaza, a graduate of Harvard and Oxford, has just turned 30. I asked him whether the aborted mission in Vienna suggested that it was not time to abandon his chosen course and engage, together with his sister and mother, in conventional politics.

[Begin recording] [Bhutto] Well, there will never be a time to call it a day. Events have proved in Pakistan that conventional politics will not succeed as long as this regime feels that they can employ any method, use any force to subjugate the people of Pakistan. We indulge in guerrilla activities because we feel there is no alternative.

[Lay] But what have these guerrilla activities achieved?

[Bhutto] They have put the regime on the defensive. They have at certain stages turned Pakistan upside down, we have shot down the governor of Baluchistan's aircraft, we have attacked the inspector general of Sind's police party, we have carried out operations, we will continue to carry out operations till the very end.

[Lay] When did you shoot down the plane carrying the governor of Baluchistan?

[Bhutto] It was in the beginning of July and the plane was flying over a part of Pakistan which is called Mian Wali. Two commandoes of Al-Zulfiqar fired a SAM-7 anti-aircraft missile and there was a thunderstorm, or a lightening which struck at that time, which deflected the missile and it wobbled and it still hit the underbelly of the aircraft. It brought the plane crashing down.

[Lay] But hasn't this been denied by the Pakistani authorities? They say the plane was not brought down by a missile.

[Bhutto] Well, in February 1982 we fired a SAM-7 at Zia's airplane and at that time they said no, there was no attack on Zia's aircraft and today they admit that a group of Al-Zulfiqar fired a SAM-7 anti-aircraft missile at Zia's airplane. So, of course, they have not denied specifically that a missile was fired but they just said that the cause of the crash was an accident.

[Lay] As you know, your sister Benazir challenges you on a number of points and one of them is that once violence is inducted into a political system it is very hard, perhaps impossible, to eradicate it. In other words, she is really charging you with perhaps condemning political life in Pakistan to continuing violence. How do you answer that charge?

[Bhutto] Well, we are a united family, and I--and Benazir is not challenging me--she is saying what we have always said, that actually, violence introduced in a society which has not known violence in the past does, in fact, breed a cycle of violence. And we agreed to that and we have always warned during my father's trial, at every instance--I spoke publicly--I warned that if violence is inducted into Pakistan society it will be difficult to remove it. And this is a correct assessment because violence has been introduced into Pakistani society, not by us, by General Zia. We are not terrorists, we are counterterrorists. We are countering state terrorism.

[Lay] But for your campaign to be successful don't you really have to join forces somehow with your mother and sister. Don't you have to come to terms with the Pakistan People's Party--perhaps they providing the political organization and you a military arm. Can you continue successfully in a position where you appear to be in conflict with the party?

[Bhutto] Well, we have always stated in the past that we have no conflict with the ultimate objectives of the Pakistan People's Party, or for that matter, of any representative popular nationalist party. At this stage, the Pakistan People's Party is the only one which is the mass party in Pakistan, which reflects the aspirations of the people of Pakistan. If the People's Party tells us tomorrow that they are prepared to cooperate, of course we will cooperate with them. We have nothing against cooperation with the Pakistan People's Party or with any, for that matter, nationalist, progressive people's party which represents the aspirations of our people.

[Lay] What the Pakistan People's Party has invited you to do--and Benazir Bhutto herself said this in an interview with me in April--she invited you to suspend your operations. She said that Al-Zulfiqar, the guerrilla group, was in fact harming the party.

[Bhutto] We are prepared to suspend our guerrilla operations if we can be convinced that by suspending our guerrilla operations we will in fact move closer to the goal which we seek to achieve. We are not going to be dogmatic. We are not going to be tied by a straightjacket. We are prepared to make any modification to achieve our goal; but we are convinced at this time that armed struggle is the only solution.

[Lay] But doesn't it ever cross your mind that you are tarnishing the image of the Pakistan People's Party and that perhaps you are playing a part in ensuring that the Bhutto family does not return to political power in Pakistan?

[Bhutto] No, quite the contrary. If there is any hope for the people of Pakistan to achieve their freedom again I think, I would be modest enough to say that it would be a combination of two actions, which is political action and armed action. I think the people in Pakistan recognize that the two things cannot go separately, that you will have to have political mobilization and a political uprising which can only be achieved when guerrilla activity has reached a certain stage and it has broken the will of the Pakistan army.

[Lay] Well if a combination of military action and political action does succeed one day, how would you really expect to be rewarded?

[Bhutto] Honestly, I tell you I do not visualize a political role in the government of a democratic Pakistan. I have not visualized that role ever and I am being really honest with you, I would like to remain with this organization as long as the members accept me. I would like to, somehow, play a role whereby we put an end to a situation where any military officer feels it is his God-given right to usurp power and impose his will and his whim on the people of Pakistan, and I will be very satisfied if my contribution merely remains that we become somehow--I wouldn't say the guardians--the guarantors of democracy in Pakistan without really interfering in the democratic political process of Pakistan.
[End recording]

CSO: 4600/27

LEADER URGES REGIME TO TAKE PEOPLE INTO CONFIDENCE

GF050932 Karachi DAWN in English 1 Oct 84 p 2

[Text] Lahore, 30 Sep--Malik Mohammad Qasim, secretary-general, defunct Muslim league, on Sunday urged the government to take people into confidence and seek their active cooperation to meet the threats hovering over the national borders.

Malik Qasim, who was addressing a news conference here, made a pointed reference to the serious developments that had taken place in quick succession in the Siahchin glacier area in Kashmir, in Parachinar in the NWFR [Northwest Frontier Province] and the Chaman area in Baluchistan. He said these happenings were too serious to be ignored or taken lightly.

He said that he was a firm believer in the efficacy of the armed forces and would personally support them in the case of a threat to national integrity but would not be in a position to persuade his followers as the people were losing interest in the national affairs.

He maintained that in this hour of crisis the armed forces should be relieved of their "administrative duties" to concentrate fully on defending the frontiers.

He noted that workers and leaders of almost all the political parties were seriously worried over "the intrusion by Afghan Mujahideen into the domestic and economic affairs" of the local people and urged the government to take effective steps to prevent this intrusion.

To meet the situation on the frontiers, he demanded that the ban on inter-district and inter-provincial movement of political and labour leaders be removed immediately and cases against them withdrawn.

These steps would enable them to contact the people and convince them of the need for unity, he added.

CSO: 4600/27

MAULANA NOORANI SAYS ISLAM, MARTIAL LAW NOT COMPATIBLE

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 28 Sep 84 p 8

[Article by Badruul Islam Butt]

[Text]

LAHORE, Sept.27: Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani, President, World Islamic Mission, today stressed the need for a joint working programme on the issue of the forthcoming elections. He, however, expressed his opinion that in order to safeguard national integrity, elections should be held on the basis of the 1973 Constitution which had been formulated by a consensus of all the four provinces.

He was speaking at a reception this evening hosted in his honour by Syed Ahmad Saeed Kirmani, a veteran worker of the Pakistan Movement and an ex-minister in the old West Pakistan. Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan, a prominent leader of the Pakistan Movement also addressed the gathering.

Referring to certain questions raised by Mr. Kirmani in his address of welcome about the prevailing situation in the country, Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani said, it was a pity that the country after 37 years of independence was again faced with the question whether elections were at all needed and whether the elections should be held on party or non-party basis.

Maulana Noorani said, non-party elections and presidential systems had already been tried during the Ayub regime and proved a failure as admitted later by Ayub Khan himself. It was not in the interest of the country, he said, to repeat the experience now.

Maulana Noorani, referring to Islamic history, went on to assert that there was not a single instance of military rule being super imposed on the civilian representatives of the Ummat. Even on the most sensitive occasions like those of the martyrdom of Hazrat Omar Farooq and Hazrat Ali, none of the great Muslim generals who had conquered vast lands dared to interfere in the domain of Khilafat.

He said right from the days of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) down to the Dynasts, the Muslims had been constantly locked in battles with the Romans and then the Iranians, two super powers of the time. But no emergency was declared, nor were fundamental rights suspended in the Islamic state.

Martial law and Islam, said Maulana Noorani, were poles apart and could not be made to work side by side. In the present circumstances martial law had rather an edge over Islam as a Shariat court had no jurisdiction to give its verdict on an order passed by a military court.

Maulana Noorani said: "Today we have about 44 Muslim states all over the world. But we have also witnessed the barbaric massacre of Muslims at Sabra and Shatila camps, on the West Bank and in various parts of India. All the Muslim rulers

kept mum over these massacres".

Referring to the prevalent situation in the country Maulana Noorani said no harm was done to the integrity of the country while politicians and the political parties were at the helm of affairs.

In his opinion the present situation was not a pleasant one and the country was still passing through a critical phase. The sense of deprivation was on the increase in other provinces among which Sind had assumed a most sensitive position.

Maulana Noorani further said that no foreign power could undo Pakistan. Only hands from within could harm the integrity of the country by driving the people to dismay and deprivation. He said it was high time that patriotic elements should unite to safeguard the country and chalk out a joint programme for the purpose.

Earlier, Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan, recalling the days of the Pakistan Movement, said the Quaid-i-Azam believed in democracy and had achieved Pakistan by the force of the people's vote. "We must follow the path of the great leader in order to save Pakistan from the prevalent dangers."

Mr. Ahmad Saeed Kirmani criticised the non-party election proposal and said it was not in consonance with the spirit of Islam.

ELECTIONS UNDER 1973 CONSTITUTION URGED

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 29 Sep 84 p 8

[Text]

LAHORE, Sept. 28: The veteran leader, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, has said that the consensus was that the forthcoming elections in the country should be held under the 1973 Constitution. Talking to "The Muslim", he said that he had met a number of important political leaders and found their point of view identical.

He said that some of the political parties were still observing the political developments in the country, as elections under the August 12, 1983 plan of President Ziaul Haq needed a lot of clarifications regarding the nature and functions of the proposed National Security Council, the role of political parties, nominations to the Senate or National Assembly, restoration of the 1973 Constitution, and many other allied issues. He said that it was his considered opinion that without a proper election atmosphere and in the absence of opportunities for the political parties to present themselves and their manifestoes before the people, and with important political workers still in jails, the holding of elections would bear no fruit.

Referring to his recent meeting with leaders of other political parties, he said that he had a number of meetings with Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani, and discussed with him the prevailing political situation in the country. He said that, Maulana Noorani told him without any ambiguity

that his party would only participate in the forthcoming elections if these were held under the 1973 Constitution.

Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan said that the defunct Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (Darkhawasti group), defunct Jamiat-Allahis headed by Allama Ehsan Elahi Zaheer, prominent leaders of the defunct Muslim League factions, including, Mr. Mumtaz Mohammad Khan Daultana, Mr. Yousaf Khattak, Mr. S.M. Zafar, Mr. Ahmad Saeed Kirmani and many other national leaders had expressed their intention not to participate in the elections if they are not held under the 1973 Constitution.

Analysing the present situation, the veteran leader said that during the last seven years, major national and political problems of a serious nature had cropped up, and it was not possible for any single party to deal with them.

He added these gigantic problems could only be tackled by collective political wisdom.

Referring to the recent report about some government officials establishing contact with Asghar Khan, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, and other leaders, he said, so far these reports were not confirmed, and secondly he had full faith in the political wisdom of these leaders. He added if these meeting had at all taken place, then their nature would not be different from that of a meeting of a jailor and a prisoner.

RELEASED LEADER COMMENTS ON ELECTIONS

GF100708 Lahore NAWA-E WAQT in Urdu 3 Oct 84 p 1

[Text] Rawalpindi, 2 Oct--The former leader of the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal Party, Air Marshal Asghar Khan, has said: We do not believe in elections for the sake of elections. If the government is sincere in its intention to hold elections, then it should hold meaningful, proper elections, which would facilitate the transfer of power to the people, and the people could take charge. He said: The conditions around Pakistan depend on the internal situation. If the internal situation improves it will have international repercussions. The government must try to improve the internal situation.

He continued: If the government wishes to hold negotiations with politicians it can be considered. The important thing is that the government should take the people into its confidence. The retired air marshal said this in an exclusive interview with NAWA-E WAQT at his residence in Abbottabad. The panel of interviewers consisted of Tariq Warsi, Ikramul Haq Shaikh, and Anjum Ikram. The interview lasted for 2 hours and was the first formal interview given after his 5-year term under house arrest.

Air Marshal Asghar Khan spoke about the events and the affairs of the country during his 5 years of house arrest. He answered the telephone, receiving congratulations from all over the country on his release. Analyzing the conditions in the country he said that the people want the government to answer to them. They should be able to ask it to accede to their wishes. This can only be possible if the people get the chance to form their own government and their economic condition is stable. If their internal circumstances are stable then it will have a favorable effect on the international situation.

Regarding the elections, he said, whatever has been said so far is quite ambiguous. The government issues contradictory statements every other day and it is difficult to find out if and when the elections will be held. First the government said one thing and now it says that the elections will take up where the 1977 elections left off. Therefore, until the elections schedule is announced we will not be assured. If the government plans to hold elections they must be meaningful, that is, civil rights are restored, the press is free, and the political parties

are permitted to operate. He added: So far the government statements indicate that the government does not wish to transfer power. In any case we will wait until March 1985 for them to fulfill their promise. Regarding the 12 August formula I told General K.M. Arif, who came to see me a year ago, that it is not very clear.

Asghar denied the allegations that he had met another government representative in the near or distant past. In answer to a question, as regards the government invitation for talks, he said it is a supposition that if the government expresses the desire for constructive negotiations, it will be considered. In answer to another question he said, the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal Party has not decided whether to participate in the party or nonparty elections. That will be announced when the elections schedule is released. He added: If there is any difference of opinion in the party on this subject, it is a sign of democracy, but the final decision will be unanimous.

Replying to a question on the MRD he said: We agree on the four points of the MRD and we will cooperate with them until their four aims are achieved, but we are not in favor of making it into an electoral union. The MRD consists of various parties with different points of view. In order to participate in elections, there has to be a common manifesto, but each party has its own. In any case we shall find a way to discuss this with our MRD friends, but we are not in favor of increasing the four points of the MRD.

CSO: 4656/9

PASHTUN LEADER RETURNS FROM AFGHANISTAN

GF100647 Lahore JANG in Urdu 30 Sep 84 pp 1, 8

[Text] The JANG correspondent in Peshawar has reported that the founder of the Khudai Khitmatgar Movement, Abdul Gaffar Khan, on his return from Afghanistan was offered an ambulance upon his arrival at the Towr Kham border post. Bacha Khan [an alias of Abdul Gaffar Khan] was looking healthy and happy and refused to use the government-provided ambulance. For this reason the ambulance returned empty. Along with Bacha Khan, Abdul Wali Khan, his son, and Begam Naseem Wali Khan also arrived in Pakistan. All three later arrived at their residence in Wali Bagh. Their convoy, consisting of some 100 cars and vehicles, was greeted by tribesmen firing Kalashnikov rifles, who accompanied the procession up to the historical gate at Khyber. On the Pakistan-Afghan border, Bacha Khan was received by the president of the defunct Pakistan National Party, Abdul Latif Khan advocate, and certain other political leaders, including Abdul Khaliq Khan advocate and Ghulam Ahmad Bilor. On his way through the Khyber Pass Bacha Khan was greeted by Sinwari and Afridi tribesmen.

Earlier at the Pakistan-Afghanistan border students on both sides of the border shouted such slogans as "Long live revolution," and Babrak and Wali are brothers, and also slogans for greater Pashtunistan. In the rush that occurred at the border many people ran across the border to greet Bacha Khan. The local police and troops had to resort to using batons to control the crowd. Although extensive security precautions had been taken on this occasion to prevent crossings, nine students still succeeded in crossing over into Afghanistan, out of some 200 students who attempted to on this occasion. The angry students stoned the troops who were preventing them from crossing over. Earlier when the procession accompanying the reception committee was moving from Peshawar to Towr Kham border the students in the procession threw stones at troops in the Fort Michni area at one point along the way. One soldier was injured in the incident.

At Kabul, when Bacha Khan, his son Wali Khan, and his daughter-in-law Begam Naseem Wali Khan were leaving Abdul Wali Khan told the BAKHTAR NEWS AGENCY that he very much appreciated the welcome he was accorded while in Kabul. He thanked the Kabul government for the hospitality extended to him. Abdul Wali Khan also expressed good wishes for the success of Afghan society.

Abdul Wali Khan, upon his arrival in Pakistan, told the press that the party came from Kabul to Jalalabad by air. From Jalalabad it was transported to Towr Kham by road. The cavalcade was protected by Afghan military vehicles along the road. However, when their procession was passing through Tangay pass, the Mujahidin, who were hiding along the roadside, fired on the procession. At this attack the Afghan armored vehicles and the helicopters who were guarding the procession heavily bombarded the Mujahidin positions and repelled them. Abdul Gaffar Khan, alias Bacha Khan, has also brought with him copies of his book, "My Life and Struggle," in 46 jute bags, estimated to contain several thousand copies.

CSO: 4656/9

MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE INTERVIEWED, DISCUSSES EMERGING ISSUES

Islamabad THE MUSLIM Magazine in English 28 Sep 84 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Sartaj Aziz, Minister of State for Food, Agriculture and Co-operatives by Aslam Sheikh and Nusrat Javed; date and place not specified]

[Text]

Question: Mr. Sartaj Aziz, at the FAO, you had the opportunity to acquire a special insight into the agricultural problems of the Third World. How do you see the current agricultural situation in Pakistan, particularly after last year's major set-back?

Answer: In comparison with other developing countries, Pakistan's economic and agricultural performance has been quite encouraging. In the past three decades, Pakistan has achieved a real increase of 5.5 per cent per annum in GNP and about 3.5 per cent in agriculture. The growth rate in the past six years has been particularly impressive - 6.8 per cent in GNP and 4.0 per cent in agriculture.

The setback in 1983-84 was therefore very unfortunate. The negative growth of 4 per cent in the agriculture sector was no doubt caused by climatic factors, but it has also highlighted certain inadequacies which, if tackled, could minimise the impact of adverse weather in the future - integrated pest control for the cotton crop for example.

I have carried out, since my return, a careful review of the strength and weaknesses of the agriculture sector and my assessment is that Pakistan's agriculture is basically healthy and dynamic. If the weather remains normal, the sector should regain the growth momentum of the preceding six years. There are of course many weaknesses and inad-

quacies which need greater attention and it might not be easy to achieve all the Sixth Plan crop targets or the overall agricultural growth target of 5 per cent, but the prospects of maintaining a growth rate of at least 4 per cent seem fairly promising.

HIGHER YIELDS

Q. You are emphasising the good performance of the last seven years. But good agricultural performance has been there even before this period. Only good weather helped agriculture during this period.

A. I do not think statistics will fully support this contention. The past three decades of high economic growth can be divided in four periods: The first 10 years i.e. in the 1950's, the growth rate hardly kept pace with population increase. The second period from 1961 to 1969 saw a very high growth - 7.1% in GNP and 5.5% in agriculture. The third period from 1969-70 to 1976-77, growth in GNP declined to 4.2% while agricultural growth fell back to 1.5%, below the population growth rate. In the fourth and final period, the pace of growth accelerated to 6.8% and agricultural growth to 4%.

I think that most encouraging feature of the recent agricultural performance is the fact that more than half the increase in output has come from higher per hectare yields, particularly in wheat and irri rice. There are four essential factors which have contributed to this agriculture performance:

- Major expansion in fertilizer production and consumption (from about 700,000 tons to 1.2 million tons - in nutrient tons).
- A three-fold increase in the availability of agricultural credit - from Rs. 3000 million to Rs. 9000 million.
- Increased water availability from Tarbela and other projects.
- Active price support policies for major crops as a result of which the whole sale price for all crops increased faster than the increase in import prices and the share of marketable surplus of wheat increased from 33% in 1974-74 to 67% in 1983-84 and of rice from 50 to 95 per cent.

The Pakistani farmer is very responsive to price incentives. The increase in support price of wheat in 1978-79 and of cotton in 1980-81 was followed by a significant jump in production.

Q: What are the major weaknesses and inadequacies in the agriculture sector which could affect the Sixth Plan targets?

A. The major weaknesses are plant protection services and marketing but my main worry for the Sixth Plan is not with respect to the major crops (i.e. wheat, rice, cotton and sugarcane), which I hope will regain their momentum in 1984-85. It is the so-called minor crops. The most important of these are non traditional oil seeds like sunflower and soyabean. Our dependence on imported edible oils has been increasing very rapidly and the

Sixth Plan target is to bring about an increase in non-traditional oil seeds which will keep our dependence on imports at the same level. Even this modest target will mean expanding soyabean and sunflower production on at least 400,000 hectares, compared to only 35,000 at present. With our present policies of controlling ghee prices and very inadequate arrangements for procuring these non-traditional oil seeds it will be very difficult to achieve these targets. A major reappraisal of this sub sector is needed urgently.

The second major group of minor crops for which the Plan has set very ambitious production and export targets is fruits and vegetables. There is, of course, tremendous scope for both, but our major weakness is marketing and processing. In many areas, particularly in NWFP and Baluchistan, people have responded to good prices and produced high-value fruits only to see the prices fall. Only in mangoes and oranges extra production has led to sizeable exports. Similar institutional arrangements backed by stable export policies are necessary. Another area which needs greater attention is pulses.

In general, it would be fair to say that during the last ten to fifteen years, we have concentrated all our efforts — research, procurement and support price policy — on four major crops i.e. wheat, rice, cotton and sugarcane. I think much greater attention should be devoted to many important and so called 'minor' crops. These are important not only for our balance of payments but because they are critical for the small farmers, whose viability will depend not so much on cereals but on high value crops like fruits and vegetables and edible oils and on poultry and livestock.

WHAT'S NEEDED

Q: One widely held view is that without basic land re-distribution there can be no further growth in agriculture as the instrument of price incentives has exhausted itself within the existing framework. Also this is the only way to extend the impact of Green Revolution to large segments of rural population still untouched by it, with surpluses produced so far only on big farms. The problem of future agricultural growth needs to be tackled from a socio-economic point of view and not merely from a technological angle.

A: I agree with the basic premise implicit in the question

that problems of agricultural growth cannot be tackled in a narrow economic or technical framework. They must be looked at in the total socio-economic context. This is particularly true in countries like Pakistan where for a rural population of almost 60 million we have only 20 million hectares of cultivated land. As a consequence, one of the most striking aspect of Pakistan's agriculture is the predominance of small farmers. Out of 4 million farms, 75 per cent or 3 million are small farms of less than 5 hectares but they have less than one third (or 6.5 million hectares) of cultivated land.

It is also true that the capacity of the large and medium farmers to take advantage of the new technological packages — seeds, fertilizers, tubewells and tractors — is much greater than that of small farmers. As a result, large farmers with holdings of more than 10 hectares (which constitute 9 per cent of total farms about 40 per cent of the cultivated area) have made the largest contribution to higher output and therefore, received the largest proportion of the additional income generated in this sector.

In the light of these realities the question of land redistribution can be considered an important issue. But supposing such an alternative was politically feasible, how much land can be resumed for allocation to the landless or the small farmers? In 1959, the area resumed under the land reforms was only 700,000 hectares and in 1972 about one third of that. This perhaps provided about 180,000 landless farmers with holdings of 5 hectares each, but how does that solve the problem of 3 million existing small farmers with holdings of 5 hectares or less? There are many other issues which in our context are perhaps more important than that of land redistribution, i.e. how to give security of tenure to tenant farmers, how to increase the cropping intensity of large holdings, and most critical of all, how to increase the productivity of the small farmer by giving him adequate access to knowledge, credit and water and by ensuring that he receives a fair return for whatever surplus he can produce.

Some progress has already been made in this direction, specially in credit, but much more remains to be done. For example even in the field of credit, small farmers below 5 hectares are receiving only 15 per cent of the total agricultural credit. They should receive at least 33 per cent, equal to their share in cultivated land. In the field of extension and marketing, the bulk of the small

farmers have not yet been reached. Some proposals are being worked out at present to give operational content to the Sixth Plan objectives in this important area. Personally I am convinced that without increasing the productivity of the small farmers, the Plan's production objectives will be difficult to achieve.

SMALL FARMER

Q: How do you define the small farmers?

A: Until recently, farmers with holdings of less 10 hectares were regarded as "small farmers". This was probably based on the classification presented in the 1959 land reforms which declared 10 hectares to be the minimum economic holding and 5 hectares as the subsistence holding. For a country where 90 per cent of all holdings are below 10 hectares, this definition would seem too broad. The Sixth Plan has taken the first corrective step and referred to small farmers as those with less than 5 hectares, without formally defining them.

But the size of holding is only one criteria. In barani or remote areas even farmers with much larger holdings are much poorer than a 2 hectare farmer growing fruits and vegetables on an irrigated holding. The basic objective should be to assist the poor small farmers and not to be rigid about the size of the holding.

In helping the small farmer we should also remember that farming is not just a matter of credit and inputs. It is a way of life which must be made pleasant and comfortable. If the farmer is harassed by the official, if he is uncertain about the availability of water, the arrival of the tractor, and about the final price he will receive for his hard labour, farming will cease to be a worthwhile activity. We have to create institutions in which the small farmer can participate and which give him a greater sense of security.

DRINKING WATER

Q: Some people say that government must adopt an integrated approach towards agriculture. The improvements in productivity must not be isolated from broader aspects of rural development. Do you agree?

A: Yes, I would agree wholeheartedly. (Basically rural development means social development in its wider meaning for the entire rural population — together with rapid growth of agricultural production and related sectors.

As I mentioned earlier, in pure economic terms, Pakistan has made

encouraging progress) in the past thirty years Pakistan's per capita income has increased from Rs. 340 or 70 dollars in 1950 to Rs. 5300 or 380 dollars in 1983. Thus from the bottom of the list of developing countries, it is now at the upper end of the list. In a year or two Pakistan can move into the category of middle income countries. But unfortunately Pakistan's commendable economic progress is not yet fully reflected in social indicators like female literacy, enrolment rates, infant mortality, life expectancy at birth and the rate of population growth. In fact on the basis of social indicators Pakistan is very much at the bottom of the list of developing countries.

This comparison is not just statistical. It is very vivid on the ground. There are visible signs of material prosperity in the form of cars, television sets, refrigerators and other gadgets. But side by side the standards of hygiene, availability of drinking water, health and education facilities were deplorably inadequate. In such a situation even if more food is available, it would not be converted into nutrition because of the high incidence of water-borne diseases.

DIVERSIFICATION

Q: What has your strategy to offer to landless people? They don't have any trade union.

A: If agriculture continues to grow at 4 or 5 per cent per annum it will provide additional employment and income opportunities as the extra produce has to be processed and marketed. But the second and perhaps most important factor would be in the area of agricultural diversification: non-agricultural activities in rural areas, livestock, and agroindustries, not only provide assured markets and inputs to agricultural producers, but also provide jobs to the landless.

MORE LANDLESS?

Q: Some estimates indicate that the number of landless has been increasing over the year.

A: I do not think there is any reliable analysis of the landless in Pakistan. According to the 1981 census of population, the rural population was estimated at about 60 million. If we take an average of 6 to 7 members in each rural household, there will be 9 million rural households in the country. According to the 1980 agricultural census, there are 4.25 million farm households occupying about 4 million farms. In other

words, in a technical sense, about half the rural households are landless but according to some estimates, about 2 million or half of these belong to non-agricultural, middle class rural society consisting of professionals, craftsmen, civil servants and those employed in transport and trade. So the remaining 2.5 million landless households could be categorised as relatively poor. Perhaps most of them are small scale livestock holders, the rest would be seasonal agricultural labour, with incomes of less than Rs. 10,000 per year.

There have been reports of some large landowners, resuming land for self cultivation from small tenants, so there could be an increase in the number of landless. But there has also been a large scale migration of workers from rural areas. This could have reduced this number. It is difficult to say by how much, but most of these workers have gone from barani areas, which had the poorest of the landless. Some of the money sent by the workers has been used by their dependents to establish income generating activities like transport, tractor hire and small scale agro industries. In this way, migration had a dual impact on the poverty problem. With the emigration of about 2 million workers, the pressure on land has diminished and the remittances from them have generated new economic activities in these areas.

Q: How has mechanisation affected productivity and employment?

A: Yes to some extent. Imports of tractors commenced on a significant scale in the early 1960's and by 1968-69 there were about 20,000 tractors in the country. The total number reached 60,000 in 1976-77 but after that, the annual rate of imports increased to 15,000 to 20,000. By 1983 the cumulative number of tractors was 180,000, of which perhaps 140,000 are operational. There has been a corresponding increase in other equipment like trailers, threshers and cultivators. The Sixth Plan provides for an annual import level of 50,000 tractors taking the total to 330,000 including some small tractors by 1987-88.

Farm mechanisation in Pakistan is essentially a replacement for bullocks as draft power but it has also supplemented the traditional bullock cart and thus played an important role in marketing.

There are many different views on the impact of mechanisation on land productivity but I think there is enough evidence to show that the extra area brought under wheat in recent years would not have been possible without tractors. One encouraging development has been

the widespread system of hiring tractors. Some more sophisticated agro services, like harvesting and land levelling, are now being provided by some private companies. According to some reports mechanised harvesting can save 10 to 12 maunds of wheat per hectare, otherwise lost in traditional threshing. Land levelling is an essential pre-requisite for more efficient water use which in the coming years will be the one of the most important factors in raising production.

Theoretically mechanisation might displace some labour but in Pakistan's case with rapid agricultural growth and larger scale labour migration, this has not been a problem. In fact, it has helped to relieve labour shortage in peak periods for harvesting and threshing. Pakistan's agriculture has now reached a stage of maturity in which selective mechanisation is an essential element in future progress.

Q: While talking about mechanisation, there was controversy about the size of the tractors. Any comments?

A: I think this controversy is unnecessary. We should allow the importer to respond to the demand of the farmer. The economic cost of a small tractor per unit of cultivation is higher, but if farmers with holdings of say 10 to 15 hectares, need to use a tractor for 50 or 100 days in a year, it will be better for them to have a small tractor of 25-30 horse power. But a small farmer, of less than 5 or 3 hectares who cannot maintain a pair of bullocks on his limited holding, will be better off hiring a tractor for a few days every year. A small tractor is thus needed but not necessarily for small farmers. We also need large tractors for land levelling and deep ploughing. I think that time has come to liberalise the system, within a general system of standardisation so that the policy of progressive domestic manufacturing is not delayed. But having standardised some brands, there should be no restriction on the size of tractors.

Q: To mobilise small and middle peasants to play an effective role in agricultural growth various countries of the world have achieved tremendous results through co-operatives. What are the prospects of co-operatives in our country?

A: Potentially co-operatives can play an important role, particularly in reaching and organising the small farmers. However, in practice, co-operatives have so far played a limited role. The reasons for this have been discussed at length. Some writers have expressed the view

that our villages are overwhelmed by traditional rivalries or tribal feuds and cannot be persuaded to work together. Others have blamed bureaucratic controls which have not allowed local leadership to develop. I am personally optimistic because we have no alternative in helping the small farmers particularly in marketing and credit. But we will need a basic change in the present system in which the regulatory and supervisory functions of the Co-operative Department far exceed their promotional functions. We have to shift the responsibility for promotional work to non official leadership, at the local, middle and provincial levels. I am convinced that local leadership can develop if we give it the opportunity and some financial support. But we have to accept that the development of cooperatives will be a slow process and the prospects for service cooperatives are better than for production cooperative.

Q: Pakistan's agriculture It has been claimed, has reached a stage where it has made the country self-sufficient. What is required now is to commercialise it and integrate it with the world market for example, by introducing more high-value crops and those which can generate more export, regardless of the nutrition requirements of the country. Do you think that Pakistan has reached that stage?

A: I do not think that the two strategies are mutually exclusive. Food self-sufficiency is our major aim and we should continue to concentrate on increasing the production of wheat and rice. I do not think that we have reached a stage where we should diversify out of these crops deliberately. But there are substantial areas where double cropping is possible and we can produce other high value crops in these areas. For example, soyabean can be grown between two cotton crops. Sunflower is also a short duration crop and can be grown with wheat. Our total cropping intensity is fairly low, about 95 per cent, although with 75% land under irrigation, it should be possible to double crop a considerable proportion. We can, therefore, diversify our agricultural output without reducing the net area under wheat and rice. In barani areas, there are possibilities of increasing maize output which has remained static at about a million tons. In Baluchistan and NWFP, which are not cereal growing areas, the possibilities for fruits and vegetables are very promising, if we can improve marketing and processing.

The objective of increasing agricultural exports does not necessarily

mean sacrificing improved nutrition. Many high value cash crops are produced by small farmers, also milk. If they get good prices and earn more income, they can buy the food they need. Even otherwise if agricultural production increase at 4% or more, i.e. faster than population some surpluses for exports will emerge. If these are not exported, the prices will decline, and so will the income of farmers. Fortunately, with the exception of sugar, Pakistan's agricultural exports are fairly competitive in terms of world prices. To maintain this competitive position, in wheat, rice and cotton there is need to raise productivity further and reduce marketing and distribution costs so that agriculture remains a profitable activity for the farmer and prices remain reasonable for the consumer.

Q: What is your estimate regarding surplus in the wheat this year and in future?

A: Last year we exported 300,000 tons to Iran. In 1984-85 there is no exportable surplus, because the wheat crop was about 16 per cent lower than the target i.e. 10.9 million tons compared to 12.4 million tons in 1982-83. We can however manage because we had stocks of 1.8 million tons at the beginning of the year. Next year, even if we achieve the production target of 13.1 million tons we will have a million tons surplus, but that would be needed to rebuild our stocks. Once the stock level reaches about 1.5 million tons, we can enter the export markets again.

Q: Some people are skeptical about our capability to export wheat on competitive prices in the international market.

A: Our wheat prices are fairly competitive in the international market, particularly for the Middle East market because lower transport costs gives us an extra edge for competition. But we do not have a system of grading and quality control at the time of procurement. We, therefore, sell wheat which is listed as F.A.Q. (fair average quality) and fetches the lowest prices.

The real problem is higher production. If the Sixth Plan target of 15.5 million tons is achieved, there will be an exportable surplus of about 2 million tons in 1987-88. The world trade in wheat is very substantial - about 70 million tons and we should have no difficulty in selling 2 to 3 million tons. Our wheat exports can even reach 5 million tons if suitable regional food security or trading arrangements can be evolved with Islamic or South Asian countries. Once our exports reach that level, hopefully in the early 1990's, then we can consider diversifying out of

wheat.

Q: Recently a debate has again been initiated on the question of absentee landlordism. What do you think is the relevance of this issue to the overall growth of our agriculture?

A: According to the 1980 census of agriculture, there are 4 million farms in the country, of these 2.2 million or 55 per cent are owner cultivated, 1 million or 25 per cent are tenant operated and 20 per cent or the remaining 800,000 farms, owner cum tenant operated. The land cultivated by these tenants is partly owned by landlords who are absent, i.e. businessmen or other living in the cities, but a large proportion is owned by landlords who are present but parcel out their holdings among several tenants.

There is no question that when the tiller of the land has ownership, both the incentive and the ability to improve the land and to increase productivity is much greater. But since it is not always practicable to change the pattern of ownership, the situation of tenants can still be improved by giving them a minimum security of tenure and enabling them to borrow money and securing the required inputs on a timely basis. Whenever possible, any state land or new land created by a project should be given to the landless poor or the small farmer, preferably in the form of a cooperative, as was done in Khanewal.

I understand some businessmen living in the cities have acquired agricultural land because agricultural income is not subject to income tax. This gives them an easier option for tax evasion, by showing a part of their business income as agricultural income. There should be a more vigorous check on the agricultural incomes of all absentee landlords.

Q: What are the implications and impact of ushr which was imposed last year?

A: Ushr, which literally means one tenth, has actually been levied at the rate of five per cent and farmers below 12½ acres are exempt. The total amount collected last year (about Rs. 250 million) is not much more than the land revenue which it replaced. But the principle of levying ushr is very sound. Based on gross produce, rather than net income, it is more progressive than agricultural income tax. Hopefully, once the system of fixing the rates of ushr is rationalised, it will yield higher revenue. Together with zakat, ushr can provide new resources for social services and community welfare programmes in rural areas.

SECURITY OPTIONS FOR SOUTH ASIA ANALYZED

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 28 Sep 84 pp 4, 5

[Article by Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema]

[Text]

The future of peace in South Asia perhaps depends on the healthy relationship between India and Pakistan. Jointly they can shoulder the burden of area defence and maintain the peace of the region and independence of the countries involved. Persistence in individual pursuits can, not only provide ample opportunities to the enhancement of their interests but could also damage the peace of our area. Time has come that instead of seeking threat from within, they should direct their attentions to threats that loom large on the periphery of the areas.

For years both India and Pakistan concentrated on strengthening their defences against each other. Admittedly at initial stages, problems emanating from hasty and surgical partition of the Indian subcontinent, compelled them to opt for antagonistic and hostile relationships. Experience of the last thirty years has taught us that obsessions like Captain Ahab's with Moby Dick could only result in increased frequency of violent clashes and more destructiveness. Neither country has been able to resolve its differences and disputes by employing physical means of violence. Much of the resources of the region are allocated towards the militarisation of the states. Most of the regional states are tied together by negative forces like mutual fear,

suspicion and distrust rather than by positive cementing elements like increased mutual trade, commerce, joint ventures etc.

POLICIES

Given the incumbent physical and resource disparities within the region, the major responsibility for introducing harmony and maintaining peace in the area lies with the attitude and policies of the major states; India and Pakistan. Once these two resolve their disputes and set the example of harmonious relationship, the others will follow. But India - Pakistan are locked up in conflictual relationship. That is the product of the last thirty seven years. Rightly or wrongly the origin of this conflictual cobweb is attributed to the departing British in 1947 who concentrated too much on constitutional niceties and could not or did not devote much time in analysing and even comprehending the dangerous implications of their policy with regard to the status of princely states. When the departing British had already decided the basic principles for states' accession and when Lord Listowel had categorically declared that none of the states would be allowed to become an independent entity, the question that strikes us is why could not the British themselves decide the accession of states to respective dominions before the independence was announced? On one hand the British announced that with their departure technically all princely states would become independent but on the other hand they insisted that all princely

states must join one of the two dominions. Since the British government had taken a policy decision that all states must join the two successor dominions of the Indian subcontinent, it would have been a much wiser course action had the British themselves resolved the accession issue before awarding independence to India and Pakistan.

PROBLEMS

While the British dangerously overlooked many serious problems which eventually contributed rather heavily toward building deep distrust between these two states, the emotionally charged attitudes of the Indians and the Pakistanis not only led them away from realistic and pragmatic approaches but also injected genuine fears - fears of each other. Pakistan's fears were based on India's awesome size and the conviction that the Congress leaders did not accept the two nation theory and the consequent partition of India and were devotedly engaged to annul the partition. India's initial fear was based on the conviction that the very bases of Pakistan would eventually damage the very foundation of Indian society. Later Pakistan's participation in western sponsored defence alliance system generated the fear that Pakistan was trying to attain parity - parity in a region which India aspired to dominate. The notion that Pakistan's participation in Defence Pacts was primarily meant to strengthen its own defences and not to generate insecurity for any neighbouring country, was curtly brushed aside by the Indian decision makers - especially during the 50s. Perhaps that is why India took quite some time to rid off these fears and become confident of her own strength.

Vast changes have occurred since the days when India and Pakistan were genuinely locked up in an irreconcilable dilemma that was the product of mutual fears. Not only the hostility generated by the bi-polarity of the 50s at the global level has been transformed into accommodations of each others' legitimate interests by the superpowers, but the hitherto vigilance and probing of the Grey areas have also been replaced by active adventurism. The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union is one reminder of the changing trends. At regional level, significant developments have also taken place. Collective efforts to promote regional cooperation within South Asia have also been seriously undertaken during the recent past. In

addition, India - Pakistan and China are engaged in constructive processes of mending fences.

Given the existing situation with the Soviets engaged in consolidation of their power in Afghanistan and taking into cognizant the regional efforts, one could easily visualise at least four following future scenarios of South Asia.

a) Continued Confrontation: Essentially this implies that India and Pakistan would continue with the policy of confrontation. This policy, in fact, means adherence to balance of power theories. In order to balance their strength vis-a-vis the perceived adversary both would be dependent in some ways upon the support of the outsiders. Continued dependence also implies participation, however, limited it may be, in outsiders game. Compared to the American support to Pakistan that has always been somewhat limited, the Soviet support to India has been massive and continues to be so. Large Soviet aid doses to India has in many ways inhibited freedom of action that India once enjoyed under Nehru in foreign affairs. Being the leader of NAM and having realised that the Soviets were wrong to invade Afghanistan, India was unable to openly and vociferously criticise and condemn the latest Soviet adventurism. Perhaps this was India's way to not only harmonize its interests with that of the Soviets but also to repay part of its heavy debt and gratitude incurred over the years. In many ways such dependence upon the outsiders immobilises regional powers to play a constructive role in the Asian balance.

COUNTERING INROADS

Just as the Soviets have been fishing in troubled waters ever since they were invited into the area in 1955, the Americans did not miss any opportunity to counter the communist inroads. In fact, the Americans took up positions earlier than the Soviets incongruence with their containment policy and dictates of bi-polarity. Regional powers inadvertently provided the opportunities to the outsiders to enhance their interests with the illusion that they were promoting and securing their own interests.

b) Regional Cooperation: This scenario is only possible if India-Pakistan resolve their disputes and encourage the development of South Asian Regional Cooperation. Rapid strides in this pursuit could also induce the states of the region to opt for a collective security

system of their own. For obvious reasons, such an eventuality would imply the acceptance of pre-eminence of Indian economic and military strength. The security arrangements could be envisaged on the lines of NATO or Warsaw Pact. Dependence upon foreign sources of weapon supplies could be progressively limited through consensus. Self sufficiency could be attained in the field of nuclear technology by mutual cooperation.

A CLEAR WINNER

In such a system India would be a clear winner mainly because of its size, population, advancements in intermediate technology, military strength etc. Although India would enjoy the commanding position but the other smaller members would also have the veto power that could be exercised if the need arose. The investiture of veto power for all the member states, would theoretically treat smaller powers at par with their larger neighbours and thus remove all types of apprehensions and promote cooperation. In all probability smaller partners would be looking towards their larger partners for assistance and guidance.

c) Soviet Dominated Region: Basically this means two situations; one in which the Pakistanis accept Soviets position in the area almost in the same way as the Indians have done so. The Soviets would then emerge as a balance between India and Pakistan. However, this could disappoint the Indians who have frequently asserted their designs for extra regional role and would not hesitate to switch over to the west or the Chinese. The second situation would be the one in which the Soviets accept the Indian domination of the region and try to increase their influence and hold through India over the other regional states. India, of course, would be more inclined to such an eventuality. But there is an inherent danger in such a situation that once India has subdued its regional neighbours, it could go its own way and pursue its visualised grandeur goals. This means that such an arrangement is not very suitable for the Soviet designs. If ever a Soviet dominated region emerges, it would not only have a Finlandised Pakistan but would also have a contained India. Only then the region would be truly dominated by the Soviets. If Pakistan comes under the Soviet influence,

then the Soviets would not just be satisfied with a friendly India but would work enthusiastically for a contained India as India is a much attractive prize than Pakistan. In addition they know that without a contained India, the region would never be fully dominated by the Soviets.

d) Indian Dominated Region: This implies that all the states in the region accept India's domination. India would love this but she has not, so far, really constructively worked for it. It has tried to intimidate and induce its neighbours through coercion and physical violence. Its leaders have not yet shown the vision and magnanimity that could help India substantively in attaining this coveted status. Employment of physical violence instead of persuasion have in fact pushed the other states in the region to call the extra regional powers to redress the balance. Many opportunities were missed by India to demonstrate its magnanimity that could inculcate confidence among the other countries of the region.

Persuasion, negotiation and magnanimity are the keys to India-dominated region. However, one cannot just rule out the continued pursuit of frequently opted Indian route through military strength and diplomatic exploitation of situations that are part and parcel of the dynamic nature of international relations. But this route would be resolutely resisted by the other regional countries with whatever power they could muster.

Among the above mentioned scenarios, the most likely are the first two. But the best of them is the regional cooperation. To attain that, both India and Pakistan need to resolve their disputes through negotiations, avoidance of external diversions for seeking respite from internal troubles, encourage contact between the people, curb propaganda, promote joint ventures, harmonize policies on international issues in accordance with NAM doctrines, develop their own regional doctrines which secures the smaller countries interests but does not damage the eminence of the larger countries, gradually decrease arms dependence upon the outsiders and develop regional industries etc. In short, provide incentives for all the states to opt for regional collective cooperative efforts with a view to make the region safe and improve the quality of life for the people of South Asia.

SIGNING DEFENSE PACTS FOR SECURITY OPPOSED

GF110913 Karachi MASHRIQ in Urdu 2 Oct 84 p 3

[Editorial: "This Is Not Sound Advice"]

[Text] In an interview, Major General (retired) Omrao Khan has said that in view of the dangers confronting Pakistan from the east and the northwest, Pakistan should sign defense pacts with the United States and the People's Republic of China. He said that Pakistan needs such friends who could fight Pakistan's battles and come to its aid when in need. For this purpose there should be no qualms even if we have to give them military bases.

We think that this view is a result of unnecessary worry about the present situation facing Pakistan. Maj Gen (retired) Omrao Khan expressed his concern in these words. He said that although President General Ziaul Haq, to bolster the national morale, has often said that there was nothing to worry about, I think the situation is very dangerous and we hope we are not caught unprepared in some misfortune.

We think that justifiable concern for the situation on the east and northwest frontiers could not be objected to, but we should not become so scared that we should forget our nonaligned status in world politics and start looking for such allies who could fight our battles. In the present-day world nobody fights battles for others, nor should one depend on others for one's security. Pakistan in the past signed defense pacts with the United States but these pacts could not save us from the pain of the secession of east Pakistan. Therefore, one cannot safeguard its security merely by signing defense pacts with some superpower and by giving it military bases.

As far as the danger on the east and northwest frontier is concerned there is no justification for closing our eyes to it or becoming more frightened than necessary. President Gen Ziaul Haq has said several times that the government was not unaware of the situation on our borders, but that there was no justification for raising a hue and cry that war was imminent. We know that the situation on our borders is certainly tense. And we know that we should do all we can to safeguard the security of our nation. But at the same time we should not become unnecessarily

alarmed or take a hasty wrong step. Even in this tense situation Pakistan has left no stone unturned in carrying out the policy of peaceful coexistence with India. It would also be in the interest of India if peace remains in the subcontinent.

The Karmal regime has gotten into the habit of violating our northwestern borders in order to put pressure on us. However, Pakistan has never given in to any such pressure. Pakistan has the support of the entire world regarding Afghanistan. Pakistan is trying its best to seek a peaceful solution to the Afghanistan problem. Pakistan is quite sincere and steadfast in this search. It is only on this account that neither the Karmal regime nor the Soviet Union has tried to wriggle out of the indirect talks. Pakistan wants peace; it harbors no hostility toward the Soviet Union, nor does it want any confrontation with this power. However, signing a defense pact with the United States at this stage would mean inviting confrontation with the Soviet Union.

We think that the best guarantee for Pakistan's security is its nonaligned status. It has based its international relations on the principle of nonalignment. In this respect it has the support of world opinion. The new framework of relations which Pakistan has set up with the United States on the principles of nonalignment enables the United States to take a deep interest in the security of Pakistan. As far as the People's Republic of China is concerned it is such a sincere friend that it does not believe in the formalities of a defense pact, nor is there any necessity for it. China is a friend of Pakistan on the basis of its principles and it will stand by Pakistan as it has done in the past. Pakistan has also played an important role in uniting the Muslim world on the basis of nonalignment and every Muslim country acknowledges this. The entire Muslim world is interested in the security and stability of Pakistan.

This analysis is meant to clarify that the biggest source of strength which Pakistan has in global and regional disputes is its fair and nonaligned status. In view of the extraordinary respect and prestige that Pakistan wields in the brotherhood of nations owing to its principled stance, there is no reason to think that Pakistan is friendless these days or that any power would be foolish enough to invade it. On the other hand, if, for the sake of a confrontation with the Soviet Union, Pakistan joins with the United States in a defense pact or gives it military bases on Pakistan territory, then not only its principled stance will change on the question of Afghanistan, but it will be crushed between the forces of opposition between the two big powers.

In any case the situation on our borders requires that we should take all necessary steps for our national security. In this respect our national unity will be the strongest weapon to meet any eventuality. We should, as a united nation, maintain our readiness to meet any danger, and instead of depending on others for our own security, we should depend on our own united strength. We are honest and sincere in dealing with our neighbors. It is righteousness and honesty which pays off in the end.

BRIEFS

WOMAN APPOINTED SHARIAT COURT CONSULTANT--LAHORE, Sept 27--Mrs Asma Jahangir, daughter of the late Malik Ghulam Jilani, has consented to her proposed appointment as jurisconsult to Shariat Bench of the Supreme Court. The Registrar of the Supreme Court, Mr M. A. Latif, had issued a letter offering the assignment to Mrs Asma Jahangir. According to rules, terms and conditions governing the jurisconsults of the Shariat Appellate Bench, Supreme Court of Pakistan, the Bench may direct or issue notice, in any case, to them to appear before the Bench and to give it such assistance as it may consider necessary. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 28 Sep 84 p 2]

LAWYERS DECLINE COURT ORDER--LAHORE, Sept 27--Six lawyers have declined to appear on behalf of the 56 accused who are now being tried by a special military court at Kot Lakhpat Jail. In their joint reply to the offer made by the military court to defend the accused at State expense, they expressed their inability to participate in the court proceedings in their professional capacity. The lawyers are: Chaudhry Khalid Mehmood, Mr Abid Hassan Minto, Mr Aitzaz Ahsan, Syed Afzal Haider, Malik Saeed Hassan and Raja Mehmood Akhtar. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 28 Sep 84 p 2]

STUDENT UNIONS: BAN PROTESTED--PESHAWAR, Sept 27--The Provincial Chief of defunct IJT, Mr Fakhr-ul-Islam, had demanded immediate removal of "undesirable" ban on students unions, withdrawal of "false and fabricated cases" against students and also of rustication orders against students of different institutions including the Ayub Medical College, Abbottabad. Addressing a Press conference in Peshawar on Wednesday Mr Fakhr-ul-Islam said that the IJT had not ended its agitation against ban on students unions and warned it could be launched with fresh vigour again. The current lull, he said, should not be seen in any other way as a period of remission by the Government. He announced that IJT did not recognise ban on students unions in the country and therefore, they rejected all institutions whereby students were deprived of their right of franchise. He warned persons joining Government sponsored bodies in educational institutions would be dealt with severely by the students community. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 28 Sep 84 p 3]

ASGHAR KHAN TO VISIT SIND--SUKKUR, Oct 2--Air Marshal (retd) Asghar Khan is expected to reach Karachi on Oct 12 next. He is expected to visit different parts of Sind province to meet the people and exchange views with them. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 3 Oct 84 p 1]

REFUGEES MOVED TO CAMP--QUETTA, Oct 2--The first batch of 15,000 Afghan refugees shifted from Quetta in 40 trucks have reached a tentage village near Dalbandin in Chagai district, according to a report received here on Tuesday. Another batch of 35,000 Afghan refugees will be shifted in groups to the tentage villages in Baluchistan. It follows Government decision to shift Afghan refugees from urban to rural areas. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 3 Oct 84 p 8]

SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH BODY: ENQUIRY URGED--KARACHI, Oct 2--All-Pakistan Council Labour Federation has urged the Government to enquire into the affairs of the PSCIR to set its financial affairs in order to enable the scientists and the workers to work in harmony in the interest of research and development in the country. The Federation in a communication to the Ministry of Finance, has urged an inquiry into the working of the PCSIR. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 3 Oct 84 p 8]

ROMANIA TO PROVIDE LOAN--Romania has agreed in principle to provide a loan of about \$500 million to Pakistan. The arrangements for this loan were finalized during the talks between the Romanian delegation and the Bankers Equity. The Romanian delegation is led by the deputy chairman of the Romanian Foreign Trade Bank. The loan will be utilized for the purchase of machineries, equipment, and industrial goods from Romania. Besides this, the purview of this loan will be expanded at an appropriate time to provide funds for export of machineries, equipment, and industrial goods from Pakistan and Romania to Third World countries. According to the arrangements, the Romanian loan will be repayed in the form of Pakistani commodities and products. [Text] [Karachi Domestic Service in Urdu 1500 GMT 3 Oct 84]

UREA EXPORT TO CHINA--Pakistan is to export 200,000 metric tons of urea worth about \$40 million to China. An agreement in this regard was signed between the Pakistani delegation led by the Fauji Foundation managing director and the delegation of the Chinese National Chemical Import Export Corporation in Karachi. This is the biggest urea export agreement ever signed by Pakistan and the third such deal between the two countries. [Text] [Karachi Domestic Service in Urdu 0200 GMT 9 Oct 84]

CONSPIRACY SUSPECTS WITHDRAW DEFENSE--In Pakistan, 18 people standing trial in Rawalpindi by a military court have withdrawn their defense expressing their lack of confidence in the court. The defense counsel for the trial, Mr (Asif Vardaz), told reporters that the trial was being held in camera and the verdict was expected soon. Earlier, 56 defendants also abandoned their defense in a similar case in a Lahore jail. In an appeal to world public opinion, he called for humane treatment and fair trial for these unfortunate accused. [Text] [Delhi Domestic Service in English 0240 GMT 11 Oct 84]

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